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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the economic effects of occupational regulation of dietitians and 
nutritionists (DNs) and social workers (SWs).   Both occupations require a bachelor’s degree, 
employ high percentages of female, part time, and institutional workers, have strong 
occupational associations, and are subject to different types of regulation in different states.  
Models for the effect of regulation on numbers and wages of practitioners use individual-level 
data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 5% Census surveys and control for regulation via a dummy 
variable (for linear effects) or a function of years of regulation (for non-linear effects).  Models 
for the effect of regulation on quality of service use individual-level data from the 1984 through 
2013 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) surveys and measure quality of 
service in terms of health indicator variables derived from survey questions.  Empirical models 
include OLS, FE, and 2SLS models with IVs for regulation variables.  Results are found for the 
effect of any regulation, regulation that is named licensure (with or without practice restriction), 
or licensure on the number of practitioners, wages, and quality of service.  I find no evidence that 
regulation reduces the number of DN or SW practitioners, but licensure of DNs is associated 
with an increase in the number of DNs in job positions that are exempt from regulation.  Any 
regulation of DNs and regulation named licensure of SWs have small, positive, although not 
significant, impacts on wages.  I find positive elasticities of wages with respect to years of 
regulation for both DNs and SWs.  I also find small improvements in the quality of service due 
to any regulation of DNs and licensure of SWs.  Results for different regulation levels are similar 
to those for licensure. 
Keywords: licensure, occupational regulation, wage impact, health outcomes, dietitian, 
nutritionist, social worker, health economics, labor economics 
JEL Classification: I, J 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Types of State Occupational Regulation 
In the U.S., occupational regulation can occur at the federal,
1
 state,
2
 or local level,
3
 but most 
occupational regulation occurs at the state level.  Thus, it is up to the state legislature to decide if 
and when to regulate an occupation and what kind of regulation to adopt.  State regulation of 
occupations generally falls into one of four types:
4
 registration, title protection, certification, and 
licensure.  These types of regulation differ by how restrictive they are for the regulated 
individual and by how much information they provide to the consumer. 
Registration is the least restrictive form of state occupational regulation.  Typically, 
registration requires an individual to file his qualifications with a state agency before practicing 
his occupation.  Although the state is aware that the individual is practicing, it has no 
responsibility for assessing or verifying the individual’s qualifications and it does not define or 
restrict the scope of the individual’s practice. The value of registration to the consumer is that it 
can help the consumer find individuals that practice a particular occupation. 
Title protection is more restrictive than registration.  Typically, title protection restricts 
the use of an occupational title to those individuals who meet certain qualifications.  The state 
                                                 
1
 An example of federal occupational regulation is the licensure of air traffic controllers and pilots by the Federal 
Aviation Administration. 
2
 Examples of state occupational regulation include licensure of doctors, teachers, and manicurists. 
3
 Local occupational regulation includes licensure of tree trimmers in Minneapolis, MN; tour guides in New 
Orleans, LA; and auctioneers in Newark, NJ.  
4
 CLEAR (the Council on Licensure, Enforcement, and Regulation) defines three categories of occupational 
regulation: licensure (right-to-practice), certification (occupational right-to-title), and registration.  These CLEAR 
categories are based on occupational titles, not on scope of practice.  As a result, the certification category can mean 
either (1) title protection with no scope of practice defined or (2) title protection with scope of practice defined.  To 
avoid ambiguity, I separate the CLEAR certification category into (1) title protection and (2) certification, where 
both title protection and certification include title protection, but certification also defines the scope of practice 
associated with the title.  Kleiner (2006b), who has published several books on occupational licensing and whom I 
frequently reference in this dissertation, uses the CLEAR definition of certification and sees three types of 
occupational regulation: registration, certification, and licensure.  However, various individual states and 
occupational associations recognize four types of occupational regulation: registration, title protection, certification, 
and licensure.   
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verifies the individual’s qualifications, but the state does not define or restrict the scope of the 
individual’s practice. For example, an individual cannot use the title “Clinical Social Worker” in 
the state of Alabama unless he or she has earned a master’s degree, passed an exam, completed 
field work, and been approved by the state board of social workers.  However, Alabama does not 
define what a “Clinical Social Worker” does, so individuals who have not been approved by the 
state board can perform the same services as “Clinical Social Workers” as long as they do not 
use the title.  The value of title protection to the consumer is that it can help the consumer 
identify individuals who have certain qualifications, but title protection does not tell the 
consumer if the titled individual is qualified to perform a specific service. 
Like title protection, certification restricts the use of an occupational title to those 
individuals who meet certain qualifications. However, certification is more restrictive than title 
protection, because certification also defines the practice associated with the title.  The state 
verifies the individual’s qualifications and defines the scope of the individual’s practice, but the 
state does not restrict that practice to those who are certified.  A financial planner in the state of 
New Jersey, for example, can become a “Certified Financial Planner” upon meeting a list of 
requirements (including minimum education and experience and passing an examination) and 
being approved by the board.  As a “Certified Financial Planner,” the individual is certified to 
perform a list of services that are enumerated in the state regulation.  Another individual who is 
not certified can perform those same services, but cannot claim the title of “Certified Financial 
Planner.”  For this reason, certification is also sometimes called voluntary licensure.  The value 
of certification to the consumer is that it can help the consumer identify individuals who are 
deemed to be qualified by the state to perform specific services. 
4 
 
Licensure is the most restrictive form of state occupational regulation.  Like certification, 
licensure includes both title protection and practice definition, but licensure also includes 
practice restriction, making practice in a licensed profession illegal without a license. A state 
licensing board specifies and enforces the requirements for obtaining and renewing a license to 
practice a specific occupation in the state, and thereby exercises a degree of control over 
employment in that occupation.  Thus, a physician cannot practice medicine or claim to be a 
medical doctor in the state of Florida without a Florida state medical license.  The value of 
licensure to the consumer is that it informs the consumer that a licensed professional has met 
state licensure requirements, but, since all practitioners must be licensed, licensure does not 
assist consumers in distinguishing between practitioners of a licensed occupation. 
State legislators do not always adhere to these definitions of the types of state 
occupational regulations.  In particular, the name of a state regulation may not match the detailed 
provisions of the regulation.  I have found examples where the name is more restrictive than the 
regulation and examples where the regulation is more restrictive than the name.  For example, 
the state of Oklahoma has a law that licenses Dietitians and Nutritionists, but the provisions of 
the law do not restrict practice to licensees, so the law is actually certification instead of 
licensure.  Similarly, the state of Nebraska has a law that certifies Social Workers, but the 
provisions of the law include practice restriction, so the law is actually licensure instead of 
certification.  There are also cases where a state regulates an occupation, but does not name the 
regulation as any of the types defined here.  South Dakota, which licenses Social Workers, is an 
example of this.  Therefore, to be sure about what type of occupational regulation is imposed by 
a state, it is necessary to read the text of the actual regulation for a particular occupation.  
Confusion about the meaning of the terms registration, title protection, certification, and 
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licensure and inconsistencies between regulation names and regulation provisions can obscure 
the signaling value of occupational regulation for the consumer. 
1.2 The Economics of Occupational Licensure 
Of the four types of state regulation of occupations, only licensure (with its practice restriction) 
controls entry into an occupation.  The state licensing board exercises this control by setting the 
minimum requirements for obtaining or renewing a license and by specifying a code of conduct 
for licensees with consequences for violations.  Licensure statutes typically specify minimum 
levels of education or training, numbers of practice hours, required examinations, continuing 
education requirements, and licensure fees.  The board can control available openings for 
education, training, and practice; the frequency and pass rate of examinations; and the size of 
licensure fees to limit the number of practitioners entering a licensed occupation.  The board can 
also control the strictness and level of enforcement of the code of conduct, the availability and 
difficulty of continuing education courses, and the size of licensure renewal fees to manage the 
number of practitioners who maintain licensure. 
When licensure reduces the number of practitioners in an occupation, the result is 
generally an increase in wages for practitioners and an increase in the price of services for 
consumers.  Individuals who seek to enter a licensed occupation invest time, effort, and money to 
comply with the licensure requirements and expect to realize a return on their investment in 
human capital in the form of higher wages and job security.
5
  Consumers expect higher quality 
service from licensees due to the minimum competency demonstrated by compliance with 
licensure requirements.  The result is higher prices for consumers who are able and willing to 
pay, but no services for consumers who either cannot or will not pay the premium due to 
                                                 
5
 Since licensure includes practice restriction, licensees do not have to compete with low-quality substitutes for their 
services (Akerlof 1970; Shapiro 1986).  
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licensure.  Access to services may also be reduced due to the reduction in the number of 
practitioners. 
From a public policy perspective, occupational licensure improves the quality of service 
provided to consumers, reduces the availability of lower-quality substitutes, and minimizes 
consumer uncertainty about the quality of service.  This uncertainty is due to asymmetric 
information, where the consumer knows less about the factors that may affect the purchase of a 
service than the practitioner does.  This is particularly true of occupations that make use of 
advanced technology or medical science (Kleiner 2006b).  Licensure addresses market failures 
due to asymmetric information and minimizes consumer uncertainty about the quality of service, 
which helps to alleviate the level of risk perceived by the consumer and increases the consumer’s 
demand for the service (Arrow 1971).       
When licensure is first introduced, it raises entry costs for the occupation, since 
applicants for licensure have to meet the licensure requirements and pay licensure fees.  This 
increase in entry costs causes the short-run supply of labor to decrease as the market waits for 
new practitioners to become licensed.  Practitioners in the occupation before licensure is passed 
can enjoy higher wages during the early years following licensure.  In the long-run, the higher 
wages associated with licensure attract additional entrants into the occupation, new entrants 
become licensed, and the market moves long-run wages back down, in the absence of any action 
by the licensing board (Maurizi 1974).  However, the price paid by consumers for the services of 
a licensed practitioner is likely to be higher than the price paid prior to licensure in both the 
short-run and the long-run.   
Licensure is a barrier to entry that can control the quality of practitioners entering an 
occupation.  Barriers to entry are artificial limits to an occupation’s labor supply that can force 
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wages in that occupation to increase, resulting in a potential increase in the price of service 
provided.  For many occupations, licensure requirements include an examination that individuals 
must pass before applying for a license.  State licensing boards can set the pass rate for the exam 
based on the current excess demand or supply in the labor market.  If the board wants to match 
the supply of practitioners to the demand for services in the short term, the board may respond to 
excess supply by lowering pass rates and to excess demand by raising pass rates (Maurizi 1974).  
However, most members of state licensing boards are practitioners of the occupation it licenses, 
so the board may respond to excess demand by lowering the pass rate on the licensure 
examination to slow the flow of new licensees into the occupation and help to maintain higher 
wages for licensees.   
Since licensure can restrict entry into a licensed occupation, it can cause an oversupply of 
labor in other related, unlicensed occupations that may have comparable education and aptitude 
requirements (Filer, Hamermesh, and Rees 1996).  Consider the case of doctors who are licensed 
in every state and research biologists who are not licensed.  If the state licensing board chooses 
to restrict entry into the medical profession, the supply of doctors decreases.  If an individual can 
only be a doctor or a research biologist, medical school graduates who cannot enter the market 
for doctors instead choose to enter the market for research biologists, creating an oversupply of 
research biologists in that market.  The increase in the number of research biologists equals the 
decrease in the number of doctors, and the increase in doctors’ real wages equals the decrease in 
research biologists’ real wages.  However, the labor and wage effects for research biologists of a 
decrease in the labor supply for doctors are likely to be smaller than suggested in this simple 
example, since individuals who are excluded from being doctors can actually choose to be 
something other than research biologists.  
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Practitioners of a licensed occupation may experience gains due to the higher wages and 
improved job security resulting from licensure restricting entry into the occupation.  However, 
society can experience losses due to the reduction in the number of practitioners of an occupation 
and higher prices paid for services provided by licensees.  Overall, there is a reallocation of 
income from consumers to practitioners.  This welfare loss is due to lost employment in the 
occupation and loss of service output to society (Kleiner 2006b).  Using economic data from 
2000,
6
 Kleiner estimates that the reallocation of earnings from consumers to licensed 
practitioners is between $116 billion and $139 billion per year, while the dead-weight loss to 
society due to licensure is between $34.8 and $41.7 billion per year.   
State occupational licensure regulations typically include grandfather clauses that exempt 
current practicing members of an occupation from new licensure regulations.  These grandfather 
clauses play an important role in securing support for licensure from current workers in an 
occupation.  When an occupation is licensed for the first time, a grandfather clause automatically 
qualifies current practicing members of the occupation for a license.  When existing licensure 
requirements are made stricter, a grandfather clause allows current licensees to retain their 
licenses without having to meet the stricter requirements.   
Initially, the increases in wages of practitioners due to licensure may be limited by a 
grandfather clause.  Current workers are not forced out of the occupation by licensure, so the 
licensing board cannot easily restrict the number of practitioners.  However, as current workers 
leave the occupation due to normal attrition, licensure can limit the number of new licensees 
                                                 
6
 Assumptions of this analysis include: Individuals in licensed occupations earn about 10-12% more than their 
unlicensed counterparts and licensed occupations make up 20% of the total workforce (in 2000), so licensing 
increases overall consumer costs by 2-2.4% relative to a labor market without licensure.  Total wage income in the 
U.S. is $5.8 trillion in 2000 and elasticity of labor demand is -0.3 (Hamermesh 1993). 
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entering the occupation to replace them.  When the replacement rate is less than the rate of 
attrition, the number of workers in the occupation shrinks (Dorsey 1980).  
Since occupational licensure is generally a state regulation, an individual who is licensed 
to practice an occupation in one state cannot practice that same occupation in another state 
without first obtaining a license.  Some licensure regulations also include state residency 
requirements that stipulate either how long an individual has to reside in a state before applying 
for a license in that state or that an individual has to reside in a state to practice in that state.  
When licensure restricts “occupational migration” between states, it acts as a barrier to mobility 
that causes a misallocation of labor resources across states. 
Often, licensure statutes include reciprocity agreements that allow an individual that is 
licensed in one state to either practice in another state using his current license or easily obtain a 
license in another state without having to meet new licensure requirements.  Reciprocity 
agreements remove the barriers to mobility.  However, willingness to incorporate reciprocity 
agreements in licensure regulations varies across occupations.  Typically, licensed dentists can 
move easily from state to state, but public school teachers have limited mobility due to the 
efforts of strong unions (Kleiner 2006b). 
In nonprofessional occupations (i.e., those that do not require a college education), 
licensing examinations generally include both a written test and a practical test.  An applicant for 
licensure who fails either part of the exam is excluded from working in the licensed occupation.  
This is true even though performance on a written licensure examination has not been shown to 
predict an individual’s ability to perform the tasks associated with the licensed occupation 
(Kleiner 2006b).  Dorsey (1980) found that less educated applicants, blacks, and those choosing 
apprenticeship, rather than formal classroom training in a trade school, are more likely to fail the 
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written examination than are better educated applicants, whites, and those choosing to attend 
trade school.  This may occur because some applicants for licensure are at a disadvantage in 
taking written examinations, even if they perform well on the practical examination and can 
adequately perform the tasks related to the occupation.  Thus, occupational licensure can restrict 
the labor market opportunities of groups of workers whose alternatives are already limited, 
resulting in distributional effects due to licensure, in addition to price and output effects.  In 
addition, when an occupation is newly licensed by the state, if the provisions of the regulation do 
not include a grandfather clause that automatically qualifies current workers for licenses, some 
current workers will fail to obtain a license.  This creates a second group of excluded workers.  
1.3   Literature Review – Number, Wage, and Quality Impacts of Licensure  
1.3.1 Impact of Licensure on the Number of Practitioners in an Occupation 
Economic theory predicts a reduction in the number of practitioners due to licensure.  However, 
there are mixed results in the literature as to whether licensing actually does reduce the number 
of practitioners.  Carroll and Gaston (1981) studied electricians, dentists, plumbers, real estate 
agents, optometrists, sanitarians, and veterinarians and found that licensing lowers the total stock 
of practitioners.  However, Thornton and Weintraub (1979) found little evidence that stricter 
licensing requirements had an impact on the state’s number of barbers, and White (1980) found 
that licensing had no impact on employment levels for nurses. 
There is empirical evidence that state licensing boards can affect the number of 
practitioners in a licensed occupation by manipulating the pass rate on licensing exams.  Kleiner 
and Kudrle (2000), for example, estimated that a ten percent decrease in a state dentistry 
licensing exam’s pass rate reduced the number of dentists per capita in the state by two percent.  
Jackson (2006) and Carpenter and Stephenson (2006) found similar results for CPAs.  Maurizi 
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(1974) modeled the short term behavior of licensing boards in setting examination pass rates as a 
function of excess demand and mean income of practitioners in a licensed occupation.  Using 
data for a limited number of licensed occupations in 1940 and 1950, he found that a ten percent 
increase in excess demand for workers resulted in a one to ten percent decrease in the pass rate, 
depending on the licensed occupation.  He also found that a ten percent increase in average 
practitioner income was associated with up to a ten percent decrease in pass rate.   
1.3.2 Impact of Licensure on the Wages of Practitioners in an Occupation 
Empirical evidence of a wage premium due to occupational licensure is mixed.  Using data from 
a specially designed 2006 Gallup survey resulting in approximately 2,000 observations of 
individuals working in various occupations, Kleiner and Krueger (2010) found that, if a licensure 
dummy is added to a standard wage equation, having a license is associated with an average 
wage premium on hourly earnings of 15 percent.  Kleiner (2006b) analyzed the impact of 
licensure on wages in regulated occupations relative to similar unregulated occupations.  He 
looked at a sample of 36 occupations using Census data from 1990 and 2000 and found an 
average wage premium due to licensure of 12 percent for fully licensed occupations
7
 and four 
percent for partially licensed occupations,
8
 possibly due to spillover of higher wages from 
regulated states to unregulated ones.  For regulated occupations, the highest-wage occupations 
and those with the highest education requirements tend to show the largest wage growth (percent 
growth) during the 1990s, while lower-wage occupations and those with lower education 
requirements tend to show smaller wage growth than national averages across all occupations 
(Kleiner 2006b).  Increases in wages due to licensure may also depend on whether licensees in 
the occupation work in the quasi-private sector where wages are determined on an individual 
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 Fully licensed occupations are occupations that are licensed in all states in the U.S. 
8
 Partially licensed occupations are occupations that are licensed in some, but not all states in the U.S. 
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basis (e.g., physicians, dentists, lawyers) or primarily for large institutions like hospitals and 
school boards where wages may be determined by collective bargaining under institutional 
pressure to control costs (e.g., nurses and teachers).   
A number of empirical studies focus on the effect of occupational licensure on specific 
occupations.  For selected occupations requiring post-graduate education and with employment 
in the quasi-private sector, several studies find empirical evidence that licensure may have a 
positive wage premium.  Licensure was found to increase wages from 1 to 340 percent, 
depending on the occupation.  These studies include Shephard (1978), Kleiner (2000), and 
Kleiner and Kudrle (2000), who studied dentists; Kleiner (2000) and Tenn (2001), who studied 
lawyers; Kugler and Sauer (2005), who studied physicians in Israel; and Benham and Benman 
(1975) and Feldman and Begun (1985), who studied optometrists.
9
  However, empirical evidence 
of the impact of licensure on wages is mixed for occupations with lower education requirements 
or with institutional employment.  Some studies did not find a wage premium due to licensure 
for those occupations.  White (1978) found that licensure did not increase wages of clinical lab 
personnel except in states that made a college degree a licensure requirement.  White (1980) also 
found that licensure was not associated with a wage premium for registered nurses in 1960 and 
1970, despite earlier estimates of a wage premium due to licensure in 1950.
10
  Kleiner and Petree 
(1988) found that licensure has no impact on wages of public school teachers.  Kleiner (2000) 
found that licensure of barbers and cosmetologists did not increase their wages relative to 
unlicensed occupations with similar training requirements.  Other studies did find a wage 
premium due to licensure.  Timmons and Thornton (2007) found that, after controlling for place 
of work and job specialization, licensure of radiologic technologists increased average wages by 
                                                 
9
 To the extent that dentists, lawyers, physicians and optometrists are in private practice, they have some latitude in 
setting their fees, subject to the demand for their services.  Fee setting may impact wages for these professionals. 
10
 White (1980) used state-level wage data for registered nurses from the 1950, 1960, and 1970 U.S. Census. 
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about three percent; and Timmons and Thornton (2010) found that some licensure provisions 
increased barber earnings by as much as 26 percent. 
1.3.3 Impact of Licensure on the Quality of Service by Practitioners  
To the extent that licensure results in a reallocation of income from consumers to licensed 
practitioners, consumers should expect that licensure increases the quality of service provided.  
However, empirical studies of the quality effects of occupational licensure yield mixed results.  
Shapiro (1986) found that licensing is a means of solving the principal-agent problem.  In 
general, practitioners do not have a strong incentive to acquire the level of human capital 
necessary to provide good service to their clients.  By setting competency requirements that 
practitioners have to meet to acquire a license, licensing provides a means of aligning the 
interests of the practitioners with those of the principals (consumers).  Shapiro found that 
licensing improves the quality of service delivered to consumers, but his model suggests that 
licensing generally decreases consumer welfare.  Overall, the costs associated with licensure 
(higher prices) appear to exceed the benefits of licensure (higher quality of service).   
Leland (1979) modeled the demand for used automobiles (the lemons problem) and 
determined that the quality of service delivered to the consumer in a market with asymmetrical 
information does not maximize social welfare.  Instead, quality standards are generally set above 
the social welfare maximizing level.  Although minimum quality standards may initially increase 
quality of service, Ryoo (1996) found that, in the long run, minimum quality standards provide a 
ceiling on the quality of services delivered to consumers. 
Most empirical studies have generally failed to find evidence of improvements in quality 
of service provided to the consumer due to licensure.  Maurizi (1980) found evidence that 
licensing of contractors in California between 1954 and 1975 increased the frequency of 
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complaints of poor service.  Maurizi suggests that licensing resulted in the introduction of 
licensing exam schools and as a result, contractors with little experience could learn how to pass 
the exam without necessarily learning the skills of the trade.  Carroll and Gaston (1981) studied 
seven different licensed occupations and found either a negative impact or no impact on the 
quality of services received by consumers.  A number of studies of public school teaching quality 
((Kleiner and Petree 1988), (Angrist and Guryan 2003), (Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2005), and 
(Kane and Staiger 2005)) found no improvement in teaching quality due to licensure.  Cordes 
(2005) used insurance malpractice premiums as a measure of the quality of counselor
11
 services 
and found no evidence that licensure reduces the risk of a high insurance payout.  In the case of 
dentists, Holen (1978) found that licensing reduces the likelihood of unsatisfactory outcomes and 
increases the quality of care, while Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) found that tougher licensing 
statutes have no effect on overall quality, but higher-income groups benefit from tougher 
standards.  Taken together, the lack of significant empirical evidence of quality improvement due 
to licensure weakens any public policy argument for occupational licensure that argues that the 
most important justification for occupational licensure is that it improves the quality of service 
rendered to consumers.  
1.4  Occupations Selected for Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis chapters of my dissertation focus on estimating the economic effects of 
occupational licensure on two occupations: (1) dietitians and nutritionists and (2) social workers.  
I selected these occupations because they have not been extensively studied in the literature, they 
are recognized by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
12
 and the U.S. Census,
13
 and they share a 
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 Counselors include pastoral counselors, marriage and family therapists, and professional counselors. 
12
 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics identifies Dietitians and Nutritionists as Occupation 29-1031 
(http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes291031.htm); while Social Workers include Child, Family, and School Social 
Workers  - Occupation 21-1021 (http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes211021.htm), Healthcare Social Workers – 
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number of similarities.  First, both occupations have a strong national association that advocates 
for the profession and sets the standards for licensure examinations at the national level,
14
 even 
though actual regulation is controlled by the individual states.  Second, both occupations fall 
under the broad category of health and social services occupations, which is an area where much 
of occupational regulation activity is focused.  Third, both occupations experienced new 
regulation by a number of states during the period from 1980 to 2000.  Fourth, both occupations 
set a minimum education level of a bachelor’s degree for licensure.  Fifth, both occupations have 
a high percentage of female practitioners (approximately 93 percent of dietitians and nutritionists 
and 70 percent of social workers are female).  And, finally, members of both occupations work 
in a wide range of industries and perform a number of different kinds of work that may affect 
wages, independent of state regulation effects. 
1.4.1 Dietitians and Nutritionists 
1.4.1.1 Overview of the Profession  
Dietitians and nutritionists (DNs) are experts in food and nutrition who promote healthy eating 
habits and treat illnesses by recommending dietary modifications (Dietitians and Nutritionists 
2014/15).  Within the field of dietetics and nutrition, there are a number of specialties.  Clinical 
dietitians provide nutritional services to patients in hospitals, nursing care facilities, and other 
institutions and may specialize in weight management or the care of renal (kidney), diabetic, or 
critically ill patients.  Community dietitians work in places such as public health clinics, home 
health agencies, and health maintenance organizations, where they counsel individuals and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Occupation 21-1022 (http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes211022.htm), Mental Health and Substance Abuse Social 
Workers – Occupation 21-1023 (http://www.bls.gov/soc/2000/soc_f1c3.htm), and All Other Social Workers – 
Occupation 21-1029 (http://www.bls.gov/soc/2000/soc_f1c9.htm). 
13
 The U.S. Census identifies Dietitians and Nutritionists as Occupation Code 097 and Social Workers as 
Occupation Code 174 (http://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/OCC1990/#codes_section). 
14
 The Commission on Dietetic Registration (formerly the American Dietetic Association) is the national association 
for Dietitians and the Association of Social Work Boards is the national association for Social Workers. 
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groups on nutritional practices designed to prevent disease and promote health.  Management 
dietitians oversee large-scale meal planning and preparation in health care facilities, company 
cafeterias, prisons, and schools.  Consultant dietitians work under contract with health care 
facilities or in their own private practice.  They perform nutrition screenings for their clients and 
offer advice on diet-related concerns such as weight loss and cholesterol reduction. 
All but a few states regulate DNs.
15
  Regulation requirements vary somewhat across 
states, but all statutes require earning a minimum of a bachelor’s degree, completion of 
supervised practice, passing an examination, and payment of a fee.  Most DNs have a bachelor’s 
degree in dietetics, clinical nutrition, foods and nutrition, or food service systems management.  
These degree programs typically include courses in nutrition, psychology, chemistry, and 
biology.   
DNs frequently choose to earn the Registered Dietitian Nutritionist (RDN) credential, 
which is administered by the Commission on Dietetic Registration (CDR), the credentialing 
agency for the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics.  The RDN is a national credential, distinct 
from any state regulation of DNs.  However, many employers of DNs require the RDN and the 
qualifications for the RDN are typically copied by the states when crafting the statutes for state 
regulation of DNs.  To earn the RDN, the CDR requires DNs to complete a minimum of a 
bachelor’s degree and a dietetic internship program,16 pass an examination that is administered at 
the national level, and pay an application fee.  In order to maintain the RDN credential, RDNs 
must complete continuing professional education requirements and pay yearly fees.  DNs may 
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 The source is the Commission on Dietetic Registration (http://www.cdrnet.org). 
16
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also seek additional certifications in a variety of specialties such as pediatric nutrition, renal 
nutrition, gerontology nutrition, oncology nutrition, and sports dietetics. 
There is sometimes confusion about the meaning of the two titles: dietitian and 
nutritionist.  Experts in the fields of dietetics and nutrition do recognize a distinction (Lehman 
2015).  A dietitian is generally recognized as one who has met the RDN requirements and 
maintains registration by complying with registration renewal requirements.  A nutritionist, on 
the other hand, is someone who has studied nutrition, but is typically not required to obtain a 
specific degree or meet other requirements.  Instead, a nutritionist’s expertise may come from 
personal experience in the area of health and nutrition and may incorporate alternative 
approaches as components of nutritional counseling.  Thus, dietitians are nutritionists, but 
nutritionists may or may not be dietitians.  However, it is not true that nutritionists are 
necessarily less credentialed than dietitians, since nutritionists with graduate degrees in nutrition 
or related fields can be granted protected titles (such as Certified Nutrition Specialist (C.N.S) or 
Certified Clinical Nutritionist (C.C.N.)) by certification boards (Lehman 2015).  
 While the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines dietitians and nutritionists as a single 
occupation, until recently nutritionists have not been widely recognized by government agencies 
or professional organizations.  In 1980 and 1990, the U.S. Census included dietitians as an 
occupational choice, but not nutritionists.  The latter were not included as a recognized 
occupation by the Census until 2000, when the two titles were combined into a single 
occupation.  The American Dietetic Association (ADA), the nation’s largest organization of food 
and nutrition professionals, officially changed its name to the Academy of Nutrition and 
Dietetics in 2012, after nearly 100 years as the ADA.
17
  Prior to the name change, the ADA dealt 
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with the education of dietitians, the requirements for becoming a registered dietitian, and the 
promotion of licensure of dietitians, but did not define the title nutritionist.   
State statutes for regulation of dietitians and nutritionists typically either mention just 
dietitians or use the terms dietitian and nutritionist interchangeably.  There are a few cases where 
the titles of state statutes mention only nutritionists, but the actual statutes map the term 
nutritionist back to the term dietitian.  For example, Montana and Nebraska issue licenses for 
nutritionists and not dietitians, but the wording of the statutes equates nutritionists with 
dietitians, since an individual must first become a registered dietitian before applying for a 
nutritionist license.  There are also cases where statutes recognize advanced degrees in nutrition 
with special regulations.  Kentucky and Mississippi license dietitians at the bachelor’s degree 
level and then provide certification or title protection for nutritionists who are licensed dietitians 
and also earn advanced degrees in nutrition.  However, at the bachelor’s level, state regulations 
apply either just to dietitians or to both dietitians and nutritionists.  Thus, it is not possible to 
distinguish between state statutes for dietitians and nutritionists. 
In this dissertation, I follow the precedent set by the BLS and the U.S. Census and I treat 
dietitians and nutritionists (DNs) as a single occupation.  To address any resulting ambiguity, I 
limit any datasets for empirical analysis to the population of DNs who have obtained at least a 
bachelor’s degree.  This is the minimum education level for RDNs and the minimum education 
level for all types of state regulation of DNs.  In this manner, I can eliminate any individuals who 
did not complete a college degree (such as self-taught nutritionists) and I can control for any 
advanced graduate degrees earned by DNs that might equate to special certifications.  I can also 
use state statute data for regulation of dietitians and apply it equally to both dietitians and 
nutritionists. 
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1.4.1.2 State Regulation of Dietitians and Nutritionists at the Bachelor’s Level  
Licensure of DNs began in Puerto Rico in 1974 (Skipper 2008).  Nearly a decade later, 
regulation of DNs followed in the United States with title protection for DNs in California and 
Montana in 1983.  The first states to license DNs were Iowa and North Dakota in 1986.  As of 
2000, 41 states and the District of Columbia regulated DNs.  An additional six states passed 
occupational regulation for DNs between 2001 and 2012.  Only Arizona, Colorado, and New 
Jersey still have no statutory regulation of DNs.
18
  In New Jersey, bills to license DNs failed to 
pass in 1997 and 2008.
19
   
An examination of state regulation of DNs must recognize the influence of the 
Commission on Dietetic Registration (CDR) (formerly the American Dietetic Association 
(ADA)).
20
  As a national organization, the CDR/ADA has no authority to impose statutory 
regulation of DNs at the state level.  However, the CDR/ADA has influenced state regulation of 
DNs in at least three important ways.  First, the CDR/ADA actively promotes state licensure of 
DNs
21
 and maintains a government relations team with a contact for states that want to pursue 
licensure.  Second, the CDR/ADA defines uniform, national RDN credentials that, almost 
without exception, have been adopted as the basis for regulation requirements by states that have 
chosen to regulate DNs.  Third, the CDR/ADA promotes and monitors quality in the dietetics 
profession and provides quality resources for RDNs, including: medical nutrition therapy guides 
for practice, an evidence analysis library, standards of practice in nutrition care, standards of 
professional performance, and a code of ethics (Hager 2005).  
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Data on state regulation of DNs is available through the CDR, which provides a list of 
laws that regulate DNs and links to the state licensure agencies and applicable statutes.
22
  These 
statutes include information about the dates that regulations were enacted and became effective, 
the types of regulation, and the detailed regulation requirements.  For each state, Table 1.1 
summarizes the type of regulation of DNs, the year the regulation became effective, and any 
exemptions to the regulation.   
For occupational regulation of DNs in the United States, there are examples of title 
protection, certification, and licensure, but no examples of registration.  Thus, in practice, DNs 
have only three types of regulation.  However, the name of the state statute frequently does not 
match the actual type of regulation spelled out in the statute. So, by name, DNs have all four 
types of occupational regulation.  Examples of how the statute name differs from the type of 
statute include: California and Maine, where statutes that are named registration are actually title 
protection and certification, respectively; ten states that have statutes that are named licensure, 
but are actually certification because the statutes do not include practice restriction;
23
 and 
Alabama and Montana, which do not use a statute name that implies any specific type of 
regulation.  The regulation type in Table 1.1 is the actual type of regulation of DNs, even if it 
differs from the name of the statute.  
State regulation of DNs has been dynamic, with some states initially enacting less-strict 
forms of regulation and later enacting a stricter form.  This is the case for ten states,
24
 where the 
regulation of DNs was initially either title protection or certification and was later changed to 
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licensure.  States for which the type of regulation changed over time have multiple rows in Table 
1.1.  In all cases, changes in state regulation of DNs over time have made the regulations stricter.  
At one point, Georgia had certification in place when the state legislature voted to remove 
regulation of DNs, but a licensure statute was later enacted before the certification statute 
expired. 
Most states exempt DNs who work in certain industries or job positions from having to 
meet state regulations.
25
  These exemptions are listed in Table 1.1.   An exemption applies to a 
DN who practices the occupation in a work setting or economic sector that is explicitly listed as 
exempt from regulation.  For example, Minnesota has licensed DNs since 1995, but a DN can 
work in a nursing home without first obtaining and then maintaining a license to practice.  The 
most frequent exemptions from regulation for DNs are for federal employees; members of the 
armed forces; persons marketing, distributing, or preparing food or dietary supplements; and 
employees of a religious organization.  Thus, even in the case of licensure, where practice in an 
occupation is restricted to those who are licensed, the exemptions built into the licensing statute 
can weaken its effects. 
1.4.2 Social Workers  
1.4.2.1 Overview of the Profession 
Social workers (SWs) are professionals who help people cope with and solve problems in their 
everyday lives (Social Workers 2014/15).  There are different types of SWs who specialize by 
working with a particular population or in a specific setting.  Child, family, and school SWs 
assess the needs of children and their families and offer assistance to improve their situation.  
Medical and public health SWs help vulnerable populations cope with chronic, acute, or terminal 
illnesses.  Mental health and substance abuse SWs assess and treat individuals with mental 
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illness or substance abuse problems.  Other types of SWs include administrators, researchers, 
planners, and policymakers.  Of the 642,000 positions held by SWs in the U.S. in 2008, 46% 
were child, family, and school SWs; 22% were medical and public health SWs; 21% were 
mental health and substance abuse SWs; and 11% were other types of SWs. 
SWs must earn a college degree from a social work program that is accredited by the 
Council on Social Work Education.  A bachelor’s degree in social work (BSW) or a related field, 
such as psychology or sociology, is the most common minimum requirement for entry into the 
profession.
26
  Accredited programs require a minimum of 400 hours of supervised field 
experience.  Entry-level social workers are trained as generalists.  They typically deal with a 
broad range of clients, maintain a wide scope of knowledge, and practice a great diversity of 
skills.  A master’s degree in social work (MSW) is usually required for positions in health and 
school settings, for clinical work, and for supervisory, administrative, and staff training 
positions.  Master’s programs prepare graduates for work in a field of concentration and include 
a minimum of 900 hours of supervised field experience or internship.  College and university 
teaching positions and most research appointments normally require a doctorate in social work 
(DSW or Ph.D.) (Social Workers 2014/15). 
All states and the District of Columbia have enacted some regulation for the practice of 
social work and the use of related professional titles.  Because of the different education and 
experience levels required for different types of SW positions, there are three levels of state 
regulation of SWs: bachelor’s, master’s, and clinical.  Each regulation level has degree and 
examination requirements.  Regulation at the bachelor’s level generally requires the individual to 
earn a BSW degree and take the bachelor’s level exam and qualifies the individual to work as a 
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generalist.  Regulation at the master’s level requires the individual to earn a MSW degree and 
take the master’s or advanced generalist exam.  Regulation at the clinical level requires the 
individual to earn a MSW or DSW degree and take the clinical or advanced generalist exam.  
Every state that regulates SWs regulates at the clinical level and may also regulate at the 
bachelor’s and/or master’s level.  
The degree requirement is the same (MSW) for the master’s and clinical levels in all 
states that regulate either or both levels of SW practice.  Thus, it is not possible to distinguish 
between the master’s and clinical levels of regulation based on educational attainment.  
Furthermore, since every state that regulates SWs at the bachelor’s level also regulates SWs at 
the clinical level, controlling for regulation of SWs at the clinical level in my empirical models is 
not useful.  Instead, I control for regulation of SWs at the bachelor’s level and rely on control for 
graduate degrees and age (as a proxy for experience) to capture any impacts due to regulation of 
SWs at the master’s or clinical levels.  Also, since a bachelor’s degree is the minimum education 
level for entry into the SW profession and the minimum education level for all types of state 
regulation of SWs, I limit any datasets for empirical analysis to the population of SWs who have 
obtained at least a bachelor’s degree.  This allows me to focus on the economic impacts of 
licensure of SWs at the bachelor’s level and makes comparison between my empirical results for 
DNs and SWs possible. 
1.4.2.2 State Regulation of Social Workers at the Bachelor’s Level 
U.S. licensure of SWs began in Maryland in 1957.
27
  Fifteen years later, Mississippi licensed 
SWs in 1972, followed by licensure in Kansas and title protection in Kentucky in 1974.  As of 
2000, all but 18 states regulated SWs at the bachelor’s level and all states regulated SWs at the 
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clinical level.  An additional three states passed occupational regulation for SWs between 2001 
and 2005.  Of the 39 states that currently do regulate SWs at the bachelor’s level, four states 
employ title protection and 35 states employ licensure.   
The Association of Social Work Boards (ASWB) is a nonprofit association that is 
dedicated to regulation of SWs.  Its mission is “To strengthen protection of the public by 
providing support and services to the social work community to advance safe, competent and 
ethical practices.”28  While each state decides which levels of SW practice to regulate and writes 
its own statutes, the ASWB owns and maintains the SW licensing examinations that are used by 
its members.  ASWB’s members include 49 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and all ten Canadian provinces.  California is the only state that is not a member, 
because it chooses to administer its own SW licensing examinations.  The ASWB also developed 
and maintains a model practice act that offers regulatory bodies a resource for developing their 
own laws and regulations.  These model regulations define standards of minimum social work 
competence associated with the levels of practice.
29
 
Data on state regulation of SWs is available through the ASWB, which provides a list of 
laws that regulate SWs and links to the state licensure agencies and applicable statutes.  These 
statutes include information about the dates that regulations were enacted and became effective, 
the types of regulation, and the detailed regulation requirements.  For each state, Table 1.2 
summarizes the type of regulation of SWs at the bachelor’s level, the year the regulation became 
effective, and any exemptions to regulation. 
For SWs in the United States, there are examples of title protection and licensure at the 
bachelor’s level, but no cases of registration or certification.  Thus, in practice, SWs have only 
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two types of regulation.  Like regulation for DNs, the name of the state statute for SWs 
sometimes does not match the type of regulation spelled out in the statute.  So, by name, SWs 
have all four types of occupational regulation.  Examples of how the statute name differs from 
the type of statute include: Louisiana and Oregon, where statutes that are named registration are 
actually licensure and title protection, respectively; five states that have statutes that are named 
certification, but are actually licensure;
30
 three states that have statutes that are named licensure, 
but are actually title protection;
31
 and Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah, which do not use a 
statute name that implies any specific level of regulation.  The regulation type in Table 1.2 is the 
actual type of regulation of SWs, even if it differs from the name of the statute.  
Most states exempt SWs who work in certain industries or job positions from having to 
meet state regulations.  These exemptions are listed in Table 1.2.  An exemption applies to a SW 
who practices the occupation in a work setting or economic sector that is explicitly listed as 
exempt from regulation.  For example, North Dakota has licensed SWs since 1987, but a SW 
does not need a license to work for a nonprofit agency in North Dakota.  The most frequent 
exemptions from regulation for SWs are for federal employees, state employees, employees of 
elementary and secondary schools, and non-state residents.   
1.5  Outline of Dissertation 
This dissertation includes 6 chapters.  Chapter 1 defines the types of state regulation of 
occupations, discusses the economics of occupational licensure, surveys the literature dealing 
with the number, wage, and quality impacts of occupational licensure, and identifies the two 
occupations that are the focus of the empirical analysis in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.  Chapter 2 
examines why states license occupations.  Chapter 3 examines the impact of licensure of 
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dietitians and nutritionists (DNs) and of social workers (SWs) on the number of practitioners in 
those occupations.  Chapter 4 examines the impact of licensure of DNs and SWs on wages of 
practitioners.  Chapter 5 examines the impact of licensure of DNs and SWs on the quality of 
service provided by practitioners.  Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical results and discusses 
them in the context of the existing literature on the impact of occupational licensure. 
1.6 Tables 
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Table 1.1: State Regulation of Dietitians and Nutritionists at the Bachelor’s Level 
 
Table 1.1 (State Regulation of Dietitians and Nutritionists at the Bachelor’s Level ) – Page 1 of 2 
State 
Regulation 
Type 
Year 
Effective Exemptions 
Alabama 
Title 
Protection 
1984 
Person employed by licensed health care facility before May 1984. 
Licensure 1989 
Hospital employee until May 1994; member of armed forces; federal employee; 
certified teacher employed by a federal, state, county, or municipal agency or by 
an elementary /secondary school or accredited institution of higher education. 
Alaska Certification 2000 Animal nutritionist; federal employee; member of armed forces. 
Arizona None - - 
Arkansas Licensure 1989 
Member of armed forces; hospital or long term care facility employee; 
employee of a religious organization; animal nutritionist; person selling 
vitamins, health products, or food. 
California 
Title 
Protection 
1983 
None 
Colorado None - - 
Connecticut Certification 1994 Federal employee. 
Delaware 
Certification 1994 None 
Licensure 2009 Federal or state employee. 
District of 
Columbia 
Licensure 1987 
None 
Florida Licensure 1988 
Federal employee; person marketing, distributing, or preparing food or dietary 
supplements;  educator; person employed by a hospital, nursing home, assisted 
living or continuing care facility; employee of a religious organization. 
Georgia Certification 1984 None 
Licensure 1994 Member of armed forces; federal, state, or local government employee. 
Hawaii Licensure 2009 None 
Idaho Certification 1995 None 
Illinois Licensure 1992 
Federal or state employee; person selling health products; educator; 
employee of a religious organization.  
Indiana Certification 1994 None 
Iowa Licensure 1986 
Member of armed forces; educator; person selling food or dietary 
supplements. 
Kansas Licensure 1989 Employee of a religious organization. 
Kentucky 
Certification 1988 None 
Licensure 1994 
Member of armed forces; educator; federal, state, county or municipal 
employee. 
Louisiana 
Certification 1987 Member of armed forces; federal employee; educator. 
Licensure 1988 Member of armed forces; federal employee; educator. 
Maine 
Certification 1985 Educator. 
Licensure 1988 Educator; federal or state employee; person marketing or distributing food. 
Maryland 
Certification 1986 None 
Licensure 1989 Federal employee; person selling health products; food service employee. 
Massachusetts Certification 1999 
Person marketing, distributing, or preparing food or dietary supplements; 
employee of a religious organization. 
Michigan Certification 2007 Person marketing, distributing, or preparing food or dietary supplements. 
Minnesota Licensure 1995 
Animal nutritionist; state employee involved in research studies; nursing 
home or home care employee. 
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Table 1.1 (State Regulation of Dietitians and Nutritionists at the Bachelor’s Level ) – Page 2 of 2 
State 
Regulation 
Type 
Year 
Effective Exemptions 
Mississippi 
Certification 1986 None 
Licensure 1994 Member of armed forces; nutrition educator. 
Missouri Licensure 1995 State employee. 
Montana 
Title 
Protection 
1983 None 
Licensure 1987 Educator. 
Nebraska Licensure 1988 
Member of armed forces; person marketing, distributing, or 
preparing food or dietary supplements; educator; person with a 
doctoral degree;  employee of a religious organization. 
Nevada Certification 1995 None 
New 
Hampshire 
Licensure 2001 
Member of armed forces; federal or state employee working in 
public health facility. 
New Jersey None - - 
New Mexico Licensure 1990 Federal or state employee. 
New York Certification 1991 
Federal, state, or local government employee. 
 
North 
Carolina 
Licensure 1992 
Member of armed forces; state or local government employee; 
hospital or health care facility employee. 
North Dakota Licensure 1986 Member of armed forces; educator. 
Ohio Licensure 1987 Member of armed forces. 
Oklahoma Certification 1985 Federal employee. 
Oregon Licensure 1990 None 
Pennsylvania Certification 2002 None 
Rhode Island 
Certification 1991 
Federal, state, or local government employee; employee of non-
profit health agency. 
Licensure 1992 
Federal, state, or local government employee; person with doctoral 
degree. 
South 
Carolina 
Licensure 2006 
Member of armed forces; federal employee; educator; employee of a 
religious organization. 
South Dakota Licensure 1996 Member of armed forces. 
Tennessee Licensure 1987 
Member of armed forces; educator; federal, state, or local 
government employee; employee of hospital or nursing home. 
Texas Certification 1984 None 
Utah Certification 1986 None 
Vermont Certification 1995 None 
Virginia 
Title 
Protection 
1995 
None 
Washington Certification 1988 None 
West Virginia Licensure 1996 Cook in an educational institution. 
Wisconsin Certification 1994 None 
Wyoming Licensure 2012 None 
 
Data for Dietitians and Nutritionists are from the Commission of Dietetic Registration, “Laws that Regulate 
Dietitians and Nutritionists” (http://cdrnet.org/certifications/licensure/index.cfm ) accessed 05 August 2009 and 
(http://www.cdrnet.org/vault/2459/web/files/Licensurelawsregulations.pdf ) accessed 02 January 2015, with data 
verified/edited based on the actual state statutes and with exemptions derived from the actual state statutes.  Note 
that exemptions that do not apply to an individual who is a DN with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree are not 
included. Also, the language describing exemptions has been simplified in some cases to allow the information to be 
included in the table. 
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Table 1.2: State Regulation of Social Workers at the Bachelor’s Level 
 
Table 1.2 (State Regulation of Social Workers at the Bachelor’s Level ) – Page 1 of 2 
State 
Regulation 
Type 
Year 
Effective Exemptions  
Alabama 
Title 
Protection 
1978 
None 
Alaska Licensure 2001 Federal, state, or local government employee; employees of 
nonprofit agency. 
Arizona Licensure 2004 Non-state resident. 
Arkansas Licensure 1981 Hospital employee; state employee working in family service, social 
service, or adult protective service. 
California None - - 
Colorado None - - 
Connecticut None - - 
Delaware None - - 
District of 
Columbia 
Licensure 1981 
Federal employee. 
Florida None - - 
Georgia None - - 
Hawaii Licensure 1994 
Federal, state, or local government employee; college employee; 
employee of a religious organization. 
Idaho Licensure 1993 None 
Illinois None - - 
Indiana None - - 
Iowa Licensure 1985 None 
Kansas Licensure 1974 None 
Kentucky 
Title 
Protection 
1974 
State employee; school employee. 
Louisiana Licensure 2000 None 
Maine Licensure 1977 None 
Maryland Licensure 1957 Federal employee; non-state resident. 
Massachusetts Licensure 1980 State or local government employee. 
Michigan Licensure 1978 None 
Minnesota Licensure 2005 
State or local government employee; employee of a federally 
recognized tribe; employee of a private nonprofit agency. 
Mississippi Licensure 1972 Federal employee. 
Missouri Licensure 1989 State employee. 
Montana None - - 
Nebraska Licensure 1993 
Federal employee; educator; employee of a religious organization; 
addiction counselor; state employee providing rehabilitation or 
support services. 
Nevada Licensure 1999 Federal, state, or local government employee. 
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Table1.2 (State Regulation of Social Workers at the Bachelor’s Level) – Page 2 of 2 
State 
Regulation 
Type 
Year 
Effective Exemptions  
New 
Hampshire 
None - - 
New Jersey Licensure 1991 
State or local government employee; school employee; employee of 
non-profit agency.  
New Mexico Licensure 1990 None 
New York None - - 
North 
Carolina 
Licensure 1992 
None 
North Dakota Licensure 1987 Employee of nonprofit agency. 
Ohio Licensure 1984 
Elementary or secondary school employee; state government 
employee; substance abuse counselor; member of labor 
organization. 
Oklahoma Licensure 1981 
State government employee; employee of a health care facility. 
 
Oregon 
Title 
Protection 
1990 
None 
Pennsylvania 
Title 
Protection 
1990 
None 
Rhode Island None - - 
South 
Carolina 
Licensure 1976 
Hospital employee.  
South Dakota Licensure 1975 None 
Tennessee Licensure 1986 Non-state resident. 
Texas Licensure 1999 None 
Utah Licensure 1994 Federal employee; non-state resident. 
Vermont None - - 
Virginia Licensure 1979 
Federal, state, or local government employee; employee of 
nonprofit agency; private personnel manager. 
Washington None - - 
West Virginia 
Title 
Protection 
1997 
Elementary or secondary school employee. 
Wisconsin Licensure 1991 
Elementary or secondary school employee; employee of a religious 
organization.  
Wyoming Licensure 2000 
Non-state resident; employee of a religious organization; elementary 
or secondary school employee.  
 
Data for Social Workers are from the Association of Social Work Boards, “Social Work Licensing Basics” 
(http://www.aswb.org/SWL/licensingbasics.asp ) accessed 09 January 2010 and “Member Statutes and Regulations”  
(https://www.aswb.org/licensees/member-statutes-and-regulations/ ) accessed 02 January 2015, with data 
verified/edited based on the actual state statutes and with exemptions derived from the actual state statutes.  Note 
that exemptions that do not apply to an individual who is a SW with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree are not 
included. Also, the language describing exemptions has been simplified in some cases to allow the information to be 
included in the table. 
 
  
31 
 
Chapter 2:  Why States License Occupations  
2.1 Introduction 
Occupational licensure is a long-standing form of regulation in the United States.  It began with 
physician licensing in the Virginia colony in 1639 and continued through the mid-nineteenth 
century with state medical authorities licensing physicians in most states.  However, early 
occupational licensure did not include practice restriction or uniform education and training 
standards, so it was not successful in providing a minimum quality of service for consumers.  As 
a result, there was no effective state occupational licensure in place at the time of the U.S. Civil 
War.  Modern professional associations were formed in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and this led to the passage of the first modern medical practice legislation in Texas in 1873.  The 
Supreme Court case Dent v. West Virginia in 1888 took away the federal authority to override 
states in the area of occupational licensing and gave the states the right to license occupations to 
protect the health, welfare, or safety of citizens.  Following that decision, state occupational 
licensure grew steadily, with licensure of 12 occupations by 1889, 30 occupations by 1920, and 
more than 800 occupations in at least one state by 2003
32
 (Kleiner 2006b).  Licensed occupations 
include both professional occupations where practitioners must earn one or more college degrees 
(e.g., physicians, dentists, and lawyers) and non-professional occupations (e.g., barbers, 
beauticians, and massage therapists). 
As a result of the growth in state regulation, the percentage of the U.S. workforce that is 
subject to licensure has increased from 4.5% in the 1950s, to 20% in 2000, and to 29% in 2008 
(Kleiner 2013).  Much of the growth in the number of workers subject to licensure since 1990 
has been in health care and services occupations, which made up over half of the licensed 
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occupations in 1990.  This is due both to growth in the number of individuals working in 
occupations that were already licensed in 1990 and to an increase in the number of new health 
care occupations resulting from advancements in health technologies and specializations that 
were licensed after 1990 (Graddy 1991a).  More recently, states continue to regulate additional 
occupations, but the rate of growth in the number of licensed occupations has decreased due to 
state legislatures requiring stronger justifications for licensure (Kleiner 2006b).  
2.2 Economic Theories of Occupational Licensure 
If the market between the practitioners who provide a service and the consumers who purchase 
that service operated under the assumptions of a perfectly competitive model, occupational 
licensure would not be necessary.  A prerequisite for the effective operation of any market is that 
the consumers have knowledge concerning the nature of the product or service being provided, 
so that the rational choice can be made in attempting to maximize satisfaction.  Under 
competitive market conditions, when there are many buyers and sellers in the market, well-
informed consumers are able to obtain the products or services they want for the price they want.  
Some consumers will choose goods or services of lower quality and pay a lower price, while 
others will opt for a combination of higher quality and higher prices.  Overall, consumers will 
generally be able to obtain the quantity, quality, variety and price that are optimal for their 
income level. 
In the actual market for many professional services, practitioners know more about the 
services and the skills needed to provide those services than consumers.  This asymmetric 
information problem is particularly true for professions that require high levels of education or 
skill, use advanced technology, or deal with health care or medicine.  Consumers need 
information about the providers’ qualifications to minimize the risk of selecting a low-quality 
33 
 
provider (Leffler 1978).  The initial growth in occupational licensing laws from 1880 to 1930 
was a response to the asymmetric information problem caused by a rapid growth in the 
knowledge and skills held within various professions and the reduction in transportation costs 
that made urbanization feasible.  Consumers found themselves in densely populated urban areas 
without critical information about the quality of key service providers (e.g., doctors and 
lawyers).  Passage of occupational licensing laws in the early twentieth century helped to address 
this problem (Law and Kim 2005).  Licensure requirements establish a minimum level of 
competency as measured by the applicant’s ability to complete the education or training 
requirements and pass any licensure examination.  Consumers can purchase services from a 
licensed practitioner, knowing that the state licensing board has determined that the licensee is 
qualified to provide those services.  Licensure minimizes consumer uncertainty about the quality 
of service, which helps to alleviate the level of risk perceived by the consumer and increases the 
consumer’s demand for the service (Arrow 1971).   
The dominant rationale for occupational regulation is that is serves the public interest.  
From a public policy perspective, state legislators typically justify occupational licensure by 
claiming that licensing laws increase the competence of practitioners and, as a result, protect 
consumers.
33
  This is consistent with the “public interest theory,”34 which focuses on the 
consumer protection aspect of occupational licensure.  It is one of two contrasting theories used 
by economists in discussions of occupational licensure.  The second theory is the “rent capture 
theory,”35 which focuses on the restricted entry aspect of occupational licensure.  While the two 
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 The stated objectives of licensing laws in Minnesota, for example, are “to increase competence and reduce 
negligence of practitioners” (Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota 1999) from Kleiner (2006b, p. 
98). 
34
 The “public interest theory” is called the “public interest view” by Timmons and Thornton (2010) and it is 
consistent with the view of Shapiro (1986).   
35
 The “rent capture theory” is called the “private interest view” by Timmons and Thornton (2010) and it is 
consistent with the view of Friedman (1962).   
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economic theories look at occupational licensing from different viewpoints, both perspectives are 
important to an understanding of the topic. 
According to the “public interest theory,” the major theoretical justification for 
occupational licensure is the market failures that occur due to asymmetric information (Kleiner 
2006b).  Licensure reduces the asymmetric information problem between the provider and the 
consumer and reduces the consumer’s perceived level of risk of selecting a low-quality provider 
by ensuring that licensees meet a set of requirements for minimum competency.  However, the 
public may also benefit from occupational licensure in other ways.  For consumers who tend to 
underestimate personal risk, occupational licensure provides paternalism by protecting 
consumers from making unsafe choices, such as purchasing a root canal from an unlicensed 
dentist.  The practice restriction component of licensure removes (or reduces) that possibility 
(Wheelan 1998).  Professional licensure may also correct market failures where there is a 
negative externality created from poor service.  For example, if a doctor misdiagnoses a patient, 
a contagious disease may spread to others; or, if an electrician does a poor job installing an 
electrical service, a fire may be sparked.  In these examples, the quality of service is too low 
from a social welfare perspective and licensure requirements that exclude low-quality 
practitioners (thus eliminating the negative externality) can benefit the general public.   
An alternative explanation for professional licensing comes from an economic theory of 
regulation that has evolved over that last four decades.  Stigler (1971) proposed a theory of 
economic regulation where regulation is sought by an industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit.  This is referred to as the “rent capture theory,” where professionals 
actively pursue licensure for their occupation in order to gain higher wages and improve job 
security (Kleiner 2006b).  Stigler conjectures that any occupation with sufficient political power 
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will seek to control entry.  His “rent capture theory” laid the groundwork for a less kind view of 
regulation, in general, and of occupational licensure in particular.   
 The economic effects of occupational regulation have been studied in the literature.  
Licensing boards can restrict entry into an occupation by manipulating licensure requirements 
and examination pass rates.  This may reduce the supply of labor in the occupation, which 
typically raises wages and allows practitioners to capture rents.  It also hedges against downside 
risk by reducing competition, both through the reduction in the supply of labor and the 
introduction of practice restrictions that succeed in carving out specific services that can be 
provided only by licensed practitioners (Wheelan 1998).  Licensure creates greater incentives for 
individuals to invest in more occupation-specific human capital because they will be able to 
recoup the full returns on their investment if they do not need to face low quality substitutes for 
their services (Akerlof 1970; Shapiro 1986).  Through licensure of their occupation, 
professionals also enjoy a level of prestige associated with being a member of an exclusive club.  
While consumers may benefit from occupational licensure by avoiding the risk of low-
quality service, they are on the losing side when the economic effects of licensure are taken into 
account.  Licensure typically increases the price of services and reduces consumer access to 
those services, due to higher prices and entry restrictions.  Another casualty of occupational 
licensure is the reduction in innovation due to practice restriction (Graddy 1991a).   There is little 
evidence that the quality of service is improved under licensure, although licensure does set 
some minimum level of provider competence through the successful completion of licensure 
requirements.  Thus, in exchange for some assurance of a minimum quality of service which 
addresses the consumer’s aversion to loss, consumers are subject to higher prices, reduced 
access, and less innovation, without overall quality improvement.   
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In the early years of occupational licensure, the anti-competitive aspects of licensure that 
benefitted practitioners over consumers were generally accepted without question by the public 
as being necessary to maintain the quality of professional services.  More recently, attention is 
being paid to the social and economic costs of occupational licensure.  However, despite the 
many costs and few benefits of occupational licensure, it has a great deal of public support and 
the public is reluctant to abandon regulation to adopt any alternative policy.  States can be 
expected to continue to license occupations because “licensing has evolved as the culturally and 
politically acceptable method of quality assurance,” even though it provides little actual quality 
improvement and it carries real economic costs (Kleiner 2006a).  
2.3 Production of Occupational Regulation 
The major theoretical justification for licensure has historically been market failures due to 
asymmetric information on quality between producers and consumers that regulation can correct 
(Kleiner 2006b).  While growth of information technology and access to the Internet weakens 
that argument somewhat, states still have an interest in shielding the public against the 
untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible (Kleiner 2002).  All states have enacted 
licensure of some occupations and continue to pass new legislation for occupational regulation.   
In most cases, the practitioners of an occupation seek regulation through their 
associations.  The goal of most occupational associations seeking regulation is licensure instead 
of certification, title protection, or registration, because licensure restricts practice to members of 
the occupation and allows for control of standards of practice and entry into the profession.  If 
the goal of the occupational association is licensure, state legislatures generally require 
justification of the potential impact of licensure on the supply of practitioners and the cost of 
services.  Some states have sunrise provisions that require members of the occupation seeking 
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regulation to propose the components of the legislation, include cost and benefit estimates, and 
convince legislators that consumers will be unduly harmed if the proposed legislation is not 
adopted (CLEAR 2015).  As a general rule, any proposed new legislation for occupational 
regulation must be formulated to serve the public interest in some way; otherwise it may be 
difficult to obtain the support of state legislators who have to answer to their constituents.  
There is generally no opposition on the part of employers to the formation of 
occupational associations at work, since, unlike unions, these associations do not demand a wage 
premium from the employer (Freeman and Lazear 1995).  As an occupational association grows, 
it may reach the point where it has the political clout, financial resources, and organizational 
skills to lobby state legislatures and present a case for regulation.  Members of the occupation are 
informed and organized by the association and costs of seeking regulation are low for individual 
practitioners, while the potential benefits of regulation can be significant (Kleiner 2006b). 
Frequently, attempts by associations to secure regulation for occupations are not 
successful.  There may be opposition to new regulation on the general grounds that the costs of 
regulation to society are too large compared to expected benefits.  These costs include higher 
prices for services, reduced access to services, less innovation in the occupation, and a 
reallocation of income from consumers to practitioners (Kleiner 2006b).  There may also be 
organized opposition to regulation for a particular occupation from those who are professional 
competitors.  In New Jersey, for example, recent attempts to license dietitians
36
 have been 
blocked by petition signing campaigns led by natural healing professionals.
37
  Obstetricians have 
opposed right-to-practice legislation for nurse-midwives (Gross 1984).  Attempts to regulate 
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 New Jersey Assembly Bill A2933 and Senate Bill S1941 call for licensure of dietitians. 
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 Homeopathic forums claim that licensure of dietitians would deprive the people of New Jersey of their freedom of 
choice and natural practitioners of their freedom of speech (De Poto 2009).  
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physician assistants have been opposed by physicians and other health professionals (Daniels and 
Regens 1980/81).  
Even though consumers may benefit from occupational licensure, consumers rarely 
demand it.
38
  This is because the costs of taking action to seek regulation of an occupation are 
high.  Consumers would have to learn about an occupation and the services practitioners in that 
occupation provide, determine what kind of regulation to pursue, and work to inform and 
organize a large enough group of consumers to effectively lobby the state legislature to regulate 
the occupation.  If the cost of a professional service is low or an individual consumer purchases 
that service only infrequently, it is not cost-effective for that consumer to demand regulation.  If 
a group of consumers does pursue regulation of an occupation, there is likely to be a free-rider 
problem where the costs of obtaining regulation are shouldered by few, while the benefits of 
regulation are enjoyed by many (Kleiner 2006b). 
Most states have hearings during each legislative session to deal with requests for new 
occupational regulation.  Like any new legislation, occupational regulation requires legislative 
support, including someone to sponsor the bill and legislators to vote for it, so political factors 
can affect passage.  Legislators must weigh the risks of no regulation for an occupation against 
the social costs of regulation.  Ideally, this tradeoff is aimed at maximizing consumer utility or 
welfare.  Since voters tend to prefer to reduce the downside risk of any service, legislators may 
consider requests for new occupational regulation legislation that benefits the public by 
addressing consumer aversion to loss, even though the legislation provides greater economic 
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 Exceptions where consumers (or others outside of an occupation) might call for regulation of an occupation 
include cases where there is perceived corruption or incompetence among the practitioners of an occupation.  
Examples include stock brokers after the market crash of 1929 (Gellhorn 1976) and mortgage brokers after the 
subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 (Clement 2008). 
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benefits to the practitioners of the occupation than to the consumers of their services (Kahneman 
and Thaler 1991). 
A supply and demand framework can be used to discuss the factors that influence passage 
of occupational regulation legislation (Smith 1982; Graddy 1991a; Graddy 1991b).  The demand 
for regulation for a particular occupation is a result of the combined efforts of four groups that 
have both an interest in whether the occupation is regulated and potential political influence on 
legislators.  The four groups are (1) providers of the service, (2) consumers of the service, (3) 
professional competitors of the providers, and (4) public interest groups.  The practitioners who 
provide the service and request regulation for the occupation are likely to support the regulation 
because regulation improves the value of their human capital.  Consumers of the service are 
likely to support regulation if they are loss averse or oppose regulation if they are concerned 
about the price and availability of the service.  The extent of asymmetry in the distribution of 
information determines the value of regulation to the consumer.  Professional competitors of the 
providers are likely to oppose the regulation out of a fear that practice restriction will exclude 
them from providing the service.  Public interest groups are likely to support regulation if it 
benefits the public or oppose regulation if the social and economic costs are too high.  These four 
interest groups will participate in the political process to actively seek a particular outcome and 
give political and financial support to legislators if the value of the outcome to the group exceeds 
the cost of obtaining that outcome (Graddy 1991a).  
The costs of lobbying legislators to obtain desired regulatory outcomes include the costs 
of organizing the group and giving political contributions and support to legislators.  
Organizational costs increase with the size of the group, decrease with its cohesiveness, and tend 
to be less for practitioners than for consumers.  Small groups are more likely to participate in the 
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political process and attain their desired outcomes than large groups.  Costs of political 
contributions and support increase with more restrictive regulation and the degree of harm it 
might cause, since additional costs are incurred when there is opposition from other interest 
groups.  Occupations whose practitioners work for individual consumers (e.g., barbers) have an 
easier time getting licensed, since individual consumers are less likely to mount opposition to 
proposed regulations than are organized institutions (e.g., hospitals) that consume the services of 
many providers (Kleiner 2006b). 
The supply of occupational regulation comes from the state legislature, where legislative 
choice is a response to the demands of interest groups that offer political support in exchange for 
regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976).  Legislators’ willingness and ability to respond to the 
demand for regulatory legislation depend both on the political environment within which they 
operate and on the amount and type of legislation that can be supplied in a given legislative 
environment.  It is assumed that legislators consider both the positions of influential interest 
groups and the general public interest in their decisions regarding occupational regulation.  
2.4 Occupational Characteristics that Affect Regulation 
There are many characteristics of an occupation that make it more or less likely to be licensed 
than other occupations.  These include the type of occupation, the mean education and wage 
levels of practitioners, the type of consumer of the practitioner’s services (individual versus 
institutional), the degree of political organization of any occupational association, and the 
existence of substitute occupations that can provide the same services and may organize 
opposition to licensure.  Technically advanced occupations where the asymmetric information 
problem is significant are more likely to be licensed than less technical occupations (Kleiner 
2006b).  The number of years of education and income of practitioners, which are positively 
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correlated with occupational licensure, are proxies for professional complexity (Moore 1961; 
Kleiner and Kreuger 2010).  An occupation in the health sector or one that has high malpractice 
insurance premiums is associated with a risk of harm to consumers and so has a higher 
probability of being licensed than an occupation that poses less risk to consumers (Wheelan 
1998).  Occupations where others besides the buyers of the service can be harmed by purchasing 
the service from incompetent practitioners have social costs that are greater than private costs 
and so are more likely to be licensed.  Examples include physicians, construction workers, and 
pharmacists (Moore 1961). 
Occupations in service industries are more likely to be licensed than occupations in 
manufacturing (Eckstein and Nagypal 2004).  Occupations whose practitioners work for 
individual consumers are more likely to be licensed than occupations in which most practitioners 
work for large institutions, since institutions can organize more easily to oppose licensure than 
individual consumers (Graddy 1991a).  Occupations with strong professional associations are 
more likely to be licensed than occupations that do not have associations, since they are likely to 
benefit more from regulation than broad, diffuse groups (Peltzman 1989).  Occupational 
associations generally organize campaigns and initiate requests for regulation.  They can do so 
without incurring a significant free-rider problem, since the costs of obtaining regulation are 
shared by members of the association (Kleiner 2006b).  And finally, occupations without 
available substitutes are less likely to encounter organized opposition to regulation and so are 
more likely to be licensed.  
There may be differences across occupations that result in an individual state enacting 
regulation for one occupation, but not for another similar occupation.  The state of Ohio, for 
example, licenses preschool teachers, but not child care workers, yet practitioners in both 
42 
 
occupations are responsible for the care and teaching of young children.  This may be due to the 
fact that teachers have a strong occupational association, while child care workers do not.  City 
bus drivers are licensed in Minnesota, while taxi drivers are not, perhaps due to public versus 
private liability issues.  Delaware licenses veterinary technologists, but not pharmacy 
technicians, possibly because pharmacists have opposed right to practice legislation for 
pharmacy technicians.   
Similarly, there may be differences across states that result in a specific occupation being 
licensed in some states, but not in others.  Massage therapists, for example, are licensed in 38 
states, while 36 states license security guards and only 8 states license travel agents.  White 
(1980) found that licensure of registered nurses (RNs) came first in states where hospitals 
already employed relatively large numbers of RNs compared to the number of practical nurses, 
attendants, and orderlies.  With significant numbers of RNs already employed, licensure would 
be unlikely to force changes in employment patterns and, as a result, hospitals and physicians 
would be less likely to oppose licensure.  However, if relatively few RNs are employed, 
opposition to licensure of RNs might occur, since hospitals and physicians would see more 
substitutes for RNs and threaten to shift employment away from RNs.  Therefore, occupational 
characteristics alone cannot explain why a particular occupation is licensed in a particular state.  
It is likely to be a combination of occupational characteristics and state characteristics, including 
the characteristics and political climate of the state legislature, that influences which occupations 
are licensed in which states (Carpenter, Knepper, Erickson, and Ross 2012). 
2.5 State Characteristics that Affect Regulation 
State characteristics that affect the passage of occupational regulation and the strictness of that 
regulation have been studied in the literature.  Graddy (1991b) modeled the decision of state 
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legislatures to regulate occupations in terms of both public interest and interest group forces, as 
well as characteristics of the legislative environment within which they operate.  She found that 
the probability of regulation increases with interest group organization, political market 
volatility, legislative resources, and information asymmetry.  Zhou (1993) studied the 
contributions of occupational power (prestige of the occupation and age of the national 
association), state capacities (per-capita state revenue and inter-party competition), and diffusion 
processes to the variation among states in licensing 30 occupations between 1890 and 1950.  He 
found that the adoption rate for licensing legislation for an occupation increases with increased 
occupational power, increased state capabilities, increases in the cumulative number of 
occupations licensed in the state, and increases in the cumulative number of states licensing that 
occupation.  High state revenues increase licensing for occupations concerned with public health 
and safety, but decrease licensing for occupations in the business sector.   
Moore (1961) found that the least restrictive types of regulation were imposed for the 
public welfare, while the most restrictive types were imposed to benefit practitioners.  Begun, 
Crowe, and Feldman (1981) studied regulation of optometrists and found that a strong 
occupational interest group leads to more stringent regulation, while more inter-party 
competition in the state legislature decreases the occupational interest group’s control over 
regulation.  Teske (2004) studied state regulation of attorneys and found that the severity of 
licensure requirements (such as entry barriers, bar exam fees, and continuing education hours) 
was determined by the power and concentration of attorneys in the state.  Average lawyer 
income (a power variable) and percentage of population holding law degrees (a concentration 
variable) in the state, for example, were positively associated with higher entry barriers for the 
profession.  The percentage of population holding law degrees was also positively associated 
44 
 
with higher bar exam fees and lower continuing education requirements.  Thus, the specific 
provisions of state licensure for an occupation may be influenced by the power and concentration 
of the practitioners of that occupation in that state.  
These studies identify some of the state characteristics that affect regulation.  Other 
factors also contribute to the variation in the number of occupations regulated and the percentage 
of the workforce in each state that is licensed.  State characteristics that affect occupational 
licensure include demographic and economic characteristics, the degree of pre-existing 
occupational regulation, and the composition of the state legislature.  Larger and more urbanized 
states are more likely to have stronger occupational associations that can effectively represent 
occupations and obtain regulation as rent capture.  States with high population density, heavy 
industrialization, or high per capita incomes tend to have higher levels of occupational licensing 
than more rural, less industrialized, or lower income states.   
Characteristics of the state legislature also affect the production of occupational 
regulation.  Three state legislature factors are significant determinants of the change in the 
number of licensed occupations (Smith 1982; Graddy 1991b; Begun et al. 1981).  First, party 
concentration is negatively related to licensure, so that occupational licensure is passed more 
frequently in states where party control of the legislature is less certain.  This is because 
licensing laws are devices used by politicians to carve out interest group support from their 
constituencies.  Thus, passage of more occupational regulation is likely in response to political 
competition, because occupational regulation is a durable permanent regulation
39
 that reassures 
interest groups of the support of the legislature.  Second, a change in the identity of the majority 
party is negatively related to volume or industrial output, so that less legislation is enacted in less 
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 Occupational regulations are rarely repealed, so an occupational association that is successful in convincing 
legislators to support regulation is likely to remain loyal to those legislators. 
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stable political environments.  Third, the number of constituents per representative is positively 
related to licensure output, so that as the number of constituents per representative increases, a 
voter has less incentive to monitor (and possibly oppose) legislative output. 
If the political environment in the state is consumer-oriented, the legislature should be 
responsive to unorganized consumer interests and thus carefully consider the public interest 
aspects of any proposed regulation.  Decisions about occupational regulation should be based on 
the complexity of service and the extent of asymmetric information in the unregulated market.  
Occupations that pose the greatest risk to the public due to potential harm from unregulated 
practitioners should be the most likely to be regulated (Wheelan 1998). 
If the political environment is favorable to occupational regulation because the state is 
one of the most regulated states,
40
 the legislature should be familiar with occupational 
associations, the arguments for and against occupational regulation, and voter responses to 
passage of regulation legislation.  Industries that are most impacted by occupational regulation 
are more likely to contribute to influential individuals in the legislature.  In these states, 
legislators may be more inclined to support occupational regulation and the probability of 
passage is high.  This may be especially true when the occupation seeking regulation is similar to 
other occupations the state already regulates.  One example of this is occupational regulation of 
health sector occupations.   Due to specialization and advancements in medical technology, new 
health sector occupations are being created and practitioners in those occupations are seeking 
regulation.  In states that already regulate a large number of health sector occupations, 
impediments to passing occupational regulation for new health sector occupations may be 
reduced.  
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 The most regulated states license almost three times the number of occupations as the least regulated states 
(Kleiner 2006b).   
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The amount of legislation that can be passed in a session of the state legislature depends 
on available resources, which are affected by setup costs for organizing a legislative session, 
limits on session length, and the amount of staff support.  Limited resources may constrain the 
ability of legislators to produce occupational regulation (Smith 1982).  For example, some states 
limit the length of their legislative session, which raises the opportunity cost of producing a piece 
of legislation and may yield less legislation.  States also vary in the amount of staff support 
available to legislators; those with fewer resources are more constrained in the amount of 
legislation that can be produced.  
2.6 Summary and Discussion 
The long history of occupational licensure in the United States has resulted in a large number of 
licensed occupations and a large percentage of the U.S. workforce that is subject to licensure.  
Two contrasting theories of occupational licensure have been studied in the literature.  The 
“public interest theory” focuses on the consumer protection aspect of occupational licensure, 
while the “rent capture theory” focuses on the restricted entry aspect of occupational licensure.  
The two theories deal with opposing sides of the market for services, since practitioners must 
request licensure in order for the state legislature to consider it, while the proposed legislation 
must benefit consumers in order for the state legislature to pass it.  Occupational licensure is 
popular with both practitioners and consumers, so states continue to license occupations despite 
the economic costs, even though licensure brings little quality improvement. 
 The major theoretical justification for licensure has been market failures due to 
asymmetric information on quality between producers and consumers of services.  Practitioners 
of an occupation typically seek regulation through their associations.  A supply and demand 
framework can be used to understand the factors that affect the production of occupational 
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regulation.  The demand for regulation for a particular occupation is a result of the combined 
efforts of four groups that have both an interest in whether the occupation is regulated and 
potential political influence on legislators.  The four groups are (1) providers of the service, (2) 
consumers of the service, (3) professional competitors of the providers, and (4) public interest 
groups.  The supply of occupational regulation comes from the state legislature, where legislative 
choice is a response to the demands of interest groups that offer political support in exchange for 
regulation. 
 There are many characteristics of an occupation that make it more or less likely to be 
licensed than other occupations.  These include the type of occupation, the mean education and 
wage levels of practitioners, the type of consumer of the practitioner’s services (individual versus 
institutional), the degree of political organization of any occupational association, and the 
existence of substitute occupations that can provide the same services and may organize 
opposition to licensure.  There is much variation in the number of occupations regulated and the 
percentage of the workforce in each state that is licensed.  State characteristics that affect 
occupational licensure include demographic and economic characteristics, the degree of pre-
existing occupational regulation, and state legislators’ willingness and ability to respond to the 
demand for regulatory legislation. 
 In the case of DNs and SWs, occupational characteristics that increase the likelihood of 
state regulation include the type of occupations, the education requirements, and the presence of 
strong national associations.  Both occupations deal with the broad area of health care and social 
services, where practitioners provide services that are intended to improve the health and welfare 
of consumers.  Because of the education requirements, where practitioners must earn a minimum 
of a bachelor’s degree and often earn advanced degrees, there is likely to be an asymmetric 
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information problem between practitioners and consumers that supports the public interest theory 
of regulation for DNs and SWs.  In fact, both national associations (the CDR for DNs and the 
ASWB for SWs) justify the push to license their respective occupations based on the need to 
protect the public from unqualified practitioners.  In addition, both associations facilitate the 
push to licensure by maintaining strong standards of practice with national accreditation of 
degree programs, control of national licensure examinations, and provision of model practice 
acts for state statutes based on national requirements.  
 Other characteristics of the DN and SW occupations decrease the likelihood of state 
regulation.  These include the relatively low wages compared to other occupations with similar 
degree requirements, the high percentage of institutional workers in both occupations, and the 
availability of professional competitors who may oppose regulation.  Based on U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data, both DNs and SWs earn less, on average, than other occupations that 
require a bachelor’s degree (Dietitians and Nutritionists 2014/15; Social Workers 2014/15).  
Both DNs and SWs have a substantial percentage of practitioners who work in institutional 
settings, such as hospitals and educational institutions.  Professional competitors who have 
opposed regulation of DNs and SWs include natural healing professionals and psychologists, 
respectively.    
 In a number of ways that affect the likelihood of occupational regulation, DNs and SWs 
are similar to registered nurses (RNs) and public school teachers; although RNs and public 
school teachers have unions, while DNs and SWs do not have unions.  All four occupations deal 
with the health and welfare of consumers, require a minimum of a bachelor’s degree,41 have 
strong associations, have high percentages of institutional employment, and have low wages 
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 In some states, RNs require a minimum of an associate’s degree, but some states are increasing the minimum 
education requirement for RNs to a bachelor’s degree. 
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relative to other occupations that require a bachelor’s degree.  In addition, all four occupations 
have a high percentage of female practitioners and roughly comparable median wages (although 
RNs typically earn more than DNs and public school teachers, who typically earn more than 
SWs).
42
  Occupational size varies significantly across the four occupations, with approximately 
2.7 million RNs, 2.5 million public school teachers, 600,000 SWs, and 67,000 DNs in 2012.  
However, there are enough similarities to suggest that the literature on the economic effects of 
licensure of RNs and public school teachers might provide insight into the economic effects of 
licensure of DNs and SWs. 
 As noted in Chapter 1, White (1980) found that licensure had no impact on employment 
levels for RNs and did not cause a wage premium for RNs in 1960 and 1970, despite earlier 
estimates of a wage premium due to licensure in 1950.  Kleiner and Petree (1988) found that 
licensure has no impact on public school teacher pay and uncertain effects on quality, as 
measured by student achievement test scores.  Other studies by Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 
(2005) and Kane and Staiger (2005) found no quality improvement due to licensure of public 
school teachers.  Taken together, the literature suggests that, for RNs and public school teachers, 
licensure is not found to affect the number of practitioners or the quality of service provided by 
practitioners; and there is also no evidence of a lasting wage premium due to licensure.  In the 
chapters that follow, the empirical results for DNs and SWs are compared to those for RNs and 
public school teachers. 
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 BLS data for 2012 median pay shows RNs earn approximately $65,000, DNs and teachers earn $55,000, and SWs 
earn $44,000. 
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Chapter 3: Effect of Occupational Licensure on the Number of 
Practitioners 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins the empirical analysis of the economic effects of occupational licensure on 
two occupations: dietitians and nutritionists (DNs) and social workers (SWs).  I estimate whether 
licensure affects the number of practitioners in these occupations.  The effect of licensure on the 
number of practitioners is a topic of interest, because the practice restriction component of 
licensure allows licensing boards to control entry into a licensed occupation.  However, there are 
mixed results in the literature as to whether licensing actually does reduce the number of 
practitioners, with empirical results depending on the occupation studied.  I model the effect of 
licensure on the number of practitioners for DNs and SWs separately and then compare the 
empirical results across the two occupations.  
3.2 Research Design 
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the number of practitioners in the DN and SW occupations 
over a time interval of active state regulation to determine if licensure had an effect on the 
number of practitioners.  I use the 1980, 1990, and 2000 5% Census Public Use Microdata Series 
(Ruggles et al. 2004) as the source for data about the number of practitioners in the DN and SW 
occupations over the time period from 1980 to 2000.  The Census data includes individual 
observations that are each associated with a state, an observation year, and an occupation.  After 
appropriate filtering
43
 of the Census data to select the professional
44
 DNs or SWs from each 5% 
sample, I multiply the number of DNs or SWs in each state for each observation year by 20
45
 to 
compute an estimate of the total number of professional DNs or SWs.   I then use these estimates 
                                                 
43
 Filtering is described in Section 3.3. 
44
 Professional DNs and SWs are individuals who have earned at least a bachelor’s degree and are actively working 
in the occupation. 
45
 Since the Census data is a 5% sample, multiplying by 20 estimates the number in a 100% sample. 
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to construct a second dataset for each occupation that contains state-level data, including year, 
state, number of practitioners, state regulation dummies, and other state-specific variables.  This 
dataset is the basis for my empirical analysis of the effect of occupational licensure on the 
number of practitioners. 
Figures 3.1a and 3.1b plot the number of states that introduced any regulation or 
licensure, respectively, of DNs each year between 1980 and 2014.
46
  For DNs, any regulation 
means licensure, certification, or title protection, because there are no cases of registration.  The 
20-year period from 1980 through 2000 encompasses most of the period of state regulatory 
activity for DNs, since no states regulated DNs in 1980, 41 states plus the District of Columbia 
regulated DNs by 2000, and only six states regulated DNs after 2000. 
Similarly, Figures 3.2a and 3.2b plot the number of states that introduced any regulation 
or licensure, respectively, of SWs each year between 1955 and 2014.
47
 For SWs, any regulation 
means licensure or title protection, because there are no cases of certification or registration. 
Again, the 20-year period from 1980 through 2000 encompasses much of the period of state 
regulatory activity for SWs, however the time interval is not as well matched to SW regulation 
activity as it is to DN regulation activity.  Eleven states regulated SWs before 1980 and three 
states regulated SWs after 2000, but 23 states regulated SWs between 1980 and 2000.  So, the 
time period from 1980 to 2000 captures more than half of the state regulation activity for SWs. 
In addition to estimating the effect of occupational licensure on the total number of 
practitioners in the DN and SW occupations, I also model the effect of licensure on the number 
                                                 
46
 The source for the type of state regulation of DNs in effect for each state in the observation years is the 
Commission on Dietetic Registration (http://www.cdrnet.org), with data verified/edited based on the actual state 
statutes.  
47
 The source for the type of state regulation of SWs in effect for each state in the observation years is the 
Association of Social Work Boards (http://www.aswb.org), with data verified/edited based on the actual state 
statutes. 
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of practitioners in each occupation who work in industries or job positions that are exempt from 
regulation and the effect of licensure on the number of practitioners who work in industries or 
job positions that are not exempt from regulation in states that regulate DNs and SWs.  This 
allows me to examine whether occupational licensure of DNs and SWs pushes practitioners 
towards or away from job positions in those occupations that are subject to licensure.  Logically, 
if practitioners in an occupation see licensure as a way to earn higher wages, then we might 
expect to see movement from job positions that are exempt to job positions that are not-exempt 
as a result of licensure.  Individuals who expect to earn higher wages in return for investing time, 
effort, and money to comply with licensure requirements, would have an incentive to seek 
employment in a higher-wage position that requires a license.  Conversely, if licensure does not 
result in higher wages for an occupation, then we might expect to see movement from job 
positions that are not-exempt to job positions that are exempt as a result of licensure.  There is 
little incentive to invest in the human capital necessary to become licensed, if licensure does not 
bring a reward in the form of higher wages. 
I define two categories of individual practitioners in the DN and SW occupations: the 
exempt category and the not-exempt category.  Since only states that regulate an occupation have 
statutes that specify which industries or job positions are exempt from regulation, I include 
observations from only those states that regulate the occupation by the year 2000 in the exempt 
and not-exempt categories.  The exempt category includes individuals who work in an industry 
or job position that the state statute exempts from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after 
the year of the observation.  For example, if a state first regulated DNs in 1985 and the regulation 
statute exempts federal workers, then DNs who are federal workers in that state in 1980, 1990, 
and 2000 are all in the exempt category.  The not-exempt category includes individuals who 
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work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not exempt from regulation, even if 
regulation was enacted after the year of the observation.  Therefore, if a state first regulated SWs 
in 1992 and the regulation statute does not exempt elementary and secondary school employees, 
then SWs who are elementary and secondary school employees in that state in 1980, 1990, and 
2000 are all in the not-exempt category. 
I estimate the number of practitioners in exempt and not-exempt categories using the 
datasets of professional DNs and SWs built from the 5% Census data samples.  For states that 
regulate DNs or SWs by 2000, I map the individual DNs and SWs to the appropriate category 
(exempt or not-exempt) based on the exemptions from regulation in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.  I then 
multiply the number of DNs or SWs in each category in each state and year by 20 to compute an 
estimate of the total number of DNs or SWs in each category for that state and year.  
There is sufficient information in the U.S. Census data to identify individual DNs and 
SWs who work in industries or job positions that are exempt from regulation in states that 
regulate those occupations.  Census variables for each observation include year, state, 
occupation, industry,
48
 employment status, and class of worker.  Occupation identifies DN, SW, 
or some other occupation; industry identifies the work setting and economic sector in which an 
individual performs an occupation;
49
 employment status allows identification of individuals who 
are in the labor force, are employed, and are at work, as opposed to individuals who are not in 
the labor force or are unemployed or are not working for some reason; and class of worker 
identifies whether an individual works for a private company, is in the armed forces, or is 
employed by the federal, state, or local government. 
                                                 
48
 Individuals who worked in more than one industry were asked to report the industry in which he/she first earned 
the most money, or, second, spent the most time.   
49
 The source for the definition of the Census industry variable is 
 (https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/IND#description_section). 
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Summarizing the research plan, I use individual-level data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 
5% Census samples to create datasets of individual observations of professional DNs and SWs.  I 
then incorporate data on state regulation from the CDR for DNs and the ASWB for SWs to 
identify states that regulate the occupations by the year 2000 and the industries or job positions 
that are exempt from regulation.  This allows me to map observations to the exempt category 
(job positions that are exempt from regulation) and the not-exempt category (job positions that 
are not exempt from regulation) and estimate both the total number of observations and the 
numbers in each category for each state and year.  I then build a state-level dataset for each 
occupation with entries for each state and observation year that includes the total number of 
observations, the number of observations in the exempt and not-exempt categories, state 
regulation dummies, and state characteristic variables.  Using the state-level datasets, I estimate 
four models for the number of DNs and SWs as a function of regulation of those occupations.  
These include models for (1) the total number of DNs or SWs in all states, (2) the number of 
DNs or SWs in states that regulate the occupations by the year 2000, (3) the number of DNs and 
SWs in the exempt category, and (4) the number of DNs and SWs in the not-exempt category. 
3.3 Data 
In this section, I describe the details of the construction of the two datasets for each occupation: 
(1) the individual observations of professional DNs and SWs derived from Census 5% samples, 
and (2) the dataset of the number of DNs and SWs in various categories for each state and year.  
For the datasets of individual observations of professional DNs and SWs, I use the 1980, 1990, 
and 2000 5% Census samples and extract individuals in each occupation.  I then keep individuals 
who are currently employed and working for wages and have earned at least a bachelor’s degree.  
This results in a dataset of professional members of each occupation.  Variables important for 
55 
 
empirical analysis of the effect of licensure on the number of practitioners include: year, state 
where employed, annual wage, number of weeks worked per year, and the usual number of hours 
worked per week, as well as job-related variables that include industry, employment status, and 
class of worker.  I compute an hourly wage from annual wage divided by the product of number 
of weeks worked per year and the usual number of hours worked per week.  All dollar amounts 
are converted to year 2000 dollars.  I use the computed hourly wage to remove outliers by 
dropping any individual with an hourly wage less than $2.61 (the lowest state minimum wage) 
and any individual with an hourly wage greater than five standard deviations above the mean.
50
 
3.3.1 Construction of Datasets for Dietitians and Nutritionists 
For DNs, I begin with 14,266 DN
51
 observations (4,089 from the 1980 Census, 5,400 from the 
1990 Census, and 4,777 from the 2000 Census) and drop 2 observations for individuals who 
work outside the United States and so are not subject to state regulation of DNs.  To focus on 
individuals who are currently employed and working for wages, I drop 3,218 observations for 
individuals who are unemployed, on leave, or not in the workforce and 530 observations for 
individuals who do not work for wages.  The Census data does not identify which individuals are 
actually subject to occupational regulation.  Since a bachelor’s degree is the minimum education 
criterion for the RDN credential and for any type of state regulation of DNs, I drop 5,089 
observations for individuals who have not earned at least a bachelor’s degree.52  To remove 
outliers, I drop 120 observations for individuals with computed hourly wages below the lowest 
state minimum wage and 22 observations for individuals with hourly wages that are more than 
                                                 
50
 For DNs, five standard deviations above the mean is $135.05 per hour.  For SWs, five standard deviations above 
the mean is $134.60 per hour. 
51
 In 1980 and 1990, the choice of occupational codes includes Dietitians, but not Nutritionists.  In 2000, Dietitians 
and Nutritionists share the same occupational code. 
52
 Kleiner (2006b) used the same technique of dropping individuals who did not report meeting the minimum 
expected level of education for an occupation from the Census data before empirical analysis. 
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five standard deviations above the mean hourly wage.  This leaves 5,346 DN observations.  
Since the dataset is based on 5% Census samples, I calculate the number of observations for each 
combination of year and state and then multiply by 20 to get estimates of the total number of 
DNs for each state in each of the three Census years (1980, 1990, and 2000).   
Using state regulation data from the CDR, I identify the 41 states that regulated DNs by 
the year 2000.  Then, using the exemptions to state regulation of DNs in Table 1.1 and the 
industry, employment status, and class of worker variables in the Census data, I map each 
observation from those 41 states to either the exempt category or the not-exempt category.  An 
observation is mapped to the exempt category if the individual is exempt from regulation in the 
state, even if regulation was enacted after the observation year; and an observation is mapped to 
the not-exempt category if the individual is not exempt from regulation in the state, even if 
regulation was enacted after the observation year.  I then calculate the number of observations in 
the two categories for each combination of year and state and multiply by 20 to get estimates of 
the total number of exempt and not-exempt observations for each state in each of the three 
Census years. 
I use the estimates of the total number of DNs, exempt DNs, and not-exempt DNs for 
each year and state to create a state-level dataset for DNs.  Using regulation data from the CDR, I 
create regulation dummies for each year and state.  The regulation dummies for DNs include (1) 
any regulation (licensure, certification, or title protection); regulation that is named licensure, but 
may or may not include practice restriction; and regulation that actually is licensure because it 
includes practice restriction.  I also include year and state dummies and a large number of 
exogenous state variables for the observation year, to control for state-level factors that may 
affect the number of DNs and SWs, independent of regulation of those occupations.  The 
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exogenous state variables include: state population,
53
 natural log of state per-capita gross 
domestic product in year 2000 dollars,
54
 natural log of per-capita income in year 2000 dollars,
55
 
total average state tax burden (state and local taxes),
56
 percentage of females age 25 and over in 
the state who have earned at least a bachelor’s degree,57 percentage of males age 25 and over in 
the state who have earned at least a bachelor’s degree,58 ratio of per capita state debt to per capita 
income,
59
 percentage of state population on Medicare,
60
 percentage of state population below the 
poverty line,
61
 percentage of state population living in urban areas,
62
 and state unemployment 
rate.
63
  Since some of the exogenous state variables are not available for the District of 
Columbia, observations from D.C. are not included.  The resulting dataset for DNs has 150 
observations, one for each of the 50 states in each of the three Census years.  Summary statistics 
are included in Table 3.1. 
3.3.2 Construction of Datasets for Social Workers 
For SWs, I begin with 98,270 SW observations (26,866 from the 1980 Census, 35,953 from the 
1990 Census, and 35,451 from the 2000 Census) and drop 12 observations for individuals who 
work outside the United States and so are not subject to state regulation of SWs.  To focus on 
individuals who are currently employed and working for wages, I drop 16,560 observations for 
individuals who are unemployed, on leave, or not in the workforce and 1,453 observations for 
individuals who do not work for wages.  Again, since the Census data does not identify which 
                                                 
53
 The source for state population data is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
54
 The source for state per-capita gross domestic product is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov).  
55
 The source for state per-capita income is the Council of State Governments’ Book of the States. 
56
 The source for average state tax burden is Tax Foundation (http://www.taxfoundation.org). 
57
 The source for educational attainment data for females is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
58
 The source for educational attainment data for males is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
59
 The source for per capita state debt and state per capita income is the Council of State Governments’ Book of the 
States. 
60
 The source for percentage of state population on Medicare is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
61
 The source for percentage of state population below the poverty line is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
62
 The source for percentage of state population in urban areas is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
63
 The source for state unemployment rate is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov). 
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individuals are actually subject to occupational regulation and a bachelor’s degree is the 
minimum education criteria for entering the SW profession and for any type of state regulation 
of SWs, I drop 25,933 observations for individuals who have not earned at least a bachelor’s 
degree.  To remove outliers, I drop 952 observations for individuals with computed hourly wages 
below the lowest state minimum wage and 147 observations for individuals with hourly wages 
that are more than five standard deviations above the mean hourly wage.  This leaves 53,213 SW 
observations.  Since the dataset is based on 5% Census samples, I calculate the number of 
observations for each combination of year and state and then multiply by 20 to get estimates of 
the total number of SWs for each state in each of the three Census years (1980, 1990, and 2000).   
Using state regulation data from the ASWB, I identify the 33 states that regulated SWs by 
the year 2000.  Then, using the exemptions to state regulation of SWs in Table 1.2 and the 
industry, employment status, and class of worker variables in the Census data, I map each 
observation from those 33 states to either the exempt category or the not-exempt category.  I then 
calculate the number of observations in the two categories for each combination of year and state 
and multiply by 20 to get estimates of the total number of exempt and not-exempt observations 
for each state in each of the three Census years. 
I use the estimates of the total number of SWs, exempt SWs, and not-exempt SWs for 
each year and state to create a state-level dataset for SWs following the same procedure used for 
creating the corresponding dataset for DNs.  I add regulation dummies for each year and state 
based on ASWB data.  The regulation dummies for SWs include any regulation (licensure or title 
protection), regulation that is named licensure, and regulation that actually is licensure.  The 
resulting dataset for SWs has 150 observations (one for each of the 50 states in each of the three 
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Census years) and also includes year and state dummies and the same exogenous state variables 
included for DNs.  Summary statistics are included in Table 3.1. 
3.4 Empirical Model 
To estimate the effect of state regulation of DNs and SWs on the number of practitioners in each 
occupation, I use an empirical model of the form:  
                             
 
where the dependent variable N is one of four measures of the number of practitioners for state s 
in year t, R is a dummy for the type of regulation (any regulation, regulation named licensure, or 
licensure) in state s in year t, S is a vector of exogenous state characteristics in state s in year t,   
includes state fixed effects,   includes year fixed effects, and   is a random disturbance term in 
state s in year t.  The fixed effects (FE) model controls for unobservable state attributes that are 
constant over time.  I estimate separate empirical models for each combination of number 
measure and state regulation variable for each occupation.  Year dummies are for the three 
Census years: 1980, 1990, and 2000.  The four different measures of the number of practitioners 
are (1) the total number of practitioners in the occupation when the model includes all 50 states, 
(2) the total number of practitioners in the occupation when the model includes only states that 
regulate the occupation by the year 2000, (3) the number of practitioners in the exempt category 
for the occupation when the model includes only states that regulate the occupation by the year 
2000, and (4) the number of practitioners in the not-exempt category for the occupation when the 
model includes only states that regulate the occupation by the year 2000.  The three different 
state regulation variables are (1) a dummy variable equal to one if the state has any type of 
regulation of the occupation, (2) a dummy variable equal to one if the state has regulation that is 
named licensure (with or without practice restriction), and (3) a dummy variable equal to one if 
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the state has true licensure (with practice restriction) of the occupation.  For DNs, there are 41 
states that regulate the occupation by the year 2000, and the dummy variable for any type of 
regulation is equal to one if the state has licensure, certification, or title protection for DNs.  For 
SWs, there are 33 states that regulate the occupation by the year 2000, and the dummy variable 
for any type of regulation is equal to one if the state has licensure or title protection for SWs.   
All models include both year and state fixed effects, with clustering by state.   
Economic theory predicts a possible reduction in the number of practitioners due to 
licensure, because state licensing boards can restrict practice in the occupation through 
manipulation of licensure requirements.  As noted in Chapter 1, the literature includes mixed 
results on this topic, and there are examples of occupations where licensure does not appear to 
reduce the number of practitioners.  For both DNs and SWs, there is a strong national 
organization that develops, maintains, and administers the examinations required to earn 
credentials in states that regulate those occupations.  The Commission on Dietetic Registration 
(CDR) not only administers the examinations for licensure, certification, and title protection for 
DNs, but also sets the requirements for the national RDN credential, which is the model for 
nearly every state statute.  Similarly, the Association of Social Work Boards (ASWB) 
administers the examinations for licensure and title protection of SWs and also developed and 
maintains a model practice act upon which most state statutes are based.  Thus, there is a high 
degree of national influence over the state statutes for occupational regulation of DNs and SWs.   
Of course states do ultimately control whether or not to regulate DNs or SWs, what type 
of regulation to enact, and the detailed elements of the statutes.  Therefore, in the case of 
licensure of DNs or SWs, when practice restriction is included in the state statute, it is possible 
for states to limit the number of practitioners.  However, where national professional 
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organizations for DNs and SWs set standards that are duplicated by state statutes, the impacts of 
state regulations may be reduced and the number of practitioners may not be strongly influenced 
by licensure.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect either no impact or a very small negative 
impact on the number of practitioners due to licensure for these occupations. 
 The topic of how occupational licensure affects the number of individuals in the exempt 
and not-exempt categories is not found in the literature.  Practitioners who expect to earn higher 
wages due to licensure would have incentive to move from job positions in the exempt category 
to those in the not-exempt category to earn higher wages in exchange for meeting licensure 
requirements.  Practitioners who do not expect to realize a wage premium due to licensure would 
have incentive to move from job positions in the not-exempt category to those in the exempt 
category to avoid investing in the human capital necessary to become licensed.   
3.5 Empirical Results 
This section discusses the results of the empirical analysis for both DNs and SWs.  In addition to 
the linear models for the effect of any regulation, regulation named licensure, and licensure on 
the number of DNs or SWs that are reported in this section, I also estimate non-linear models for 
the effect of years-of-any regulation, years-of-regulation named licensure, and years-of-licensure 
on the number of DNs or SWs.  Empirical results for the non-linear models are included in the 
Appendix for Chapter 3, instead of in this section, since no significant coefficients for the years-
of-regulation variables are found. 
3.5.1 Empirical Results for Dietitians and Nutritionists 
Estimates of the impact of state regulation on the number of DNs are included in Table 3.2 for 
any regulation (licensure, certification, or title protection), Table 3.3 for regulation named 
licensure (with or without practice restriction), and Table 3.4 for licensure (with practice 
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restriction).  Each column in the tables includes results for a separate model for one of the 
measures of the number of DNs as a function of the type of regulation.   The four models include 
(1) the number of DNs using data for all 50 states, (2) the number of DNs using data from just 
the 41 states that regulate DNs by 2000, (3) the number of DNs in the exempt category using 
data from just the 41 states that regulate DNs by 2000, and (4) the number of DNs in the not-
exempt category using data from just the 41 states that regulate DNs by 2000.  All models 
control for year and state fixed effects and exogenous state variables and employ clustering by 
state. 
 In Table 3.2, the coefficient of the any regulation variable is positive, but not statistically 
significant for all models.  There is no evidence that any regulation of DNs reduces the number 
of DNs in any model or that any regulation of DNs causes movement between job positions in 
the exempt and not-exempt categories.  Results in Table 3.3 for the effect of regulation named 
licensure on the number of DNs are similar to those in Table 3.2, since the coefficient of the 
regulation named licensure variable is positive, but not statistically significant for all models. 
For the effect of licensure on the number of DNs in Table 3.4, the coefficients of the 
licensure variable in the first two columns are positive and not statistically significant, so there is 
no evidence that licensure of DNs reduces the number of DNs.  The coefficient of the licensure 
variable in the third column is positive and significant at the 5% level.  This suggests that 
licensure increases the number of DNs in job positions that are exempt from regulation.  While 
the coefficient of the licensure variable in the fourth column is negative, it is not statistically 
significant, so I cannot conclude that licensure also decreases the number of DNs in job positions 
that are not exempt from regulation.  However, a plausible argument to explain the signs of the 
coefficients is that the increase in the number of practitioners in the exempt category may be due 
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to a shift of practitioners away from the not-exempt category, as practitioners avoid investing in 
the human capital necessary to earn licensing credentials if there is an option to practice the 
occupation as a member of the exempt category.   
3.5.2 Empirical Results for Social Workers 
Estimates of the impact of state regulation on the number of SWs are included in Table 3.5 for 
any regulation (licensure or title protection), Table 3.6 for regulation named licensure (with or 
without practice restriction), and Table 3.7 for licensure (with practice restriction).  Each column 
in the tables includes results for a separate model for one of the measures of the number of SWs 
as a function of the type of regulation.  The four models include (1) the number of SWs using 
data for all 50 states, (2) the number of SWs using data from just the 33 states that regulate SWs 
by 2000, (3) the number of SWs in the exempt category using data from just the 33 states that 
regulate SWs by 2000, and (4) the number of SWs in the not-exempt category using data from 
just the 33 states that regulate SWs by 2000.  All models control for year and state fixed effects 
and exogenous state variables and employ clustering by state. 
 In all three tables, the coefficients of the regulation type variable in the first two columns 
are negative and not statistically significant.  Although the coefficients have the expected 
negative sign, the lack of statistical significance means there is no empirical evidence that any 
type of regulation of SWs reduces the number of practitioners.  The coefficients of the regulation 
type variable in the last two columns of the three tables are also not statistically significant, so 
there is no empirical evidence of any shift in the number of practitioners between job positions in 
the exempt and not-exempt categories due to regulation of SWs. 
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3.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of state regulation of DNs and SWs on the number of 
practitioners.  For both occupations, the impact of different types of regulation on the number of 
DNs or SWs is small and not significant. There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
licensure reduces the number of practitioners.  This result for DNs and SWs is consistent with 
the literature for RNs and public school teachers, where, as noted at the end of Chapter 2, 
licensure is not found to affect the number of practitioners for those occupations.   
 One possible explanation for not finding evidence of a decrease in the number of 
practitioners due to licensure is that licensure can actually increase the demand for service by 
reducing lemons in the market through the minimum competency requirements.  Consumers who 
are loss averse and were not in the market for service prior to licensure may enter the market 
when licensure is in place.  This increase in demand could balance out any reduction in the 
number of practitioners due to licensing (Kleiner 2006b). 
 In the case of DNs, there is some evidence that licensure of DNs causes movement of 
DNs from the not-exempt category to the exempt category.  This evidence is a statistically 
significant increase in the number of DNs in job positions that are exempt from regulation, 
together with a decrease in the number of DNs in job positions that are not exempt from 
regulation that is not significant.  This shift from the not-exempt to the exempt category due to 
licensure may show movement of DNs to exempt positions to avoid complying with licensure 
requirements, if not-exempt job positions do not have higher wages.  For SWs, there are no 
significant results associated with changes in the numbers of SWs in the exempt and not-exempt 
categories due to licensure. 
3.7 Tables and Figures 
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Figure 3.1a – Number of States that Introduced Regulation of Dietitians and Nutritionists per 
Year 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1b – Number of States that Introduced Licensure of Dietitians and Nutritionists per 
Year 
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Figure 3.2a – Number of States that Introduced Regulation of Social Workers per Year 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2b – Number of States that Introduced Licensure of Social Workers per Year 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the State-Level Datasets for Dietitians and Nutritionists and 
Social Workers 
 
Dietitians and Nutritionists 1980 1990 2000 
Total Number of DNs using data from 50 States 25,920 38,640 42,360 
Total Number of DNs using data from 41 States that Regulate 
DNs by Year 2000 
21,620 32,740 35,300 
Number of Exempt DNs using data from 41 States that Regulate 
DNs by Year 2000 
6,420 8,480 8,860 
Number of Not-Exempt DNs using data from 41 States that 
Regulate DNs by Year 2000 
15,200 24,260 26,440 
 
Social Workers 1980 1990 2000 
Total Number of SWs using data from 50 States 269,540 378,000 421,400 
Total Number of SWs using data from 33 States that Regulate 
SWs by Year 2000 
148,680 200,800 245,740 
Number of Exempt SWs using data from 33 States that Regulate 
SWs by Year 2000 
39,520 46,320 43,820 
Number of Not-Exempt SWs using data from 33 States that 
Regulate SWs by Year 2000 
109,160 154,480 201,920 
    
Numbers of DNs and SWs are extrapolated from 1980, 1990, 2000 5% Census Series, keeping 
DNs and SWs who are currently employed and working for wages and have at least a bachelor’s 
degree. 
State regulation data for DNs are from the Commission on Dietetic Registration. 
State regulation data for SWs are from the Association of Social Work Boards. 
Exempt DNs or SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute 
exempts from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt DNs or SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute 
does not exempt from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
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Table 3.2: Effect of Any Regulation on the Number of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
DNs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of DNs 
using data from 41 
States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
DNs using data 
from 41 States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt DNs using 
data from 41 States 
that Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
Any  102.084 170.377 14.509 155.869 
Regulation (84.207) (113.614) (67.086) (120.129) 
Year 1990 108.001 90.369 182.351 -91.982 
 (153.681) (191.380) (234.214) (284.755) 
Year 2000 32.773 -9.069 388.711 -397.780 
 (245.311) (306.347) (398.849) (466.873) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 41 41 41 
n 150 123 123 123 
 
Exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not 
exempt from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax 
rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per 
capita state GDP, state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of 
state population below the poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.3: Effect of Regulation Named Licensure on the Number of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
DNs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of DNs 
using data from 41 
States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
DNs using data 
from 41 States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt DNs using 
data from 41 States 
that Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
Regulation 44.582 68.557 5.345 63.212 
Named 
Licensure 
(66.697) (81.239) (100.744) (115.254) 
Year 1990 141.264 138.904 186.932 -48.027 
 (160.720) (207.540) (279.021) (326.122) 
Year 2000 93.225 71.969 396.537 -324.568 
 (253.556) (324.999) (496.543) (543.910) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 41 41 41 
n 150 123 123 123 
 
Exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not 
exempt from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax 
rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per 
capita state GDP, state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of 
state population below the poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.4: Effect of Licensure on the Number of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
DNs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of DNs 
using data from 41 
States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
DNs using data 
from 41 States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt DNs using 
data from 41 States 
that Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
Licensure 22.402 38.608 94.419** -55.812 
 (67.889) (76.661) (41.949) (63.975) 
Year 1990 165.352 175.398 128.687 46.711 
 (167.257) (217.821) (191.936) (274.539) 
Year 2000 145.218 150.641 284.266 -133.625 
 (240.682) (316.074) (321.037) (407.129) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 41 41 41 
n 150 123 123 123 
 
Exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not 
exempt from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax 
rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per 
capita state GDP, state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of 
state population below the poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.5: Effect of Any Regulation on the Number of Social Workers 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
SWs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of SWs 
using data from 41 
States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
SWs using data 
from 41 States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt SWs using 
data from 41 States 
that Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
Any  -491.545 -143.477 -155.599 12.123 
Regulation (612.194) (443.058) (294.809) (426.045) 
Year 1990 1687.565 -327.530 416.967 -744.497 
 (1697.448) (1654.553) (707.252) (1631.969) 
Year 2000 3980.554 469.911 826.462 -356.551 
 (3043.56) (3058.278) (1515.752) (3049.649) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 33 33 33 
n 150 99 99 99 
 
Exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not 
exempt from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax 
rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per 
capita state GDP, state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of 
state population below the poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.6: Effect of Regulation Named Licensure on the Number of Social Workers 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
SWs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of SWs 
using data from 41 
States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
SWs using data 
from 41 States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt SWs using 
data from 41 States 
that Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
Regulation -161.493 -44.441 180.856 -225.296 
Named 
Licensure 
(555.904) (354.318) (172.996) (347.375) 
Year 1990 1461.71 -385.397 185.479 -570.877 
 (1693.181) (1542.859) (608.033) (1583.628) 
Year 2000 3444.271 319.465 272.242 47.224 
 (2909.118) (2811.329) (1322.499) (2992.273) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 33 33 33 
n 150 99 99 99 
 
Exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not 
exempt from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax 
rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per 
capita state GDP, state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of 
state population below the poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.7: Effect of Licensure on the Number of Social Workers 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
SWs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of SWs 
using data from 41 
States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
SWs using data 
from 41 States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt SWs using 
data from 41 States 
that Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
Licensure -609.869 -305.821 -184.927 -120.894 
 (648.660) (507.260) (317.283) (502.713) 
Year 1990 1678.643 -258.522 415.223 -673.745 
 (1699.429) (1681.554) (702.271) (1674.511) 
Year 2000 4019.954 668.237 837.799 -169.562 
 (3036.23) (3138.86) (1507.72) (3184.862) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 33 33 33 
n 150 99 99 99 
 
Exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not 
exempt from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax 
rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per 
capita state GDP, state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of 
state population below the poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 4: Effect of Occupational Licensure on the Wages of 
Practitioners 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the empirical analysis of the economic effects of occupational licensure 
on two occupations: dietitians and nutritionists (DNs) and social workers (SWs).  I estimate the 
effect of licensure on the wages of practitioners in these occupations.  The effect of licensure on 
wages is a topic of interest because some of the literature on occupational licensure supports the 
hypothesis of a wage premium due to licensure
64
 while some of the literature does not.
65
  
Empirical results depend on the occupation studied, education requirements of the occupation, 
wages of practitioners prior to regulation, and the employment setting.  Occupations that require 
advanced degrees, pay high wages without regulation, and determine wages on an individual 
basis because practitioners work primarily in the quasi-private sector tend to realize higher wage 
increases due to occupational licensure than occupations that require less formal education, pay 
lower wages without regulation, and determine wages on a group basis because practitioners 
work primarily in institutional settings (Kleiner 2006b).   
DNs and SWs occupy a middle ground, since they are professional occupations that 
require a minimum of a bachelor’s degree, but average wages in the two professions are low 
compared to other occupations that require a bachelor’s degree and a substantial fraction of the 
practitioners in both occupations work in institutional settings (e.g., hospitals and educational 
institutions).  In addition, the majority of DNs and SWs are women and many of the practitioners 
                                                 
64
 Examples of empirical analysis estimating a wage premium due to occupational licensure include: Shephard 
(1978), Kleiner (2000), and Kleiner and Kudrle (2000), who studied dentists; Kleiner (2000) and Tenn (2001), who 
studied lawyers; Kugler and Sauer (2005), who studied physicians in Israel; Benham and Benman (1975) and 
Feldman and Begun (1985), who studied optometrists; Timmons and Thornton (2007), who studied radiologic 
technologists; and Timmons and Thornton (2010), who studied barbers.  
65
 Examples of empirical analysis finding no wage premium due to occupational licensure include: White (1978), 
who studied clinical lab personnel; White (1980), who studied nurses; and Kleiner (2000), who studied barbers and 
cosmetologists.   
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in both occupations work part time (35 or fewer hours per week).
66
  It is unclear how this 
combination of factors (high percentages of women, part time workers, and institutional workers 
in both occupations; and below average wages in both occupations) will affect the wage 
premium due to licensure.  Table 4.1 for DNs and Table 4.2 for SWs present summary statistics 
for the work and wage related variables mentioned here, based on the datasets of professional 
DNs and SWs derived from the 5% Census surveys for 1980, 1990, and 2000 in Chapter 3.  
The economic theory that predicts a wage increase due to licensure depends on the 
practice restriction component of licensure that allows licensing boards to control entry into the 
occupation.  Thus, an increase in wages may result from a decrease in the supply of labor due to 
licensure.  In Chapter 3, I found that, for both DNs and SWs, the impact of licensure on the 
number of practitioners is very small and not significant.  Therefore, there was no evidence to 
support the hypothesis that licensure reduces the number of practitioners in those occupations.  
As a result, licensure may not cause a shift in the supply of labor for DNs and SWs and there 
may not be a wage premium due to licensure for those occupations.  As noted in Chapter 2, the 
literature for RNs and public school teachers suggests that licensure does not impact the number 
of practitioners or cause a lasting wage premium.  However, a shift in demand for the services of 
DNs or SWs due to licensure could still impact wages, since consumers who are loss averse may 
enter the market for the services of DNs or SWs only when practitioners in those occupations are 
licensed.  To investigate further, I model the effect of licensure on the wages of DNs and SWs 
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 The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines part time work as 35 hours or less per week.  Some professions (for 
example, medical professions) define full time work as 35 hours per week. 
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for the same 20-year period (1980 through 2000)
67
 that I used for modeling the effect of 
licensure on the number of DNs and SWs in Chapter 3. 
4.2 Research Design 
Empirical studies of the impact of occupational licensure include models of different measures of 
financial compensation, including income, earnings, and wages.
68
  Wages are typically viewed as 
a subset of earnings, while earnings are a subset of income.  Care must be taken when comparing 
empirical results based on different compensation measures.  In three separate studies based on 
U.S. Census data, for example, Pfeffer (1974) models median incomes in licensed occupations, 
Kleiner (2006b) models hourly earnings of physicians and dentists, and White (1980) models 
median wages of nurses.  In this dissertation, I estimate models for the impact of various aspects 
of occupational regulation on the wages of practitioners in the regulated occupations.  I use 
wages as self-reported in the Census data, and I include individuals who are paid a salary or a 
wage by a public or private company and individuals who are self-employed, but report earning a 
wage.  I ignore any income derived from other sources. 
 I use the 1980, 1990, and 2000 5% Census Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 
2004) as the source for data about the wages of practitioners in the DN and SW occupations over 
the time period from 1980 to 2000.  This is the same source data that I used in Chapter 3 to 
model the impact of licensure on the number of practitioners.  Filtering of the data to create a 
dataset for DNs and a dataset for SWs suitable for estimating the impact of licensure on wages is 
described in Section 4.3.3.  As previously noted, the U.S. Census data includes annual wage for 
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 The 20 year time period from 1980 to 2000 was a period of active state regulation of DNs and SWs, since it 
captures approximately 87.5% of state regulation activity for DNs and approximately 62% of state regulation 
activity for SWs. 
68
 The U.S. Census defines Total Income as the sum of Wages, Business Income, Farm Income, Social Security 
Income, Welfare Income, Investment Income, Retirement Income, and Other Income.   
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each observation and enough information to compute an hourly wage.
69
  In this chapter, I 
estimate separate models for annual wage and hourly wage. 
The importance of modeling hourly wage is due to the high percentage of female 
practitioners and part time workers in the DN and SW occupations.  This is particularly true if 
the percentage of females or the percentage of part-time workers varies over the 20-year 
observation interval for an occupation.  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the percentage of males and 
females in the datasets for DNs and SWs, respectively.  Roughly 93% of DNs and 70% of SWs 
are female.  There is little variation in the percentage of females in the DN occupation over the 
20-year interval, but the percentage of females in the SW occupation grows from 62% in 1980 to 
78% in 2000. 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in 1998, 28.4% of females and 12.7% of 
males in the labor force worked part time (less than 36 hours per week).
70
  Thus, a higher 
percentage of female practitioners is likely to be associated with a higher percentage of part time 
workers.
71
  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 also show the percent of part time workers in the datasets for DNs 
and SWs, respectively, in each observation year.  For DNs, the percentage of part time workers 
tended to increase over the 20-year interval, while, for SWs, the percentage of part time workers 
tended to decrease over the same interval.   
In summary, the DN occupation maintained a roughly constant percentage of females, but 
saw an increase in the percentage of part time workers, while the SW occupation saw an increase 
in the percentage of females, coupled with an unexpected decrease in the percentage of part time 
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 Hourly wage = (annual wage)/((weeks worked per year)*(hours worked per week)). 
70
 The source for data about part time workers in 1998 is the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
www.bls/opub/ted/2000/Feb/wk4/art02.htm  
71
 The report on the 1999 ADA membership database (Bryk 2001) indicates that 31.6 percent of RDs work 30 hours 
or less per week, 63.3 percent work 31 to 40 hours per week, and only 5.1 percent work more than 40 hours per 
week. 
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workers.  Although an annual wage model could control for both gender and hours worked per 
week, I choose to estimate separate models for annual wage and hourly wage.  This allows me to 
isolate the impact of licensure on hourly wages, separate from any social forces that may 
influence the percentage of part time workers in the two occupations.  With models for both 
annual and hourly wage, I am also in a position to compare my empirical results to others who 
have modeled either wage measure. 
I implement three sets of wage models for DNs and SWs so that I can explore various 
aspects of the effect of occupational regulation on wages.
72
  For ease of reference, I label the sets 
of models: (1) regulation-level models, (2) years-of-regulation models, and (3) regulation-
strictness models.  All models are human capital earnings models of the natural log of wages as a 
function of regulation variables, either year dummies or years of regulation variables, individual 
demographic variables, exogenous state variables, and state dummies.   
Regulation-level models control for a single level of occupational regulation, where 
levels are related to, but not exactly equal to, the types of regulation defined in Chapter 1.  I look 
at three different regulation levels: (1) any regulation, (2) regulation that is named licensure 
(with or without practice restriction), and (3) licensure (with practice restriction).  For DNs, any 
regulation is true if the individual is subject to title protection, certification, or licensure in the 
observation year, since there are no examples of the regulation type registration for DNs.  
Similarly, for SWs, any regulation is true if the individual is subject to title protection or 
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 I formulated a fourth set of wage models using the Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences (DDD) methodology.  
Treatment states are states that regulate the occupation, while control states are states that do not regulate the 
occupation.  The treatment period is the time after regulation is enacted, while the control period is the time before 
regulation is enacted in treatment states.  The treatment group is individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree 
(subject to regulation), while the control group is individuals without a bachelor’s degree.  Using education level to 
identify the treatment group is problematic, since higher education levels are generally associated with higher 
wages, even in the absence of occupational regulation.  There is no consistent way to separate the wage effect due to 
education from the wage effect due to regulation.  The DDD models also do not give significant results, so I have 
chosen not to include them. 
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licensure in the observation year, since there are no examples of the regulation types registration 
or certification for SWs.   
The intent of the regulation-level models is to explore whether or not there is a wage 
premium due to licensure.  If there is a wage premium, the intent is to learn whether it is the 
practice restriction component of licensure, or the name licensure, or just the existence of any 
type of regulation that leads to the wage premium.  Due to the strong influence of the CDR for 
DNs and the ASWB for SWs, state statutes for title protection and certification are very similar 
to statutes for licensure. Therefore, an individual who earns the title protection credential in one 
state (or the certification credential, in the case of DNs) has demonstrated the same level of 
competence as an individual who earns the licensure credential in another state.  To the extent 
that this is true, any regulation might have the same impact on wages as licensure. 
Years-of-regulation models control for the absence of a single level of occupational 
regulation and some measure of the duration of that level of occupational regulation.  For 
example, one model controls for no regulation (which is true if the individual is not subject to 
any regulation in the observation year) and the natural log of the number of years of any 
regulation (if the individual is subject to any regulation in the observation year).  I look at three 
different controls for the absence of regulation: (1) no regulation (which is the opposite of any 
regulation), (2) no regulation or regulation that is not named licensure (which is the opposite of 
regulation that is named licensure), and (3) no regulation or regulation that is not licensure 
(which is the opposite of licensure).   For each of these three cases, I control for the years of that 
level of occupational regulation either with the natural log of the years of regulation or with 
years of regulation and the square of years of regulation.   
80 
 
The intent of the years-of-regulation models is to capture non-linear effects of 
occupational regulation and the lag nature of grandfather effects and to explore whether any 
wage premium due to licensure varies over time.  Models that control for the natural log of years 
of regulation are suited to cases where wages increase with years of regulation, but the rate of 
increase slows with increasing years, or wages decrease with years of regulation, but the rate of 
decrease slows with increasing years.  Similarly, models that control for years of regulation and 
the square of years of regulation are suited to cases where occupational regulation initially 
increases wages, but the wage premium due to regulation evaporates over time. 
Regulation-strictness models control for the type of occupational regulation (title 
protection, certification, or licensure for DNs; and title protection or licensure for SWs) and the 
various elements of the state statutes that contribute to the strictness of the regulation.  These 
models are estimated using subsets of the DN and SW datasets that include only individuals who 
are subject to occupational regulation in the observation year.  This means that the individual’s 
state has occupational regulation in effect and the individual is not exempt from that regulation.   
The intent of the regulation-strictness models is to explore whether any wage premium 
due to regulation can be attributed to the strictness of the type of regulation or to the strictness of 
the specific elements of the state statutes.  Licensure is stricter than certification, for example, 
and certification is stricter than title protection.  Elements that contribute to the strictness of 
occupational regulation include requirements to obtain credentials (degree, exam, practice or 
experience hours, and application fees), requirements to maintain credentials (continuing 
education hours and renewal fees), and the fraction of the state board that is comprised of 
practitioners of the occupation.  These are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3. 
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For the regulation-level and years-of-regulation models, I estimate a series of models.  
First, I estimate the impact of regulation on wages using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. 
Given the possibility that OLS coefficients may be biased and inconsistent due to endogeneity 
from both omitted variable bias and simultaneous/reverse causality, I then estimate both a state 
fixed effects (FE) model and a two stage least squares (2SLS) model.
73
  The FE model controls   
for unobservable state attributes that are constant over time.  This allows me to focus on the 
effect of changes in regulation within states, without the effect of heterogeneity among states.  
The 2SLS model with an instrumental variable (IV) for either regulation level or absence of 
regulation level focuses on the endogeneity originating from the uncertain causality between 
wages and regulation.  When practitioners of an occupation work in a state where wages for that 
occupation are low, practitioners may request regulation to secure higher wages.  In this case, 
low wages initiate a push for occupational regulation.  However, if licensure of an occupation is 
just an indication that state occupational associations are successful in limiting entry into the 
occupation, then OLS estimates of the effect of regulation on wages might be too high (Timmons 
2006).  For the regulation-strictness models, I only estimate an OLS model, because the state-by-
state variation in the components of the state statutes causes an omitted variable problem when I 
try to control for state FEs and the large number of regulation variables makes it too difficult to 
find IVs for each one.  All models employ clustering of standard errors by state because the 
regulation variable varies at the state level.  In addition, all models control for either Census year 
or some measure of years of regulation.    
The use of IVs in the literature on the effect of occupational licensure on the wages of 
practitioners is rare.  I found only one case (Timmons 2006) where IVs were used for licensure 
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 For 2SLS years-of-regulation models, I estimated the models using a maximum likelihood treatment effect 
specification (via treatreg command in STATA) and results were similar to those with xtivreg, so I report the xtivreg 
results in the empirical results.   
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variables.  Timmons’ empirical models used data from only one Census sample at a time, while I 
use data from three different Census samples over a 20-year period.  I believe that using Census 
data from multiple years adds to the challenge of identifying appropriate IVs.  My search for 
possible IVs that are conceptually valid and can be substantiated included testing a large number 
of variables that describe state revenue from occupational licensure, the prevalence of 
occupational licensure in the state, the political climate in the state, and the makeup and 
dynamics of the state legislature.  Variables that describe the makeup and dynamics of the state 
legislature proved to be the most promising IVs, since it is the members of the state legislature 
who must write, introduce, debate, and vote on bills for occupational regulation. 
I select two IVs for use in my empirical models.  Suitable IVs must be logically correct 
(correlated with regulation, but not correlated with wages), have the correct sign in the first stage 
(regulation variable as a function of the IV), yield the correct sign for wages as a function of the 
regulation variable in the second stage, and yield satisfactory statistics.  The test statistic when 
standard errors are clustered is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic.  Based on the Staiger 
and Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb, when the F-statistic is 10 or more, an IV has sufficient power 
for use in the models.  For the regulation-level models, I use the percentage of Democrat state 
legislators minus the percentage of Republican state legislators two years before the first year of 
any regulation of the occupation in the state as an IV for any regulation, regulation that is named 
licensure, and licensure.
74
  Democrat legislators are more likely to adopt occupational regulation 
than Republican legislators. So, a higher value of this IV should be associated with a higher 
probability of the state adopting occupational regulation.  Since it can take a couple of years to 
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 Timmons (2006 Dissertation) used the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature as an instrument for 
various licensure variables for massage therapists and barbers. 
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introduce a new occupational regulation bill, gather support, and get the bill passed, I look at the 
makeup of the state legislature two years before the first year of any regulation. 
For the years-of-regulation models, I use the percentage turnover in the state House in the 
first year of any regulation of the occupation in the state as an IV for (1) no regulation (which is 
the opposite of any regulation), (2) no regulation or regulation that is not named licensure (which 
is the opposite of regulation that is named licensure), and (3) no regulation or regulation that is 
not licensure (which is the opposite of licensure).
75
  The idea is that a high level of turnover in 
the state legislature has a negative impact on producing legislation.  So, higher values of this IV 
should be associated with a lower probability of the state adopting occupational regulation.  I 
look at the turnover rate in the state House (instead of the state Senate), because occupational 
regulation is typically introduced in the state House.  Also, I look at the turnover rate in the first 
year of any regulation, since that is the year during which passage of occupational regulation is 
most likely to be affected by churn in the makeup of the state House.   
Summarizing the research plan, I build on the DN and SW datasets derived from the 
1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Census samples in Chapter 3 and use data on state regulations from 
the CDR for DNs and from the ASWB for SWs to create datasets suitable for modeling the effect 
of occupational licensure on the wages of practitioners.  Because of the high percentage of 
female practitioners and part time workers in the two occupations, I create separate models for 
annual wage and hourly wage.  I define three sets of wage models for DNs and SWs so that I can 
explore various aspects of the effect of occupational regulation on both wage measures.  For ease 
of reference, I label the models: regulation-level models, years-of-regulation models, and 
regulation-strictness models.  For each set of wage models, I outline a series of regressions to 
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 Smith (1982) examined factors that affect occupational licensure, including the dynamics of the makeup of the 
state legislature.  Timmons (2006) used turnover rate of the state legislature as an instrument for various licensure 
variables for radiologic technologists, massage therapists, and barbers. 
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implement, including OLS, FE, and 2SLS for the regulation-level and years-of-regulation models 
and OLS for the regulation-strictness models.  To support the 2SLS regressions, I identify 
appropriate IVs to use for the regulation level and absence of regulation level variables. 
4.3 Data 
To study the effect of state regulation on wages, I use the datasets of professional members of the 
DN and SW occupations created in Chapter 3 using the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census samples. 
The datasets include individuals who are currently employed and working for wages and have 
earned at least a bachelor’s degree.  Previous empirical studies that used wage data from the U.S. 
Census to estimate the effect of occupational licensure on wages include Stigler (1971),
76
 Kleiner 
(2006b),
77
 Timmons (2006),
78
 and Kleiner (2013).
79
  Stigler and Timmons used data from a 
single Census year, while Kleiner (2006b) combined data from the 1990 and 2000 decennial 
Census surveys, and Kleiner (2013) combined data from the 2001 through 2009 annual ACS 
surveys.   
Census variables important for empirical analysis of the effect of licensure on wages of 
practitioners include: year, annual wage, age, gender, race, education, marital status, number of 
children less than five years old, state where employed, industry where employed, and an 
indication of whether or not the individual works in a metropolitan area.  Also included are the 
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 Stigler (1971) used data from the 1960 Census and found that unregulated occupations earn one-third less than 
regulated occupations.  However, Stigler did not employ control variables for human capital or regional differences. 
77
 Kleiner (2006b) used data from the 1990 and 2000 Census to estimate the impact of licensing on hourly wages for 
selected occupations by comparing wages for licensed occupations to wages for comparable unregulated 
occupations that have similar education and experience requirements.  Kleiner found that being in a licensed 
occupation enhanced the hourly earnings of the regulated occupations by about ten percent. 
78
 Timmons (2006) used data from the 2000 Census to estimate the impact of licensing on annual wages of massage 
therapists and barbers and found that specific licensing provisions were associated with increases in annual wages.  
For example, a 100-hour increase in education requirements is associated with an estimated 3.6%-5.8% increase in 
annual wages for massage therapists.  Similarly, an apprenticeship requirement is associated with an estimated 
9.1%-22.4% increase in annual wages for barbers. 
79
 Kleiner (2013) used data from the 2001 through 2009 annual American Community Survey (ACS) to estimate the 
impact of regulation on the wages of interior designers.  Kleiner found little influence of individual regulation 
variables on measures of hourly wage determination. 
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number of weeks worked per year and the usual number of hours worked per week, which I use 
to compute an hourly wage.
80
  The computed hourly wage is used to remove outliers.  All dollar 
amounts for annual and hourly wages are converted to year 2000 dollars. 
The industry
81
 where employed is the work setting and economic sector in which an 
individual performs an occupation.
82
  It does not refer to a specific technical function or job.  
There are 267 industry codes spread across 17 industry groups in the 2000 Census.  The 1980 
and 1990 Census have fewer industry codes
83
 and slightly different industry groups, so I map the 
industry code for each individual from the 1980 and 1990 Census to the appropriate industry 
group from the 2000 Census to allow for a consistent set of industry groups across all three 
Census samples.
84
   
I use state regulation data from the Commission on Dietetic Registration (CDR) for DNs 
and from the Association of Social Work Boards (ASWB) for SWs to create the various 
regulation variables needed to support implementation of the different wage models defined in 
Section 4.2.  For the regulation-level models, I create pairs of dummy variables for (1) any 
regulation versus no regulation, (2) regulation that is named licensure versus no regulation or 
regulation that is not named licensure, and (3) regulation that is licensure (with practice 
restriction) versus no regulation or regulation that is not licensure.  In addition, for the years-of-
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 Hourly wage = (annual wage)/((weeks worked per year)*(hours worked per week)). 
81
 The source for Census industry definitions is: https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/IND#description_section  
82
 Individuals who worked in more than one industry were asked to report the industry in which he/she first earned 
the most money, or, second, spent the most time.   
83
 There are 245 industry codes in 1990 and 234 industry codes in 1980. 
84
 The 17 industry groups from the 2000 Census are: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting; Mining; 
Construction; Manufacturing; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Transportation and Warehousing; Utilities; 
Information and Communications; Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing; Professional, Scientific, 
Management, Administrative, and Waste Management; Educational, Health, and Social Services; Arts, 
Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodations, and Food Services; Other Services (Except Public Administration); 
Public Administration; Armed Forces; and Unemployed.  Since a majority of DNs and SWs work in the 
Educational, Health, and Social Services  industry group and that group can logically be divided, I define four 
subgroups: Educational Services, Health Services (not Hospitals), Hospitals, and Social Services.  This distributes 
the observations more evenly across industry groups, which makes control for industry groups more meaningful in 
the empirical models. 
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regulation models, I create variables for (1) years of any regulation, square of years of any 
regulation, and natural log of years of any regulation, (2) years of regulation that is named 
licensure, square of years of regulation that is named licensure, and natural log of years of 
regulation that is named licensure, and (3) years of licensure, square of years of licensure, and 
natural log of years of licensure.  Finally, for the regulation-strictness models, I create variables 
for the type of state regulation and the various elements of the state statutes that contribute to the 
strictness of the regulation.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the types of regulation are no regulation, 
title protection, certification, and licensure for DNs and no regulation, title protection, and 
licensure for SWs.  Elements of the state statutes that contribute to the strictness of the regulation 
include degree, exam, practice or experience hours, and application fee requirements to obtain 
credentials; yearly continuing education hours
85
 and renewal fee requirements to maintain 
credentials; and the fraction of the state board that is comprised of practitioners of the 
occupation.
86
  For states that schedule renewal of credentials every second or third year, I 
compute an annual renewal fee.  For states that combine application and yearly fees for the first 
year or two, I subtract the yearly fee(s) from the application fee.  All dollar amounts for 
application and renewal fees are converted to year 2000 dollars.
87
   
The datasets also include year and state dummies and a number of exogenous state 
variables for the observation year, including: natural log of state population,
88
 natural log of state 
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 Adams (1996) suggests that a higher requirement for continuing education hours leads to higher wages because 
consumers are willing to pay more for services when practitioners have more continuing education requirements.  
Therefore, higher continuing education requirements make a regulation statute stricter. 
86
 Graddy and Nichol (1989) argue that the state will have less stringent regulation if there are more public members 
on the licensing board.  This suggests that strictness of regulation will increase with the fraction of the state board 
that is comprised of practitioners of the occupation. 
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 Some states include application and renewal fees in the state statutes, while other states do not. It is difficult to 
track the exact progression of regulation fees year-by-year.  I take the correct fee amounts for a year where I can 
verify the fees and then convert them to year 2000 dollars.    
88
 The source for state population data is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
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per-capita gross domestic product in year 2000 dollars,
89
 total average state tax burden (state and 
local taxes),
90
 percentage of females age 25 and over in the state who have earned at least a 
bachelor’s degree,91 percentage of males age 25 and over in the state who have earned at least a 
bachelor’s degree,92 ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income,93 percentage of state 
population on Medicare,
94
 percentage of state population below the poverty line,
95
 and 
percentage of state population living in urban areas.
96
  I include exogenous state variables in all 
of my wage models to control for state variables that change over time that may impact wages.  
Since some of the exogenous state variables are not available for the District of Columbia, the 
observations for D.C. drop out of the empirical models. 
For the empirical analysis of the effect of state regulation on wages, I remove the 
observations in the exempt category defined in Chapter 3.  In states that regulate the occupation 
by the year 2000, the exempt category includes individuals who work in an industry or job 
position that the state statute exempts from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the 
year of the observation.   In states that do not regulate the occupation by the year 2000, there are 
no observations in the exempt category.  This simplifies the interpretation of the coefficients of 
the regulation variables in my empirical models.  Exemptions from state regulations for DNs and 
SWs are listed in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. 
For the purpose of sensitivity analysis, I also use an alternate definition of exempt, where 
an observation is exempt only if the state regulates the occupation in the observation year and the 
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 The source for state per-capita gross domestic product is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov ).  
90
 The source for average state tax burden is Tax Foundation (http://www.taxfoundation.org ). 
91
 The source for educational attainment data for females is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov ). 
92
 The source for educational attainment data for males is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov ). 
93
 The source for per capita state debt and state per capita income is the Council of State Governments’ Book of the 
States. 
94
 The source for percentage of state population on Medicare is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov ). 
95
 The source for percentage of state population below the poverty line is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov ). 
96
 The source for percentage of state population in urban areas is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov ). 
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state statute exempts the individual’s industry or job position.  With this definition, no 
observations in a state are exempt from regulation unless regulation is in effect in the state.  This 
leaves more observations in the dataset for the years prior to regulation taking effect.  Summary 
statistics and empirical results for this alternate definition of exempt are included in the 
Appendix for Chapter 4. 
4.3.1 Data for Dietitians and Nutritionists 
Although filtering of the dataset of professional members of the DN occupation is described in 
Section 3.3.1, I summarize the filtering here for completeness and because additional filtering is 
done in this chapter.  I begin with 14,266 DN
97
 observations and I drop 2 individuals who work 
outside the United States; 3,218 individuals who are unemployed, on leave, or not in the 
workforce; 9 individuals who do not work for wages; 5,195 individuals who have not earned at 
least a bachelor’s degree;98  474 individuals with hourly wages below the lowest state minimum 
wage; and 22 individuals with hourly wages more than five standard deviations above the mean. 
This leaves 5,346 observations in the DNs dataset.  I then delete 1188 individuals who are 
exempt from regulation and 37 individuals from the District of Columbia, since some of the 
exogenous state variables are not available for D.C.
99
  This leaves 4,121 observations in the DNs 
dataset.  Summary statistics for the professional dataset for DNs based on the 1980, 1990, and 
2000 Census samples are included in Table 4.3.   
Regulation variables for DNs are derived from the data available through the Committee 
of Dietetic Registration (CDR).  I add dummies for regulation type (no regulation, title 
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 In 1980 and 1990, the choice of occupational codes includes Dietitians, but not Nutritionists.  In 2000, Dietitians 
and Nutritionists share the same occupational code. 
98
 Kleiner (2006b) used the same technique of dropping individuals who did not report meeting the minimum 
expected level of education for an occupation from the Census data before empirical analysis. 
99
 With the alternate definition of exempt in the Chapter 4 Appendix, only 545 exempt DN observations are 
removed, instead of 1188. 
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protection, certification, and licensure) and regulation level (any regulation, regulation that is 
named licensure, and licensure (with practice restriction)) to the DN dataset for each observation.  
I also add variables for the number of years regulation has been in effect, including years, square 
of years, and natural log of years for any regulation, regulation that is named licensure, and 
licensure.  Summary statistics for the regulation variables in the context of the DN dataset are 
included in Table 4.4.  Included are regulation type, regulation level, and years of regulation.  
By design, each observation can be subject to only one regulation type.  If a state 
regulation statute includes both title protection and practice restriction, for example, then DNs 
with a bachelor’s degree in that state are subject to licensure.  For this case, the licensure variable 
is true, while the no regulation, title protection, and certification variables are false.  
Consequently, the entire dataset is partitioned into non-overlapping regulation types and the 
percent columns for regulation type in Table 4.4 sum to (approximately) 100%.  So, it is 
reasonable to control for more than one regulation type in a single empirical model.  The 
percentage of observations subject to no regulation decreases from 1980 to 1990 to 2000, while 
the percentage of observations subject to other regulation types increases over the same time 
interval as states adopt regulation of DNs. 
Regulation level dummies can overlap.  If an individual is subject to a state statute that is 
called licensure and includes practice restriction, then any regulation, regulation that is named 
licensure, and licensure are all true.  However, if an individual is subject to a state statute that is 
called licensure, but does not include practice restriction, then any regulation and regulation that 
is named licensure are true, but licensure is false.  Thus, it is not reasonable to control for more 
than one regulation level in a single empirical model.  It follows that Table 4.4 does not include 
percent columns for regulation level. 
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The summary statistics for duration of regulation variables in Table 4.4 reflect how 
regulation of DNs did not occur until after 1980, since the maximum value for years of 
regulation is 17.  The mean number of years of any regulation, years of regulation named 
licensure, and years of licensure are 8.94, 8.34, and 7.32, respectively.  Since the intent of the 
years-of-regulation models is to explore whether any wage premium due to licensure varies over 
time, these models should be able to capture the impact of licensure on wages of DNs if that 
impact is evident roughly eight years after licensure takes effect. 
Elements of the state statutes for occupational regulation of DNs are listed in Table 4.5.  
Each element affects the strictness of the state regulation.  For each state, the type of regulation 
of DNs (none, title protection, certification, or licensure) in effect in the year 2000 is listed, 
although the type of regulation in effect in 1980 and 1990 may be different.  In the dataset for 
DNs, the correct regulation dummies and statute elements are used for each observation year.  
All dollar amounts for initial fees and renewal fees are in year 2000 dollars.  Several statute 
elements set requirements for earning the appropriate credential (title protection, certification, or 
licensure).  These include degree, exam, practice hours, and reciprocity requirements and the 
initial (application) fee.
100
  Other statute elements set requirements for maintaining or renewing 
the credential.  These include annual continuing education requirements and an annual renewal 
fee.
101
  The fraction of the state regulation board that is comprised of DNs is also of interest 
when looking at the strictness of state regulation, since credentialed DNs are likely to set higher 
entrance requirements for the occupation than other board members who are not practitioners of 
the occupation.  In some cases, there are no DNs on the state regulation board, either because 
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 For states that combine application and yearly fees for the first year or two, I subtract the yearly fee(s) from the 
application fee. 
101
 For states that schedule renewal of credentials every second or third year, I compute an annual continuing 
education requirement and annual renewal fee.   
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DNs are not governed by a regulation board or because DNs are governed by the state medical 
board in that state. 
As noted in Section 1.4.1.2, the CDR defines uniform, national RDN credentials that 
have been widely adopted as the basis for regulation requirements by states that regulate DNs.  
As a result, regulation requirements are nearly identical in all states that regulate DNs.
102
  
Minimum degree and examination requirements are uniform, and all states include an ethics code 
and a reciprocity agreement with other regulating states.  There is some state-to-state variability 
in the number of practice hours required to earn credentials (most states require 900 hours, but 
New York requires 800 hours) and in the number of annual continuing education hours required 
to maintain credentials.  Application fees and annual renewal fees vary considerably, as does the 
fraction of the regulation board that is comprised of DNs.  However, even though there is little 
difference in regulation requirements for DNs across states, there are important differences in the 
type of regulation (licensure, certification, title protection, or none), the date regulation took 
effect, and the specific job positions that are exempt from regulation. 
4.3.2 Data for Social Workers 
Again, filtering of the dataset of professional members of the SW occupation is described in 
Section 3.3.2, but I summarize the filtering here for completeness and because additional 
filtering is done in this chapter.  I begin with 98,270 SW observations and I drop 12 observations 
who work outside the United States; 16,560 individuals who are unemployed, on leave, or not in 
the workforce; 60 individuals who do not work for wages; 26,164 individuals who have not 
earned at least a bachelor’s degree;103 1,876 individuals with hourly wages below the lowest state 
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 State licensing laws for Dietitians can be found at the links provided at the Commission on Dietetic Registration, 
Certification and Licensure, http://www.cdrnet.org/certifications/licensure/agencylist.htm, 10/6/2008. 
103
 Kleiner (2006b) used the same technique of dropping individuals who did not report meeting the minimum 
expected level of education for an occupation from the Census data before empirical analysis. 
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minimum wage; and 151 individuals with hourly wages more than five standard deviations 
above the mean.  This leaves 53,447 observations in the SWs dataset.  I then delete 6,529 
individuals who are exempt from regulation and  309 individuals from the District of Columbia, 
since some of the exogenous state variables are not available for D.C.
104
  This leaves 46,609 
observations in the SWs dataset.  Summary statistics for the professional dataset for SWs based 
on the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census samples are included in Table 4.6.   
Regulation variables for SWs are derived from the data available through the Association 
of Social Work Boards (ASWB).  Again, I add dummies for regulation type (no regulation, title 
protection, certification, and licensure) and regulation level (any regulation, regulation that is 
named licensure, and licensure (with practice restriction)) to the SW dataset for each 
observation.  I also add variables for the years of regulation including years, square of years, and 
natural log of years for any regulation, regulation that is named licensure, and licensure.  
Summary statistics for the regulation variables in the context of the SW dataset are included in 
Table 4.7 regulation type, regulation level, and years of regulation.   
For SWs, the dataset is partitioned into non-overlapping regulation types for no 
regulation, title protection, or licensure, so it is reasonable to control for more than one 
regulation type in a single empirical model.  Thus, the percent columns in Table 4.7 sum to 
(approximately) 100%.  The percentage of observations subject to no regulation decreases from 
1980 to 1990 to 2000, while the percentage of observations subject to the other regulation types 
increases over the same time interval as states adopt regulation of SWs. 
The regulation level dummies in Table 4.7 can overlap, so it is not reasonable to control 
for more than one regulation level in a single empirical model.  Thus, it follows that Table 4.7 
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 With the alternate definition of exempt in the Chapter 4 Appendix, only 4,052 exempt SW observations are 
removed, instead of 6,529. 
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does not include percent columns.  While regulation types differ for DNs and SWs (DNs have 
certification as a regulation type, while SWs do not), regulation levels are the same for DNs and 
SWs and the same logic for setting the regulation level dummies applies to both occupations.  
Therefore, if an individual SW is subject to a state statute that is called licensure but does not 
include practice restriction, then any regulation and regulation that is named licensure are true 
for that individual SW, but licensure is false.   
The summary statistics for the years of regulation variables in Table 4.7 reflect how 
regulation of SWs first occurred before 1980, since the maximum value for years of regulation is 
43.  The mean number of years of any regulation, years of regulation named licensure, and years 
of licensure are 11.62, 13.32, and 12.63, respectively.  Years-of-regulation models should be able 
to capture the impact of licensure on wages of SWs if that impact is evident roughly 12 years 
after licensure takes effect.  It is possible that the early introduction of state regulation of SWs 
relative to the 20-year time interval associated with the data used in the empirical analysis may 
make it more difficult to detect the impact of licensure on the wages of SWs, than on the wages 
of DNs. 
Elements of the state statutes for occupational regulation of SWs are listed in Table 4.8.  
Each element affects the strictness of the state regulation.  For each state, the type of regulation 
of SWs (none, title protection, or licensure) in effect in the year 2000 is listed, although the type 
of regulation in effect in 1980 and 1990 may be different.  In the dataset for SWs, the correct 
regulation dummies and statute elements are used for each observation year.  All dollar amounts 
for initial fees and renewal fees are in year 2000 dollars.  Several statute elements set 
requirements for earning the appropriate credential (title protection or licensure).  These include 
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degree, exam, experience hours, and reciprocity requirements and the initial (application) fee.
105
  
Other statute elements set requirements for maintaining or renewing the credential.  These 
include annual continuing education requirements and an annual renewal fee.
106
  The fraction of 
the state regulation board that is comprised of SWs is also of interest, since credentialed SWs are 
likely to set higher entrance requirements for the occupation than other board members who are 
not practitioners of the occupation.   
As noted in Section 1.4.2.2, the ASWB administers the SW licensing examinations and 
provides a model practice act that states generally use as a template for SW regulations.  As a 
result, regulation requirements are very similar in all states that regulate SWs at the bachelor’s 
level, although there is more variability in state statutes for SWs than there is in state statutes for 
DNs.  Minimum degree requirements are uniform, and all states include an ethics code and a 
reciprocity agreement with other regulating states.  There is some state-to-state variability in the 
exam requirements, the number of experience hours required to earn credentials, and in the 
number of continuing education hours required to maintain credentials.  No exam is required in 
Louisiana, Nebraska, and New Jersey.  The only states with requirements for experience hours 
are Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Virginia.  Continuing education requirements vary from 
zero hours per year in Utah to 24 hours per year in Arkansas.  Application fees and annual 
renewal fees vary considerably, as does the fraction of the regulation board that is comprised of 
SWs.  As was the case for DNs, in addition to the statute elements in Table 4.8, there are 
important state-to-state differences in the type of regulation (licensure, title protection, or none), 
the date regulation took effect, and the specific job positions that are exempt from regulation.  
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 For states that combine application and yearly fees for the first year or two, I subtract the yearly fee(s) from the 
application fee. 
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 For states that schedule renewal of credentials every second or third year, I compute an annual continuing 
education requirement and annual renewal fee.   
95 
 
4.4 Empirical Analysis 
Following the research design in Section 4.2 and using the datasets constructed in Section 4.3, I 
estimate three sets of wage models (regulation-level, years-of-regulation, and regulation-
strictness) for the DN and SW occupations.  Each model is estimated separately for the effect of 
occupational regulation on hourly wages and annual wages.  I begin this section with a 
description of a general empirical form that applies to all of the wage models.  I then describe the 
empirical analysis for each set of wage models in detail, including theoretical results and actual 
results for DNs and SWs. 
4.4.1 General Empirical Model  
To estimate the effect of state regulation of DNs and SWs on the wages of practitioners in each 
occupation, I use a general human capital earnings model of the form:  
               
       
       
               
 
where the dependent variable ln(Wage) is one of two wage measures for individual i in year t, R 
is a vector of regulation variables in state s in year t, D is a vector of demographic variables for 
individual i in year t,  S is a vector of exogenous state characteristics in state s in year t,   
includes state fixed effects,   includes year fixed effects, and   is a random disturbance term for 
individual i in year t.  The composition of     depends on the specific wage model.  Year 
dummies are used in the regulation-level and regulation-strictness models and state dummies are 
used in the fixed effects (FE) models.  The individual demographic variables and exogenous 
state variables are the same for all wage models. 
 Individual demographic variables include gender, age, age-squared, number of children 
less than five years, marital status, race, education level, an indication of whether the individual 
works in a metropolitan area, and place-of-work industry.  Annual wages should decrease with 
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increases in the number of children less than five years, since the number of hours per year an 
individual can work tends to decrease with increasing numbers of preschool children.  Hourly 
wages, however, should increase with increases in the number of children less than five years, 
because an individual will probably choose not to work for an hourly wage that is not sufficient 
to cover childcare costs.  These relationships between wages and the number of preschool 
children are particularly true for women.  Both DNs and SWs work in positions spread across a 
number of industry groups.  I control for each industry group that accounts for at least one 
percent of the DN or SW population in the professional datasets.
107
   
 To investigate the expected sign of the year dummies in the regulation-level and 
regulation-strictness models, I compute ratios of each individual’s hourly and annual wages to 
the average hourly and annual wages of persons with a bachelor’s degree in the state in the 
observation year.  I use the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census samples and retain only those 
individuals who have earned at least a bachelor’s degree, but no higher degree. I then remove 
any individuals who are unemployed, on leave, or not in the workforce, and any outliers.
108
 What 
remains is a reference dataset for individuals with a bachelor’s degree in the state.  I remove any 
observations in the occupation of interest (either DNs or SWs) and compute the average hourly 
and annual wage for the remaining observations. 
For each occupation in the professional DN and SW datasets, I compute the ratio of the 
individual’s hourly and annual wages to the reference average hourly and annual wages.  I then 
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 For DNs, I control for the following industry groups: Wholesale Trade; Professional, Scientific, Management, 
Administrative, and Waste Management; Educational Services; Health Services (not Hospitals); Hospitals; Social 
Services; Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodations, and Food Services; Other Services (Except Public 
Administration); and Public Administration.  For SWs, I control for a slightly different set of industry groups: 
Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Management; Educational Services; Health 
Services (not Hospitals); Hospitals; Social Services; Other Services (Except Public Administration);  and Public 
Administration. 
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with a bachelor’s degree) that I used to remove outliers from the DN and SW datasets. 
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average the individual ratios across all observations for that occupation in all states in an 
observation year.  Results for DNs and SWs are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.  For 
DNs, the average hourly wage is 79.42% of the average hourly wage of people with a bachelor’s 
degree in the state in 1980.  This ratio falls to 77.55% in 1990 and to 75.98% in 2000.  So, on 
average, DN hourly wages did not keep pace with average hourly wages for those with a 
bachelor’s degree over the 20-year interval from 1980 to 2000.  Thus, I would expect the 
coefficients of the year dummies for 1990 and 2000 in the regulation-level hourly wage models 
to be negative.  A similar pattern of falling average ratios of DN and SW wages to average 
wages of people with a bachelor’s degree is seen for annual wages of DNs in Table 4.1 and for 
hourly and annual wages of SWs in Table 4.2.   
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 were computed using all observations in the professional DN and SW 
datasets, which corresponds with the regulation-level wage models. The regulation-strictness 
wage models, on the other hand, use only those observations in the DN and SW datasets that are 
subject to regulation in the observation year.  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for DNs and SWs, respectively, 
show the average ratios of DN and SW wages to average wages of people with a bachelor’s 
degree in the state using only the observations in the DN and SW datasets that are subject to 
regulation.  A pattern of falling average ratios of DN and SW wages to average wages of people 
with a bachelor’s degree is seen for hourly wages of DNs in Table 4.1 and for hourly and annual 
wages of SWs in Table 4.2.  In the case of annual wages of DNs, however, the average ratio of 
DN wages to average wages of people with a bachelor’s degree actually increases from 68.80% 
in 1990 to 70.26% in 2000.  This would suggest that the coefficient of the year 2000 dummy 
might be positive for the regulation-strictness annual wage models for DNs. 
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To investigate the expected sign of the absence of regulation dummies in the years-of-
regulation wage models, I examine how the per capita personal income in states that regulate 
DNs and SWs compares to the mean per capita personal income across all states in the 
observation year.  Figure 4.1 shows a map of the United States with states shaded to indicate the 
state per capita personal income in 1980.  The two tables below the map show the number of 
states that have any regulation or licensure of DNs (top table) or SWs (bottom table) in that year.  
Below each table is the percentage of states that regulate or license the occupation that have a per 
capita personal income that is below the mean.  No states regulate DNs in 1980.  For SWs, 55% 
of the states that regulate SWs in 1980 have per capita personal incomes below the mean, while 
44% of the states that license SWs at the bachelor’s level in 1980 have per capita personal 
incomes below the mean.  Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the same information for 1990 and 2000, 
respectively.   
In all three years, the majority of states that have any regulation of DNs or SWs have 
incomes below the mean.  This is also true for licensure of DNs and SWs in 1990 and 2000.  To 
the extent that hourly or annual wages for DNs and SWs are correlated with per capita personal 
income, this suggests that wages for practitioners of those occupations tend to be higher in states 
that do not regulate the occupation and in states that do not license the occupation.  As a result, I 
expect the coefficient of the absence of regulation dummies in the years-of-regulation wage 
models to be positive.   
The other regulation variables in the years-of-regulation wage models are used to capture 
how the effect of occupational regulation varies over time.  In the models that control for the 
natural log of years of regulation, I expect a positive effect on wages due to increases in the 
natural log of years of regulation.  This is true if regulation refers to any regulation, regulation 
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that is named licensure, or licensure.  Similarly, in the models that control for years of regulation 
and the square of years of regulation, I expect a positive effect on wages due to increases in the 
years of regulation and a negative effect due to increases in the square of years of regulation.    
4.4.2 Regulation–Level Models 
I estimate the effect of regulation level on the wages of practitioners in the DN and SW 
occupations using the general empirical model in Section 4.4.1 with the vector of regulation 
variables     equal to one of three regulation levels: any regulation, regulation that is named 
licensure, or licensure.  For each occupation, I estimate an OLS model, a FE model, and, for 
models where the selected IV has enough power, a 2SLS model with an IV for regulation level.  
I am not able to estimate a FE 2SLS model, since the selected IV (the percentage of Democrat 
state legislators minus the percentage of Republican state legislators two years before the first 
year of any regulation of the occupation in the state) does not have sufficient power
109
 for that 
model.  Empirical results for the regulation-level wage models are discussed in Sections 4.4.2.1 
and 4.4.2.1 for DNs and SWs, respectively. 
4.4.2.1 Regulation–Level Models – Empirical Results for Dietitians and 
Nutritionists 
Results for the OLS, FE, and 2SLS models that estimate the effect of any regulation on the 
wages of DNs are shown in Table 4.9.  The three columns on the left are for the dependent 
variable natural log of hourly wage and the three columns on the right are for the dependent 
variable natural log of annual wage.  Estimated coefficients for the any regulation variable, year 
dummies, and individual demographic variables are shown.  Coefficients for place-of-work 
industry group and exogenous state variables are not included in the table.  Corresponding tables 
for the effect of regulation named licensure and the effect of licensure on the wages of DNs are 
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 The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is less than 10.  
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included in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, respectively.  The 2SLS results in Tables 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 
are for 2SLS without FE. 
 The coefficients of the year dummies and individual characteristic variables have the 
expected signs for all of the models in Tables 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, except the coefficient of 
married for annual wage is negative and significant in every model.
110
  For the effect of any 
regulation on wages of DNs in Table 4.9, there are no significant coefficients of the any 
regulation variable and all of the coefficients are positive (except for the OLS coefficient for the 
natural log of hourly wage model).  This suggests that any regulation of DNs has a positive, but 
not a significant effect on wages.   In the case of regulation named licensure in Table 4.10, the 
OLS and FE coefficients are negative, while the 2SLS coefficients are positive.  The FE 
coefficients are comparable to the OLS coefficients in magnitude and have larger standard errors 
than the OLS coefficients, so the OLS coefficients are probably not biased by endogeneity due to 
omitted variable bias.  The OLS coefficient for natural log of annual wage (-.046) is statistically 
significant.  I find a 4.5 percent decrease in annual wages of DNs, on average, due to regulation 
named licensure.  Since the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistic for the 2SLS models (without 
FE) is 55.95, the selected IV is not weak.  The positive sign of the 2SLS coefficients compared 
to the negative signs of the OLS and FE coefficients suggests that there may be endogeneity due 
to reverse causality.  Therefore, the correct sign for the coefficient of the regulation named 
licensure variable is uncertain and the decrease in annual wages indicated by the OLS coefficient 
may not be correct.  For the effect of licensure on wages of DNs in Table 4.11, there are no 
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 The negative coefficient for married is unexpected, since individuals who are married generally earn higher 
wages than individuals who are not married.  However, this might be explained by differences in the number of 
hours worked per year by married and unmarried individuals in the DN dataset.  The mean number of hours worked 
per year by married DNs is 1,740, while the mean number of hours worked per year by unmarried DNs is 1,878.  
Since married DNs typically work fewer hours per year than unmarried DNs, the negative coefficient for married in 
the annual wage models seems reasonable.   
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significant coefficients of the licensure variable.   Once again, the OLS and FE coefficients are 
negative, while the 2SLS (without FE) coefficients are positive.  Overall, I find that any 
regulation has a positive, but not significant, impact on wages of DNs, while the directional 
effect of regulation named licensure and licensure on wages is uncertain.   
4.4.2.2 Regulation–Level Models – Empirical Results for Social Workers 
Empirical results for the effect of regulation level on the wages of SWs are included in Tables 
4.12 (for the effect of any regulation), 4.13 (for the effect of regulation named licensure), and 
4.14 (for the effect of licensure).  These tables have the same format as the corresponding tables 
for DNs.  Estimated coefficients for the regulation level variable, year dummies, and individual 
demographic variables are shown, but coefficients for place-of-work industry group and 
exogenous state variables are not included in the tables.  The coefficients of the year dummies 
and individual characteristic variables have the expected signs for all of the models in Tables 
4.12, 4.13, and 4.14.  In contrast to the corresponding empirical results for DNs, being married 
has a positive effect on both hourly and annual wages for SWs, although the coefficients for 
annual wage are small and not statistically significant. 
Only the regulation-level model for the effect of regulation named licensure in Table 4.13 
includes 2SLS (without FE) estimates, due to a weak IV problem.  This is possibly because SW 
regulation began in 1957, well before the 1980-2000 time interval covered by my models.  As a 
result, the wage effects due to SW regulation in states that regulated early may be more difficult 
to detect and so would require an IV with more power.  The Kleibergen-Paap rk Walk F Statistic 
in Table 4.13 is 10.95, just barely above the minimum test statistic of 10. 
There are no significant coefficients of the regulation level variables in Tables 4.12, 4.13, 
and 4.14.  The OLS and FE coefficients of the any regulation variable in Table 4.12 are negative, 
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and the FE coefficients are larger in magnitude than the OLS coefficients and have smaller 
standard errors.  This suggests that the OLS coefficients may be biased due to endogeneity.  The 
lack of significance in the FE coefficients suggests that they may be imprecisely estimated due to 
limited statistical power.  In the absence of 2SLS estimates, the directional effect of any 
regulation on wages of SWs is unknown.  For the effect of regulation named licensure on wages 
of SWs in Table 4.13, the OLS, FE, and 2SLS (without FE) coefficients are all positive for the 
hourly wage models, but have mixed signs for the annual wage models, since the OLS and FE 
coefficients are negative, while the 2SLS coefficient is positive.  This suggests that regulation 
named licensure of SWs has a positive, but not a significant effect on hourly wages, but the 
directional effect of regulation named licensure on annual wages is uncertain.  For the effect of 
licensure on wages of SWs in Table 4.14, the OLS coefficients appear to be biased due to 
endogeneity, since the magnitude of the OLS and FE coefficients are quite different and the 
standard errors for the FE coefficients are smaller than those for the OLS coefficients.  The FE 
coefficient of the licensure variable is positive for the hourly wage model, but negative for the 
annual wage model.  The lack of significance in the FE coefficients suggests that they may be 
imprecisely estimated due to limited statistical power.  In the absence of 2SLS estimates, the 
directional effect of licensure on wages of SWs is unknown.  Overall I find that regulation 
named licensure has a positive, but not significant, impact on hourly wages of SWs, while the 
directional effect of the other regulation levels on wages of SWs is uncertain.  
4.4.3 Years-of-Regulation Models 
I estimate the effect of years of regulation on the wages of practitioners in the DN and SW 
occupations using the general empirical model in Section 4.4.1 with the vector of regulation 
variables     equal to the combination of a variable that controls for the absence of a single level 
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of occupational regulation and one of two measures of the years of that level of occupational 
regulation.
111
  For each occupation, I estimate an OLS model, a FE model, and, for two SW 
models where the selected IV has enough power, a 2SLS with FE model with an IV for the 
absence of a regulation level.
112
  There are no 2SLS with FE models for DNs.  I am also not able 
to estimate a 2SLS model without FE for DNs or SWs, since the selected IV (the percentage 
turnover in the state House in the first year of any regulation of the occupation in the state) does 
not have sufficient power.  Empirical results for the years-of-regulation wage models are 
discussed in Sections 4.4.3.1 and 4.4.3.2 for DNs and SWs, respectively. 
4.4.3.1 Years-of-Regulation Models – Empirical Results for Dietitian and 
Nutritionists 
The tables with empirical results for the effect of years of regulation on the wages of DNs have 
the same format as the regulation-level tables.  Years-of-regulation wage models control for the 
absence of a specific regulation level and for some measure of years of regulation.  Since there 
are two different measures of years of regulation, there are two sets of tables for empirical results 
for each occupation.  For the case where years of regulation are modeled by the natural log of 
years of regulation, results for DNs are tabulated in Tables 4.15 (for any regulation), 4.16 (for 
regulation named licensure), and 4.17 (for licensure).  Similarly, for the case where years of 
regulation are modeled by years of regulation and the square of years of regulation, results for 
DNs are tabulated in Tables 4.18 (for any regulation), 4.19 (for regulation named licensure), and 
4.20 (for licensure). 
 In all years-of-regulation models for DNs, the coefficients of the absence of regulation 
level terms are positive and frequently significant.  This reflects the pattern where the majority of 
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 As noted in Section 4.2, the two measures of the duration of regulation are (1) natural log of years of regulation, 
and (2) years of regulation and years of regulation squared.   
112
 Table 4.22 contains the 2SLS with FE models for hourly and annual wages of SWs as a function of the natural 
log of years of regulation named licensure.   
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states that have any regulation of DNs have per capita incomes below the mean.  Thus, wages 
tend to be higher in states that do not regulate, so the coefficients of the absence of regulation 
level terms tend to be positive. 
I begin with a discussion of the empirical results of years-of-regulation wage models in 
terms of the natural log of years of regulation.  The coefficients of the individual characteristic 
variables have the expected signs for all of the models in Tables 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17.
113
  The 
estimated coefficients of the natural log of years of regulation level are positive for all models in 
Tables 4.15 through 4.17.  This suggests that wages increase with years of regulation.  OLS 
coefficients are mostly larger than FE coefficients (except for annual wage models for years of 
any regulation), but standard errors are mostly larger for FE coefficients (except for hourly wage 
models for years of licensure).  The FE estimates are mostly not statistically significant and so 
may be imprecisely estimated due to limited statistical power, but they are generally consistent 
with the OLS estimates.  This indicates that the OLS estimates are probably not confounded by 
unobservables that are time invariant over the time gaps between decennial Census samples, but 
still may be too large.  For the models of the effect of the natural log of years of any regulation 
on wages, the significant FE coefficient for the annual wage model indicates an elasticity of 
annual wages with respect to years of any regulation of 0.073. For the models of the effect of the 
natural log of years of any regulation on hourly wages and the natural log of years of licensure 
on hourly wages, the OLS coefficients are significant, but may be biased due to endogeneity.  
I next focus on a discussion of the empirical results of years-of-regulation wage models 
in terms of years of regulation and the square of years of regulation.  These results are included 
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 The coefficient of married for annual wage is negative and significant in every model.  The coefficient of the 
number of children less than five years is positive and significant for hourly wage models, but negative and 
significant for annual wage models.   
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in Tables 4.18 (for years of any regulation), 4.19 (for years of regulation named licensure), and 
4.20 (for years of licensure).  The coefficients of years of regulation are nearly always positive 
(except for the hourly wage models in Table 4.19) and the coefficients of years of regulation 
squared are nearly always negative (again, except for the hourly wage models in Table 4.19).  
The coefficients that do not have the expected sign are very small in magnitude and not 
significant.  DN wages tend to increase with years of regulation and decrease with the square of 
years of regulation.  There are no significant coefficients of the years of regulation variables in 
the models in Tables 4.18 and 4.19.  The only significant coefficients in Table 4.20 are OLS 
coefficients that may be biased due to endogeneity, since they are larger than the FE coefficients 
that are not significant.  
Based on the years-of-regulation models for DNs, I find that the coefficients of the 
absence of regulation level variables are positive because wages tend to be higher in states that 
do not regulate.  Years-of-regulation models in terms of the natural log of years of regulation are 
a better fit to the data than years-of-regulation models in terms of years of regulation and the 
square of years of regulation.  Coefficients in the years-of-regulation models in terms of years of 
regulation and the square of years of regulation sometimes do not have the expected sign and are 
often very close to zero.  However, DN wages tend to increase with years of regulation and 
decrease with the square of years of regulation, but this result is not significant.  For the models 
of the effect of the natural log of years of any regulation on wages, I find that wages increase 
with the natural log of years of regulation, but the increase in wages is not statistically 
significant.  However, I do find a significant FE coefficient for the annual wage model that 
indicates an elasticity of annual wages with respect to years of any regulation of 0.073.      
4.4.3.2 Years-of-Regulation Models – Empirical Results for Social Workers 
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The tables with empirical results for the effect of years of regulation on the wages of SWs have 
the same format as the regulation-level tables.  Years-of-regulation wage models control for the 
absence of a specific regulation level and for some measure of years of regulation.  Again, there 
are two sets of tables for empirical results for each occupation.  For the model where the natural 
log of wages is a function of the natural log of years of regulation, results for SWs are tabulated 
in Tables 4.21 (for any regulation), 4.22 (for regulation named licensure), and 4.23 (for 
licensure).  Similarly, for the model where the natural log of wages is a function of years of 
regulation and years of regulation squared, results for SWs are tabulated in Tables 4.24 (for any 
regulation), 4.25 (for regulation named licensure), and 4.26 (for licensure).  As was the case for 
the years-of-regulation models for DNs, the coefficients of the absence of regulation level terms 
are usually positive and frequently significant for SWs.  Again, this reflects the pattern where the 
majority of states that have any regulation of SWs have per capita incomes below the mean, so 
wages tend to be higher in states that do not regulate and the coefficients of the absence of 
regulation level terms tend to be positive. 
I begin with a discussion of the empirical results of years-of-regulation wage models in 
terms of the natural log of years of regulation.  The coefficients of the individual characteristic 
variables have the expected signs for all of the models in Tables 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23.
114
  The 
estimated coefficients of the natural log of years of regulation-level are positive for all models in 
Tables 4.21 through 4.23.  Significant coefficients include the OLS coefficients for annual wage 
in Tables 4.21 and 4.23 and the FE coefficient for annual wage in Table 4.21.  In most models, 
the FE estimates have the same sign, roughly the same magnitude, and roughly the same 
standard error as OLS estimates.  So, again the FE estimates may be imprecisely estimated due to 
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years is positive and significant for hourly wage models, but negative and significant for annual wage models. 
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limited statistical power, but they are generally consistent with the OLS estimates.  The OLS 
estimates are probably not confounded by unobservables that are time invariant over the time 
gaps between decennial Census samples.  The selected IV has power for the 2SLS with FE 
model for the effect of the natural log of years of regulation named licensure on the natural log of 
wages, but estimated coefficients are small and not significant. 
For the models of the effect of the natural log of years of any regulation on wages, the 
significant OLS and FE coefficients for the annual wage model indicate elasticities of annual 
wage with respect to years of any regulation of 0.02 and 0.022, respectively.  For the models of 
the effect of the natural log of years of regulation named licensure, there are no significant 
results, but the 2SLS with FE coefficients for the hourly and annual wage models indicate 
(insignificant) elasticities of 0.016 and 0.016, respectively.  For the models of the effect of the 
natural log of years of licensure on wages, the significant OLS coefficient for the annual wage 
model indicates an elasticity of 0.015.   
I next focus on a discussion of the empirical results of years-of-regulation wage models 
in terms of years of regulation and the square of years of regulation.  These results are included 
in Tables 4.24 (for years of any regulation), 4.25 (for years of regulation named licensure), and 
4.26 (for years of licensure).  Coefficients of the individual characteristic variables have the 
expected signs with the usual exceptions.
115
  None of the coefficients of the years of regulation 
or the years of regulation squared variables in Tables 4.24, 4.25, and 4.26 are significant. SW 
wages tend to increase with years of regulation and decrease with the square of years of 
regulation, but the effects are very small.  The coefficients of years of regulation are nearly 
always positive or near zero and the coefficients of years of regulation squared are near zero for 
SWs.  Once again, wage effects due to SWs may be reduced in states that regulated early (before 
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1980), making the SW coefficients small, particularly for the years of regulation squared 
variables.   
Based on the years-of-regulation models for SWs, I find that the coefficients of the 
absence of regulation level variables are positive because wages tend to be higher in states that 
do not regulate.  Years-of-regulation models in terms of the natural log of years of regulation are 
a better fit to the data than years-of-regulation models in terms of years of regulation and the 
square of years of regulation.  Coefficients in the years-of-regulation models in terms of years of 
regulation and the square of years of regulation sometimes do not have the expected sign and are 
often very close to zero.  However, SW wages tend to increase with years of regulation and 
decrease or remain the same with the square of years of regulation, but this result is not 
significant.  For the models of the effect of the natural log of years of any regulation on wages, I 
find significant elasticities of annual wages with respect to years of any regulation of 
approximately 0.02.  For the models of the effect of the natural log of years of regulation named 
licensure, I find statistically insignificant elasticities of hourly and annual wages with respect to 
years of regulation named licensure of 0.016.  For the models of the effect of the natural log of 
years of licensure on wages, I find significant elasticity of annual wages with respect to licensure 
of 0.015. 
4.4.4 Regulation–Strictness Models 
I estimate the effect of strictness of regulation on the wages of practitioners in the DN and SW 
occupations using the general human capital earnings function model in Section 4.4.1 with the 
vector of regulation variables     equal to a combination of regulation types and statute 
elements.   For each occupation, I estimate an OLS model for hourly wage and an OLS model for 
annual wage.  Empirical results for the regulation-strictness wage models are included in Table 
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4.27 for DNs and in Table 4.28 for SWs and results are discussed in Sections 4.4.4.1 and 4.4.4.2 
for DNs and SWs, respectively.  
The models for regulation-strictness are OLS models only, since FE models are not 
possible due to the collinearity between state variables and the many state-specific strictness 
variables, and 2SLS models are precluded by the difficulty in identifying six or more IVs for the 
various strictness measures.  Confidence in the validity of the OLS coefficients is low due to 
some specification issues resulting in highly significant coefficients that have an unexpected sign 
for some strictness variables. For DNs there is a large negative coefficient of the fraction of the 
board comprised of DNs for annual wage and a large positive coefficient of the year dummy for 
hourly wage.  For SWs, the licensure variable has a large negative coefficient for both hourly 
wage and annual wage.  Statistically significant results that have the expected sign include an 
annual wage premium due to certification and additional continuing education hours for DNs and 
an hourly and an annual wage premium due to additional continuing education hours and the 
application fee for SWs.   
4.4.4.1 Regulation–Strictness Models – Empirical Results for Dietitians and 
Nutritionists 
Results for the OLS models that estimate the effect of regulation-strictness on the hourly and 
annual wages of DNs are shown in Table 4.27.  Columns (1) and (2) include the estimated 
coefficients for the hourly and annual wage models, respectively.  The individual characteristic 
variables have the expected signs, but the sign and significance of the year dummy for 2000 for 
the hourly wage model is unexpected.  The significant negative coefficient for the fraction of the 
board comprised of DNs for the annual wage model is also unexpected, since more DNs on the 
board should lead to stricter regulation and higher wages for practitioners.  Only the coefficients 
of certification, fraction of the board comprised of DNs, continuing education hours per year, 
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and practice hours for initial credentials for the annual wage models are statistically significant.  
I find the percentage increase in annual wages due to certification, relative to title protection, is 
26.7; the percentage decrease in annual wages due to an increase of 1 in the fraction of the board 
comprised of DNs is 11.0; the percentage increase in annual wages due to a one unit increase in 
the number of continuing education hours required per year is 1.1; and the percentage decrease in 
annual wages due to a one unit increase in the number of practice hours for initial credentials is 
0.2.  
4.4.4.2 Regulation–Strictness Models – Empirical Results for Social Workers 
Results for the OLS models that estimate the effect of regulation-strictness on the hourly and 
annual wages of SWs are shown in Table 4.28.  Columns (1) and (2) include the estimated 
coefficients for the hourly and annual wage models, respectively.  The individual characteristic 
variables have the expected signs, but the sign and high significance of the licensure dummy for 
both the hourly and annual wage models is unexpected.  Only the coefficients of licensure, 
continuing education hours per year, application fee, and experience hours are statistically 
significant for both wage measures, but the coefficients of experience hours are essentially zero.  
I find the percentage decrease in wages due to licensure, relative to title protection, is 4.8 for 
hourly wage and 6.3 for annual wage; the percentage increase in wages due to a one unit increase 
in the number of continuing education hours required per year is 0.4 for hourly wage and 0.6 for 
annual wage; and the percentage increase in wages due to a one dollar increase in the application 
fee is .02 for both hourly and annual wages.  
4.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
Although I did not find evidence of a decrease in the number of practitioners in the DN and SW 
occupations due to regulation in Chapter 3, the possibility of a shift in demand due to consumers 
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entering the market after licensing suggests that there could still be a wage effect due to 
regulation.  In this chapter, I investigate the impact of state regulation of DNs and SWs on the 
wages of practitioners using regulation-level, years-of-regulation, and regulation-strictness 
models for both hourly and annual wages.  
The intent of the regulation-level models is to explore whether or not there is a wage 
premium due to the level of regulation (any regulation, regulation named licensure, or licensure).  
For DNs, I find that any regulation of DNs has a small, positive, but not significant, impact on 
both hourly and annual wages.  The direction of the effect of the other regulation levels 
(regulation named licensure and licensure) on DN wages is uncertain, and also not statistically 
significant.  Similarly, for SWs, I find that regulation named licensure has a small, positive, but 
not significant, impact on hourly wages of SWs, while the effect on annual wages is not clear.  
The direction of the effect of the other regulation levels (any regulation and licensure) on SW 
wages is also uncertain and not statistically significant.  
With the years-of-regulation models, the goal is to capture any non-linear effects of 
occupational regulation and the lag nature of grandfather effects and to explore whether any 
wage premium due to licensure varies over time.  I find that the coefficients of the absence of 
regulation level variables are positive in most models because wages of both DNs and SWs tend 
to be higher in states that do not regulate those occupations.  Years-of-regulation models that 
capture non-linear effects in terms of the natural log of years of regulation are a better fit to the 
data than years-of-regulation models in terms of years of regulation and the square of years of 
regulation for both DNs and SWs.  Estimated coefficients for the models in terms of the natural 
log of years of regulation consistently have the expected sign, have non-zero magnitude, and are 
sometimes statistically significant; while estimated coefficients for the models in terms of years 
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of regulation and the square of years of regulation sometimes do not have the expected sign and 
are often very close to zero.  The models for the natural log of wages as a function of the natural 
log of years of regulation suggest that wages increase with years of regulation, but the rate of 
increase slows as the years of regulation increases.  The coefficient of the natural log of years of 
regulation can be interpreted as the elasticity of wages with respect to years of regulation.  For 
DNs, I find that wages increase with the natural log of years of regulation, but the increase in 
wages is not statistically significant.  However, I do find a significant FE coefficient for the 
annual wage model that indicates an elasticity of annual wages with respect to years of any 
regulation of 0.073.  For SWs, in the models of the effect of the natural log of years of regulation 
on wages, I find significant elasticities of annual wages with respect to years of any regulation of 
approximately 0.02, statistically insignificant elasticities of hourly and annual wages with respect 
to years of regulation named licensure of 0.016, and significant elasticity of annual wages with 
respect to licensure of 0.015. 
The purpose of the regulation-strictness models is to explore whether any wage premium 
due to regulation can be attributed to the strictness of the type of regulation or to the strictness of 
the specific elements of the state statutes.  For the regulation-strictness models, I find some 
specification issues that may invalidate any conclusions.  However, I find that certification 
(relative to title protection), fraction of the board comprised of DNs, number of continuing 
education hours required per year, and number of practice hours required for initial credentials 
appear to have significant impacts on wages for DNs.  Similarly, I find that licensure (relative to 
title protection), number of continuing education hours required per year, and application fee 
appear to have significant impacts on wages for SWs. 
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 Compared to the literature for the effect of licensure on wages of RNs and public school 
teachers where no lasting wage premium due to licensure is found, my empirical results suggest 
a slightly different result for DNs and SWs.  Overall, I find a small, positive impact on wages of 
DNs and SWs due to regulation of those occupations.  This impact is evident in the small, 
positive, and not significant impact on hourly and annual wages of DNs due to any regulation 
and on hourly wages of SWs due to regulation named licensure.  It is also evident in the positive 
elasticities of annual wages of DNs with respect to increases in years of any regulation and the 
positive elasticities of annual wages of SWs with respect to increases in years of all three 
regulation levels.  The positive elasticities found from the models of the natural log of wages as a 
function of the natural log of years of regulation suggest that there is a lasting wage premium due 
to regulation of DNs and SWs.  
I had only limited success in estimating 2SLS models with IVs for regulation variables 
due to a weak IV problem.  The use of IVs in the literature on the wage effects of occupational 
licensure is rare.  I found no examples where IVs were used for regulation variables in datasets 
that spanned multiple years.  The IVs I selected
116
 were too weak for some of the models, but a 
thorough evaluation of a large number of other possible IVs did not identify any that had more 
power for the models of interest. 
I find very little evidence to suggest differences in how regulation level affects wages. In 
most of the models, empirical results for different regulation levels are similar in magnitude, 
sign, and significance of the estimated coefficients.  I do not find evidence that licensure has a 
greater impact on wages of DNs and SWs than any regulation or regulation named licensure.   
This may be a result of the strong influence of the occupational associations for DNs and SWs 
                                                 
116
 The IVs I chose are (1) the percentage of Democrat state legislators minus the percentage of Republican state 
legislators two years before any regulation of the occupation, and (2) the percentage turnover in the state house in 
the first year of any regulation of the occupation in the state. 
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that set strict professional standards apart from state regulation, such that earning state 
credentials adds little additional information about a person’s qualifications to practice.   
As an aside to the wage effects of occupational regulation, I find that hourly wages 
increase with the number of children less than five years old, but annual wages decrease with the 
number of children less than five years old.  This expected result is true for both DNs and SWs.  
I also find that being married increases hourly wages for both DNs and SWs, but it decreases 
annual wages for DNs, while increasing annual wages for SWs.  This appears to be a result of 
married DNs working fewer hours per year, on average, than unmarried DNs.  As expected, 
being female has a negative effect on both hourly and annual wages.  However, the negative 
effect of being female on annual wages is much larger and more significant than that on hourly 
wages.  
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4.6 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Dietitians and Nutritionists – Work and Wage Variables 
 
 
Males and Females 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 7.30% 6.46% 7.28% 6.99% 
Females 92.70% 93.54% 92.72% 93.01% 
 
Part Time Workers (35 or fewer hours per week) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 9.86% 10.42% 16.53% 12.85% 
Females 24.86% 30.19% 32.64% 29.92% 
All Observations 23.77% 28.92% 31.47% 28.73% 
 
Institutional Employment (Hospitals or Educational Institutions) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hospitals 61.73% 52.45% 42.00% 50.42% 
Educational Institutions 6.69% 5.38% 4.03% 5.14% 
Totals 68.42% 57.83% 46.03% 55.56% 
 
Average Ratio of DN Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– All Observations In Professional Dataset 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage 0.8011 0.7775 0.7640 0.7776 
Annual Wage 0.7413 0.6957 0.6962 0.7067 
 
Average Ratio of DN Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– Just Observations Subject to Any Regulation 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage - 0.7805 0.7680 0.7725 
Annual Wage - 0.6915 0.7025 0.6986 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Social Workers - Work and Wage Variables 
 
 
Males and Females 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 38.37% 31.66% 21.59% 29.25% 
Females 61.63% 68.34% 78.41% 70.75% 
 
Part Time Workers (35 or fewer hours per week) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 12.67% 11.91% 11.57% 12.05% 
Females 23.03% 23.08% 20.12% 21.75% 
All Observations 19.06% 19.54% 18.27% 18.91% 
 
Institutional Employment (Hospitals or Educational Institutions) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hospitals 11.47% 11.96% 13.64% 12.52% 
Educational Institutions 5.46% 4.89% 6.54% 5.69% 
Totals 16.93% 16.85% 20.18% 18.21% 
 
Average Ratio of SW Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– All Observations In Professional Dataset 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage 0.7762 0.7408 0.6815 0.7256 
Annual Wage 0.7707 0.7258 0.6631 0.7116 
 
Average Ratio of SW Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– Just Observations Subject to Any Regulation 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage 0.7708 0.7475 0.6771 0.7096 
Annual Wage 0.7512 0.7245 0.6659 0.6938 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Dietitians and Nutritionists – Individual Demographic Variables 
Summary Statistics for Dietitians and Nutritionists 
Census Year Number  
Highest Degree 
Earned Number  
Place of Work 
State Number 
1980 972  Bachelors 2,503  Arkansas 8 
1990 1,487  Masters 1,295  California 550 
2000 1,662  Professional 218  Colorado 68 
   Doctorate 105  Connecticut 70 
Sex Number     Delaware 14 
Female 3,833  Place of Work Number  Florida 92 
Male 288  Metropolitan Area 2,818  Georgia 73 
   Non-Metropolitan Area 1,303  Hawaii 28 
Age Range Number     Idaho 23 
19 0  Industry Group Number  Illinois 130 
20 – 24 313  Agriculture 15  Indiana 127 
25 - 29 764  Mining 0  Iowa 59 
30 - 34 721  Construction 2  Kansas 63 
35 - 39 592  Manufacturing 2  Kentucky 42 
40 - 44 535  Wholesale Trade 78  Louisiana 37 
45 - 49 441  Retail Trade 40  Maine 15 
50 - 54 336  Transportation and 
Warehousing 
45 
 Maryland 84 
55 - 59 233   Massachusetts 91 
60 - 64 108  Utilities 2  Michigan 179 
65 - 69 44  Information and 
Communications 
3 
 Minnesota 37 
70 - 74 21   Mississippi 35 
75 - 79 6  Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate, and 
Rental and Leasing 
6 
 Missouri 116 
80 - 84 3   Montana 12 
85 - 89 3   Nebraska 41 
90 - 94 1  Professional, 
Scientific, 
Management, 
Administrative, and 
Waste Management 
72 
 Nevada 27 
Mean Age 38.50   New Hampshire 28 
    New Jersey 187 
Number of 
Children Aged 
Less Than 5 Years Number 
  
New Mexico 18 
 Educational Services 212  New York 466 
 Health Services (not 
Hospitals) 
913 
 North Carolina 20 
0 3,421   North Dakota 17 
1 507  Hospitals 2,078  Ohio 197 
2 179  Social Services 181  Oklahoma 53 
3 14  Arts, Entertainment, 
Recreation, 
Accommodations, and 
Food Services 
110 
 Oregon 62 
4 0   Pennsylvania 255 
    Rhode Island 4 
Marital Status Number   South Carolina 48 
Married 2,753  Other Services 
(Except Public 
Administration) 133 
 South Dakota 12 
Not Married 1,368 
  
Tennessee 9 
   Public Administration 229  Texas 305 
Race Number  Armed Forces 0  Utah 43 
White 3,546  Unemployed 0  Vermont 13 
Black 222     Virginia 106 
Asian 292  Place of Work State Number  Washington 88 
Other 33  Alabama 16  West Virginia 32 
   Alaska 10  Wisconsin 141 
Total 4,121  Arizona 61  Wyoming 9 
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Dietitians and Nutritionists – Regulation Variables 
 
 
Regulation Type 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 100% 51.58% 21.78% 50.98% 
Title Protection 0% 15.40% 15.52% 11.82% 
Certification 0% 17.08% 33.27% 19.58% 
Licensure  0% 15.94% 29.42% 17.62% 
 
Regulation Level 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 972 767 362 2,101 
Any Regulation 0 720 1,300 2,020 
Regulation that is Named Licensure 0 430 709 1,139 
Licensure (with Practice Restriction) 0 237 489 726 
 
Years of Regulation 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
For the 2,020 observations subject to any regulation:     
years of any regulation 8.77 4.91 1 17 
square of years of any regulation 100.97 96.94 1 289 
natural log of years of any regulation 1.97 0.71 0 2.83 
For the 1,139 observations subject to regulation named 
licensure: 
    
years of regulation named licensure 8.06 5.04 1 16 
square of years of regulation named licensure 90.30 90.40 1 256 
natural log of years of regulation named licensure 1.82 0.82 0 2.77 
For the 726 observations subject to licensure:     
years of licensure 7.16 4.29 1 14 
square of years of licensure 69.67 64.82 1 196 
natural log of years of licensure 1.71 0.80 0 2.64 
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Table 4.5: Statute Elements that Affect Strictness of State Regulation of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists at the Bachelor’s Level 
 
Table 4.5 - Strictness of State Regulation of Dietitians and Nutritionists – Page 1 of 2 
State 
Type of 
Regulation 
in 2000  
Practice 
Hours  
DN 
Fraction 
of 
Board  
Continuing 
Education 
Hours/year Initial Fee  
Renewal 
Fee/year  
Alabama Licensure 900 0.667 15 $192.08 $57.62 
Alaska None - - - - - 
Arizona None - - - - - 
Arkansas Licensure 900 0.571 12 $84.51 $38.42 
California 
Title 
Protection 
900 0.0 15 $0 $0 
Colorado None - - - - - 
Connecticut Certification 900 0.0 15 $145.98 $76.83 
Delaware Certification 900 0.6 15 $131.38 $63.31 
District of 
Columbia 
Licensure 900 0.667 15 $189.39 $55.32 
Florida Licensure 900 0.8 15 $134.45 $40.34 
Georgia Licensure 900 0.857 15 $57.62 $19.21 
Hawaii None - - - - - 
Idaho Certification 900 0.75 15 $61.46 $34.57 
Illinois Licensure 900 0.857 15 $76.83 $38.42 
Indiana Certification 900 0.571 15 $15.37 $7.68 
Iowa Licensure 900 0.6 15 $92.20 $46.10 
Kansas Licensure 900 0.0 7.5 $107.56 $51.86 
Kentucky Licensure 900 0.857 15 $38.42 $38.42 
Louisiana Licensure 900 0.571 15 $69.15 $46.10 
Maine Licensure 900 0.6 15 $126.77 $107.56 
Maryland Licensure 900 0.778 15 $192.08 $106.79 
Massachusetts Certification 900 0.8 15 $150.59 $49.94 
Michigan None - - - - - 
Minnesota Licensure 900 0.667 15 $220.89 $57.62 
Mississippi Licensure 900 1.0 15 $76.83 $38.42 
Missouri Licensure 900 0.833 15 $38.42 $7.68 
Montana Licensure 900 0.071 15 $44.95 $38.42 
Nebraska Licensure 900 0.4 15 $87.59 $43.79 
Nevada Certification 900 1.0 15 $50.07 $0 
New 
Hampshire 
None - - - - - 
New Jersey None - - - - - 
New Mexico Licensure 900 0.75 15 $153.66 $57.62 
New York Certification 800 0.769 0 $225.88 $0 
North Carolina Licensure 900 0.286 15 $230.49 $96.04 
North Dakota Licensure 900 0.8 15 $46.10 $34.57 
Ohio Licensure 900 0.8 15 $96.04 $72.99 
Oklahoma Certification 900 0.6 15 $92.20 $76.83 
Oregon Licensure 900 0.571 15 $96.04 $57.62 
Pennsylvania None - - - - - 
Rhode Island Licensure 900 0.556 10 $69.15 $65.31 
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Table 4.5 - Strictness of State Regulation of Dietitians and Nutritionists – Page 2 of 2 
State 
Type of 
Regulation 
in 2000  
Practice 
Hours  
DN 
Fraction 
of 
Board  
Continuing 
Education 
Hours/year Initial Fee  
Renewal 
Fee/year  
South Carolina None - - - - - 
South Dakota Licensure 900 1.0 15 $53.78 $26.89 
Tennessee Licensure 900 0.833 0 $99.88 $34.57 
Texas Certification 900 0.667 6 $82.98 $34.57 
Utah Certification 900 0.8 0 $46.10 $14.21 
Vermont Certification 900 1.0 15 $76.83 $76.83 
Virginia 
Title 
Protection 
900 0.0 15 $0 $0 
Washington Certification 900 0.0 15 $76.83 $53.78 
West Virginia Licensure 900 0.8 10 $38.42 $38.42 
Wisconsin Certification 900 0.75 0 $57.62 $28.81 
Wyoming None - - - - - 
Data Source: Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics (Formerly the American Dietetic 
Association) – State Licensure Agency Contact List  – 
http://www.eatright.org/HealthProfessionals/content.aspx?id=7093 
 
All states that regulate Dietitians and Nutritionists require a bachelor’s degree and an exam and 
all regulation statutes include reciprocity. 
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics for Social Workers – Individual Demographic Variables 
 
Census Year Number  
Highest Degree 
Earned Number  
Place of Work 
State Number 
1980 11,419  Bachelors 25,896  Arkansas 222 
1990 16,447  Masters 18,712  California 5,284 
2000 18,743  Professional 1,114  Colorado 710 
   Doctorate 887  Connecticut 992 
Sex Number     Delaware 146 
Female 32,975  Place of Work Number  Florida 2,308 
Male 13,634  Metropolitan Area 30,425  Georgia 1,216 
   Non-Metropolitan Area 16,184  Hawaii 76 
Age Range Number     Idaho 155 
19 3  Industry Group Number  Illinois 2,545 
20 – 24 2,677  Agriculture 6  Indiana 936 
25 - 29 8,032  Mining 1  Iowa 574 
30 - 34 7,974  Construction 14  Kansas 482 
35 - 39 6,976  Manufacturing 24  Kentucky 348 
40 - 44 6,417  Wholesale Trade 45  Louisiana 751 
45 - 49 5,490  Retail Trade 13  Maine 331 
50 - 54 4,295  Transportation and 
Warehousing 
50 
 Maryland 1,048 
55 - 59 2,694   Massachusetts 1,168 
60 - 64 1,374  Utilities 18  Michigan 2,188 
65 - 69 419  Information and 
Communications 
18 
 Minnesota 1,178 
70 - 74 165   Mississippi 290 
75 - 79 64  Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate, and 
Rental and Leasing 
370 
 Missouri 537 
80 - 84 25   Montana 131 
85 - 89 3   Nebraska 241 
90 - 94 1  Professional, 
Scientific, 
Management, 
Administrative, and 
Waste Management 
502 
 Nevada 54 
Mean Age 39.19   New Hampshire 219 
    New Jersey 770 
Number of 
Children Aged 
Less Than 5 Years Number 
  
New Mexico 273 
 Educational Services 2,654  New York 6,442 
 Health Services (not 
Hospitals) 
3,844 
 North Carolina 1,402 
0 39,767   North Dakota 97 
1 5,485  Hospitals 5,834  Ohio 1,033 
2 1,271  Social Services 19,715  Oklahoma 181 
3 85  Arts, Entertainment, 
Recreation, 
Accommodations, and 
Food Services 
94 
 Oregon 639 
4 1   Pennsylvania 2,830 
    Rhode Island 299 
Marital Status Number   South Carolina 631 
Married 26,581  Other Services 
(Except Public 
Administration) 1,516 
 South Dakota 145 
Not Married 20,028 
  
Tennessee 821 
   Public Administration 11,891  Texas 2,447 
Race Number  Armed Forces 0  Utah 311 
White 37,478  Unemployed 0  Vermont 158 
Black 6,850     Virginia 175 
Asian 829  Place of Work State Number  Washington 1,035 
Other 842  Alabama 681  West Virginia 286 
   Alaska 111  Wisconsin 1,029 
Total 46,609  Arizona 627  Wyoming 56 
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Table 4.7: Summary Statistics for Social Workers – Regulation Variables 
 
 
Regulation Type 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 83.97% 69.62% 50.55% 65.47% 
Title Protection 2.15% 9.16% 13.82% 9.32% 
Licensure  13.87% 21.22% 39.07% 26.60% 
 
Regulation Level 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 9,589 11,451 9,475 30,515 
Any Regulation 1,830 4,996 9,268 16,094 
Regulation that is Named Licensure 1,784 3,764 6,193 11,741 
Licensure (with Practice Restriction) 1,584 3,490 7,323 12,397 
 
Years of Regulation 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
For the 16,094 observations subject to any regulation:     
years of any regulation 11.65 9.85 0 43 
square of years of any regulation 232.81 355.95 0 1849 
natural log of years of any regulation 1.97 1.15 0 3.76 
For the 11,741 observations subject to regulation named 
licensure: 
    
years of regulation named licensure 13.47 10.62 0 43 
square of years of regulation named licensure 294.20 397.02 0 1849 
natural log of years of regulation named licensure 2.12 1.17 0 3.76 
For the 12,397 observations subject to licensure:     
years of licensure 12.72 10.18 0 43 
square of years of licensure 265.45 387.74 0 1849 
natural log of years of licensure 2.10 1.11 0 3.76 
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Table 4.8: Statute Elements that Affect Strictness of State Regulation of Social Workers at the 
Bachelor’s Level 
 
Table 4.8 - Strictness of State Regulation of Social Workers – Page 1 of 2 
State 
Type of 
Regulation 
in 2000 
Exam 
Required 
(Y/N)  
Experience 
Hours  
SW 
Fraction 
of 
Board  
Continuing 
Education 
Hours/year 
Initial 
Fee  
Renewal 
Fee/year  
Alabama 
Title 
Protection 
Y 0 1.0 15 $60.68 $24.27 
Alaska None - - - - - - 
Arizona None - - - - - - 
Arkansas Licensure  Y 0 0.667 24 $80.91 $32.36 
California None - - - - - - 
Colorado None - - - - - - 
Connecticut None - - - - - - 
Delaware None - - - - - - 
District of 
Columbia 
Licensure  Y 0 0.8 20 $40.46 $34.39 
Florida None - - - - - - 
Georgia None - - - - - - 
Hawaii Licensure  Y 0 0.6 0 $194.18 $49.36 
Idaho Licensure Y 0 0.833 20 $40.46 $40.46 
Illinois None - - - - - - 
Indiana None - - - - - - 
Iowa Licensure  Y 0 0.714 13.5 $80.91 $24.27 
Kansas Licensure  Y 0 0.636 20 $80.91 $40.46 
Kentucky Licensure  Y 0 0.857 5 $40.46 $13.49 
Louisiana Licensure  N 0 0.857 20 $40.46 $20.23 
Maine Licensure  Y 0 0.714 12.5 $97.09 $28.32 
Maryland Licensure  Y 0 0.833 20 $80.91 $30.34 
Massachusetts Licensure  Y 0 1.0 7.5 $178.00 $21.85 
Michigan Licensure  Y 4000 0.667 22.5 $32.36 $16.18 
Minnesota None - - - - - - 
Mississippi Licensure  Y 0 1.0 20 $89.00 $44.50 
Missouri Licensure  Y 3000 0.9 15 $0 $26.30 
Montana None - - - - - - 
Nebraska Licensure  N 0 0.8 16 $20.23 $10.11 
Nevada Licensure  Y 0 0.8 30 $80.91 $60.68 
New Hampshire None - - - - - - 
New Jersey Licensure  N 0 0.778 10 $117.32 $28.32 
New Mexico Licensure  Y 0 0.571 15 $60.68 $20.23 
New York None - - - - - - 
North Carolina 
Title 
Protection  
Y 0 0.714 20 $80.91 $24.27 
North Dakota Licensure  Y 0 0.667 15 $80.91 $30.34 
Ohio Licensure  Y 0 0.8 15 $48.55 $24.27 
Oklahoma Licensure  Y 4000 0.857 16 $60.68 $80.91 
Oregon 
Title 
Protection  
Y 0 0.571 10 $80.91 $0 
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Table 4.8 - Strictness of State Regulation of Social Workers – Page 2 of 2 
State 
Type of 
Regulation 
in 2000 
Exam 
Required 
(Y/N)  
Experience 
Hours  
SW 
Fraction 
of 
Board  
Continuing 
Education 
Hours/year 
Initial 
Fee  
Renewal 
Fee/year  
Pennsylvania 
Title 
Protection  
Y 0 0.769 15 $36.41 $30.34 
Rhode Island None - - - - - - 
South Carolina Licensure  Y 0 0.857 20 $36.41 $36.41 
South Dakota Licensure  Y 0 0.714 15 $56.64 $28.32 
Tennessee Licensure  Y 0 0.909 7.5 $323.64 $48.55 
Texas Licensure  Y 0 0.667 15 $40.46 $12.14 
Utah Licensure  Y 0 0.857 0 $68.77 $31.55 
Vermont None - - - - - - 
Virginia Licensure  Y 3000 0.778 7.5 $80.91 $44.50 
Washington None - - - - - - 
West Virginia Licensure  Y 0 0.833 25 $60.68 $26.30 
Wisconsin Licensure  Y 0 0.7 15 $144.02 $25.49 
Wyoming Licensure  Y 0 0.667 22.5 $202.28 $30.34 
Data Source: Association of Social Work Boards (http://www.aswb.org) 
 
All states that regulate Social Workers require a bachelor’s degree and all regulation statutes 
include reciprocity. 
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Figure 4.1: Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Dietitians and 
Nutritionists or Social Workers in 1980 
 
 
 
Any Regulation Licensing
$10,966-$13,007 0 0
$10,103-$10,848 0 0
$8,021-$10,059 0 0
$7,679-$7,957 0 0
$6,573-$7671 0 0
Mean $9,205
Total Number of States 
that Regulate or License
0 0
% Below Mean 0 0
% Above Mean 0 0
Any Regulation Licensing
$10,966-$13,007 0 0
$10,103-$10,848 2 2
$8,021-$10,059 3 3
$7,679-$7,957 3 2
$6,573-$7671 3 2
Mean $9,205
Total Number of States 
that Regulate or License
11 9
% Below Mean 55 44
% Above Mean 45 56
Number of States
Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Dietitians and 
Nutritionists in 1980
Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Social Workers in 1980
Number of States
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Figure 4.2: Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Dietitians and 
Nutritionists or Social Workers in 1990 
 
 
  
Any Regulation Licensing
$22,681-$26,198 1 1
$20,042-$22,594 1 0
$16,077-$19,821 12 8
$15,171-$16,075 4 4
$13,117-$14,847 3 1
Mean $18,509
Total Number of States 
that Regulate or License
21 14
% Below Mean 76 79
% Above Mean 24 21
Any Regulation Licensing
$22,681-$26,198 2 2
$20,042-$22,594 1 1
$16,077-$19,821 10 8
$15,171-$16,075 5 3
$13,117-$14,847 3 3
Mean $18,509
Total Number of States 
that Regulate or License
21 17
% Below Mean 71 71
% Above Mean 29 29
Number of States
Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Dietitians and 
Nutritionists in 1990
Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Social Workers in 1990
Number of States
127 
 
Figure 4.3: Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Dietitians and 
Nutritionists or Social Workers in 2000 
 
 
 
 
Any Regulation Licensing
$34,623-$41,920 4 1
$31,009-$34,102 6 2
$26,292-$30,977 19 13
$23,554-$25,592 7 4
$21,555-$23,457 5 5
Mean $29,080
Total Number of States 
that Regulate or License
41 25
% Below Mean 66 84
% Above Mean 34 16
Any Regulation Licensing
$34,623-$41,920 3 3
$31,009-$34,102 1 1
$26,292-$30,977 17 15
$23,554-$25,592 8 6
$21,555-$23,457 4 3
Mean $29,080
Total Number of States 
that Regulate or License
33 28
% Below Mean 73 71
% Above Mean 27 29
Number of States
Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Dietitians and 
Nutritionists in 2000
Per Capita Personal Income in States that Regulate/License Social Workers in 2000
Number of States
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Table 4.9: Effect of Any Regulation on Wages of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Any  -.008 .001 .039 .003 .029 .041 
Regulation (.027) (.026) (.071) (.034) (.046) (.079) 
Year 1990 -.134*** -.137** -.160*** -.149*** -.037 -.169*** 
 (.029) (.067) (.083) (.054) (.118) (.065) 
Year 2000 -.113* -.160 -.158* -.193* -.010 -.230* 
 (.050) (.125) (.083) (.100) (.208) (.125) 
Female -.020 -.021 -.021 -.256*** -.250*** -.256*** 
 (.030) (.030) (.030) (.049) (.049) (.048) 
Age .037*** .036*** .037*** .077*** .077*** .077*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .040*** .042*** .040*** -.172*** -.173*** -.172*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.029) (.030) (.029) 
Married .038* .041* .037* -.067** -.068** -.067** 
 (.021) (.021) (.021) (.028) (.028) (.027) 
White .197*** .196*** .197*** .240*** .245*** .241*** 
 (.058) (.058) (.057) (.081) (.080) (.079) 
Black .198*** .193*** .198*** .361*** .361*** .361*** 
 (.060) (.061) (.059) (.085) (.085) (.084) 
Asian .151** .137** .153** .217*** .208*** .218*** 
 (.062) (.061) (.062) (.075) (.074) (.074) 
Master’s .077*** .076*** .077*** .070*** .068** .070*** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.013) (.025) (.026) (.025) 
Professional  .022 .020 .023 .032 .043 .032 
Degree (.037) (.039) (.037) (.040) (.041) (.039) 
Doctorate .215*** .228*** .216*** .308*** .321*** .308*** 
 (.058) (.059) (.057) (.066) (.066) (.066) 
Metropolitan  .034** .030** .036** .085*** .082*** .086*** 
Area (.015) (.015) (.014) (.030) (.031) (.029) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 4121 4121 
K-P F   15.96   15.96 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset. Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4.10: Effect of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Regulation  -.026 -.030 .028 -.046* -.051 .029 
Named 
Licensure 
(.023) (.037) (.051) (.027) (.051) (.057) 
Year 1990 -.129*** -.124* -.149*** -.131** .003 -.158*** 
 (.027) (.068) (.029) (.051) (.113) (.053) 
Year 2000 -.105** -.032 -.137** -.164 .073 -.207** 
 (.046) (.127) (.050) (.099) (.197) (.101) 
Female -.019 -.021 -.021 -.255*** -.249*** -.256*** 
 (.030) (.030) (.029) (.049) (.049) (.048) 
Age .037*** .036*** .037*** .077*** .077*** .077*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .040*** .042*** .040*** -.172*** -.173*** -.172*** 
Children 
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) (.029) 
Married .038* .041* .038* -.066** -.068** -.067** 
 (.021) (.021) (.021) (.028) (.028) (.027) 
White .197*** .197*** .196*** .241*** .247*** .240*** 
 (.058) (.058) (.058) (.080) (.079) (.080) 
Black .201*** .195*** .196*** .365*** .365*** .358*** 
 (.060) (.060) (.061) (.085) (.084) (.084) 
Asian .151** .138** .152** .216*** .211*** .217*** 
 (.062) (.060) (.062) (.074) (.072) (.074) 
Master’s .076*** .076*** .077*** .069*** .068** .070*** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.014) (.025) (.026) (.025) 
Professional  .022 .020 .023 .031 .043 .032 
Degree (.037) (.039) (.037) (.040) (.041) (.039) 
Doctorate .217*** .227*** .214*** .310*** .319*** .307*** 
 (.058) (.059) (.058) (.066) (.066) (.065) 
Metropolitan  .034*** .029** .035** .084*** .081** .086*** 
Area (.015) (.015) (.014) (.030) (.031) (.029) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 4121 4121 
K-P F   55.95   55.95 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4.11: Effect of Licensure on Wages of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Licensure -.016 -.059 .040 -.021 -.041 .042 
 (.028) (.041) (.074) (.033) (.064) (.082) 
Year 1990 -.135*** -.112* -.148*** -.142*** -.001 -.157*** 
 (.026) (.065) (.029) (.051) (.115) (.053) 
Year 2000 -.114** -.112 -.136*** -.182* .061 -.207** 
 (.045) (.119) (.052) (.099) (.201) (.102) 
Female -.019 -.021 -.021 -.255*** -.249*** -.257*** 
 (.030) (.030) (.029) (.049) (.049) (.048) 
Age .037*** .036*** .037*** .077*** .077*** .077*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .040*** .041*** .040*** -.172*** -.173*** -.172*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) (.029) 
Married .038* .041* .038* -.066** -.068** -.067** 
 (.021) (.021) (.021) (.028) (.028) (.027) 
White .198*** .197*** .194*** .241*** .246*** .238*** 
 (.058) (.058) (.059) (.080) (.080) (.081) 
Black .200*** .194*** .195*** .362*** .363*** .357*** 
 (.060) (.060) (.061) (.084) (.084) (.085) 
Asian .152** .138** .150** .218*** .210*** .215*** 
 (.062) (.061) (.063) (.075) (.073) (.075) 
Master’s .077*** .075*** .077*** .069*** .068** .070*** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.014) (.025) (.026) (.025) 
Professional  .023 .021 .021 .032 .043 .031 
Degree (.037) (.039) (.036) (.040) (.041) (.040) 
Doctorate .216*** .227*** .215*** .309*** .319*** .307*** 
 (.058) (.059) (.057) (.066) (.066) (.065) 
Metropolitan  .034*** .028* .036** .084*** .081** .086*** 
Area (.015) (.015) (.014) (.030) (.031) (.029) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 4121 4121 
K-P F   16.98   16.98 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4.12: Effect of Any Regulation on Wages of Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Any  -.001 -.009 -.013 -.018 
Regulation (.019) (.014) (.020) (.018) 
Year 1990 -.172*** -.225*** -.137*** -.223*** 
 (.018) (.027) (.022) (.033) 
Year 2000 -.257*** -.361*** -.195*** -.394*** 
 (.038) (.061) (.043) (.077) 
Female -.060*** -.059*** -.180*** -.179*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.007) 
Age .048*** .048*** .086*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .035*** .035*** -.022*** -.022*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .033*** .033*** .001 .0002 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
White -.019* -.016 -.010 -.009 
 (.011) (.011) (.013) (.014) 
Black .019* .024** .046** .046** 
 (.010) (.011) (.018) (.019) 
Asian -.031** -.036** -.052* -.054* 
 (.015) (.015) (.027) (.028) 
Master’s .143*** .142*** .124*** .123*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) 
Professional  .106*** .106*** .061*** .061*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .130*** .133*** .125*** .128*** 
 (.016) (.016) (.018) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .056*** .056*** .061*** .064*** 
Area (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) 
 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.13: Effect of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Regulation  .009 .004 .025 -.004 -.010 .004 
Named  
Licensure 
(.021) (.016) (.036) (.023) (.015) (.040) 
Year 1990 -.176*** -.232*** -.182*** -.142*** -.228*** -.145*** 
 (.018) (.027) (.023) (.023) (.033) (.029) 
Year 2000 -.267*** -.374*** -.282*** -.208*** -.405*** -.215*** 
 (.037) (.060) (.052) (.043) (.076) (.063) 
Female -.060*** -.059*** -.060*** -.180*** -.179*** -.180*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.007) 
Age .048*** .048*** .048*** .086*** .086*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .035*** .035*** .035*** -.022*** -.022*** -.022*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Married .033*** .033*** .033*** .001 .0002 .001 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.006) (.008) (.007) 
White -.020* -.016 -.021* -.011 -.009 -.011 
 (.011) (.011) (.011) (.013) (.014) (.014) 
Black .018* .023** .017 .045** .046** .044** 
 (.009) (.011) (.010) (.018) (.019) (.019) 
Asian -.031** -.036** -.031** -.052* -.054* -.052* 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.027) (.028) (.0257 
Master’s .142*** .142*** .142*** .124*** .123*** .124*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.005) 
Professional  .106*** .107*** .106*** .061*** .061*** .060*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.014) (.019) (.020) (.019) 
Doctorate .130*** .133*** .130*** .125*** .128*** .125*** 
 (.016) (.016) (.016) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .056*** .056*** .055*** .061*** .064*** .061*** 
Area (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
K-P F   10.95   10.95 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4.14: Effect of Licensure on Wages of Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Licensure -.001 .004 -.010 -.004 
 (.021) (.011) (.022) (.014) 
Year 1990 -.172*** -.231*** -.141*** -.231*** 
 (.018) (.026) (.022) (.032) 
Year 2000 -.258*** -.374*** -.204*** -.412*** 
 (.036) (.058) (.041) (.073) 
Female -.060*** -.059*** -.180*** -.179*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.007) 
Age .048*** .048*** .086*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .035*** .035*** -.022*** -.022*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .033*** .033*** .001 .0002 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
White -.019* -.016 -.010 -.009 
 (.011) (.011) (.013) (.014) 
Black .019* .023** .046** .046** 
 (.009) (.011) (.018) (.019) 
Asian -.031** -.036** -.052* -.054* 
 (.015) (.015) (.027) (.028) 
Master’s .143*** .142*** .124*** .123*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) 
Professional  .106*** .107*** .061*** .061*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .130*** .133*** .125*** .128*** 
 (.016) (.016) (.018) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .056*** .056*** .061*** .064*** 
Area (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) 
 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.15: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Any Regulation on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .093* .043 .094* .073 
Regulation (.047) (.052) (.050) (.072) 
ln(Years of .038* .025 .042 .073* 
Any 
Regulation) 
(.022) (.027) (.026) (.038) 
Female -.018 -.021 -.253*** -.251*** 
 (.030) (.030) (.048) (.049) 
Age .035*** .035*** .075*** .077*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .036*** .040*** -.176*** -.173*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) 
Married .037* .040* -.067** -.067** 
 (.021) (.021) (.028) (.028) 
White .193*** .195*** .237*** .245*** 
 (.058) (.058) (.080) (.080) 
Black .201*** .193*** .364*** .361*** 
 (.057) (.060) (.084) (.085) 
Asian .147** .136** .215*** .207*** 
 (.061) (.060) (.073) (.073) 
Master’s .080*** .077*** .072*** .068** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.025) (.026) 
Professional  .026 .022 .035 .042 
Degree (.038) (.039) (.040) (.041) 
Doctorate .218*** .228*** .310*** .319*** 
 (.058) (.059) (.067) (.067) 
Metropolitan  .012 .025 .065** .081*** 
Area (.012) (.015) (.027) (.030) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.16: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of 
Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .110** .061 .136** .113 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.054) (.066) (.051) (.083) 
ln(Years of .038 .017 .042 .042 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure) 
(.024) (.028) (.026) (.041) 
Female -.018 -.021 -.253*** -.249*** 
 (.031) (.030) (.047) (.048) 
Age .035*** .035*** .076*** .076*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .036*** .040*** -.176*** -.174*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) 
Married .036* .040* -.067** -.068** 
 (.021) (.021) (.027) (.027) 
White .193*** .196*** .237*** .246*** 
 (.058) (.058) (.079) (.079) 
Black .201*** .194*** .365*** .364*** 
 (.058) (.060) (.084) (.084) 
Asian .146** .136** .214*** .210*** 
 (.062) (.060) (.073) (.072) 
Master’s .079*** .077*** .071*** .068** 
Degree (.013) (.013) ( .025) (.026) 
Professional  .025 .021 .034 .042 
Degree (.038) (.040) (.040) (.042) 
Doctorate .220*** .228*** .313*** .319*** 
 (.058) (.059) (.066) (.066) 
Metropolitan  .011 .024 .065** .079** 
Area (.013) (.015) (.028) (.030) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 4.17: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Licensure on Wages of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .131** .102* .119* .095 
Licensure (.055) (.060) (.065) (.098) 
ln(Years of .062** .024 .052 .037 
 Licensure) (.029) (.024) (.037) (.044) 
Female -.018 -.021 -.253*** -.249*** 
 (.030) (.030) (.048) (.049) 
Age .035*** .036*** .075*** .077*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .035*** .039*** -.177*** -.174*** 
Children 
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) 
Married .037* .040* -.067** -.068** 
 (.021) (.021) (.027) (.028) 
White .190*** .195*** .235*** .243*** 
 (.058) (.058) (.079) (.079) 
Black .199*** .193*** .363*** .361*** 
 (.058) (.060) (.083) (.084) 
Asian .145** .135** .214*** .208*** 
 (.062) (.060) (.073) (.072) 
Master’s .079*** .076*** .072*** .068** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.025) (.026) 
Professional  .027 .022 .037 .043 
Degree (.038) (.039) (.040) (.042) 
Doctorate .221*** .228*** .313*** .321*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.067) (.066) 
Metropolitan  .012 .023 .065** .080** 
Area (.013) (.015) (.028) (.030) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.18: Effect of Years of Any Regulation and Years-Squared on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .069 .011 .105 .046 
Regulation (.057) (.071) (.067) (.103) 
Years of .005 .001 .019 .019 
Any 
Regulation 
(.012) (.014) (.016) (.021) 
Years of  .0001 -.0002 -.0007 -.0006 
Any 
Regulation –
Squared 
(.0006) (.0007) (.0008) (.0011) 
Female -.016 -.021 -.253*** -.250*** 
 (.031) (.030) (.049) (.049) 
Age .035*** .036*** .075*** .077*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .037*** .041*** -.176*** -.173*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) 
Married .037* .041* -.067** -.067** 
 (.021) (.021) (.028) (.028) 
White .197*** .197*** .235*** .244*** 
 (.059) (.058) (.082) (.081) 
Black .206*** .195*** .361*** .361*** 
 (.059) (.061) (.086) (.086) 
Asian .150** .137** .213*** .207*** 
 (.062) (.060) (.075) (.075) 
Master’s .079*** .077*** .072*** .068** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.025) (.026) 
Professional  .026 .022 .035 .042 
Degree (.038) (.039) (.040) (.041) 
Doctorate .217*** .228*** .310*** .320*** 
 (.058) (.059) (.067) (.067) 
Metropolitan  .014 .025 .066** .081*** 
Area (.012) (.015) (.027) (.030) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.19: Effect of Years of Regulation Named Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of Dietitians 
and Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No Regulation .075 .018 .144* .131 
Named 
Licensure 
(.070) (.094) (.075) (.125) 
Years of -.0007 -.008 .018 .023 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.017) (.023) (.020) (.034) 
Years of  .0005 .0006 -.0007 -.001 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure –
Squared 
(.0008) (.0012) (.0010) (.002) 
Female -.017 -.020 -.253*** -.249*** 
 (.031) (.030) (.048) (.049) 
Age .035*** .035*** .076*** .076*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .036*** .040*** -.176*** -.174*** 
Children < 5 
Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) 
Married .036* .040* -.067** -.068** 
 (.021) (.021) (.027) (.027) 
White .195*** .197*** .236*** .245*** 
 (.059) (.058) (.079) (.079) 
Black .204*** .196*** .365*** .363*** 
 (.059) (.060) (.084) (.084) 
Asian .150** .138** .213*** .209*** 
 (.063) (.060) (.072) (.072) 
Master’s .079*** .077*** .071*** .068** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.025) (.026) 
Professional  .025 .022 .033 .042 
Degree (.038) (.040) (.041) (.042) 
Doctorate .218*** .227*** .313*** .320*** 
 (.058) (.059) (.066) (.066) 
Metropolitan  .013 .023 .065** .079** 
Area (.013) (.015) (.028) (.030) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry Groups Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.20: Effect of Years of Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .181** .133 .181* .141 
Licensure (.076) (.102) (.104) (.176) 
Years of .046* .021 .046* .032 
Licensure (.025) (.032) (.034) (.055) 
Years of  -.002 -.001 -.003 -.002 
Licensure –
Squared 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) 
Female -.019 -.021 -.254*** -.250*** 
 (.030) (.030) (.048) (.049) 
Age .035*** .036*** .075*** .077*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .035*** .039*** -.177*** -.174*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.029) (.029) 
Married .037* .040* -.067** -.068** 
 (.021) (.021) (.028) (.028) 
White .189*** .194*** .234*** .243*** 
 (.058) (.058) (.079) (.080) 
Black .198*** .193*** .361*** .361*** 
 (.058) (.060) (.083) (.085) 
Asian .144** .135** .212*** .207*** 
 (.061) (.060) (.073) (.072) 
Master’s .080*** .076*** .072*** .068** 
Degree (.013) (.013) (.025) (.026) 
Professional  .027 .022 .037 .044 
Degree (.038) (.039) (.040) (.042) 
Doctorate .221*** .228*** .314*** .320*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.067) (.066) 
Metropolitan  .012 .023 .064** .079** 
Area (.013) (.015) (.028) (.030) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 4121 4121 4121 4121 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.21: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Any Regulation on Wages of Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .043* .036** .066*** .054*** 
Regulation (.024) (.015) (.023) (.016) 
ln(Years of .011 .013 .020*** .022** 
Any 
Regulation) 
(.007) (.009) (.007) (.009) 
Female -.061*** -.060*** -.181*** -.180*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age .046*** .047*** .084*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.023*** -.022*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .032*** .033*** -.0002 .0001 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.008) 
White -.014 -.015 -.007 -.009 
 (.011) (.011) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .025** .050*** .048** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.019) 
Asian -.028* -.037** -.050* -.055* 
 (.015) (.015) (.027) (.028) 
Master’s .149*** .144*** .129*** .126*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Professional  .124*** .112*** .075*** .065*** 
Degree (.016) (.015) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .155*** .139*** .145*** .133*** 
 (.018) (.016) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .039*** .052*** .047*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.22: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of Social 
Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
No  .016 .031** .109* .044 .051*** .064 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.033) (.014) (.059) (.033) (.014) (.069) 
ln(Years of .003 .006 .016 .013 .014 .016 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure) 
(.009) (.013) (.016) (.009) (.013) (.018) 
Female -.061*** -.060*** -.060*** -.181*** -.180*** -.180*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.007) 
Age .046*** .047*** .047*** .084*** .086*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.005) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0000) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** .035*** -.023*** -.022*** -.022*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Married .032*** .033*** .033*** -.0001 .0001 .0001 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.007) 
White -.014 -.016 -.015 -.006 -.009 -.009 
 (.011) (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) (.014) 
Black .028*** .025** .026** .052*** .047** .047** 
 (.010) (.011) (.010) (.017) (.019) (.019) 
Asian -.027* -.036** -.037** -.049* -.055* -.055** 
 (.016) (.016) (.015) (.027) (.028) (.028) 
Master’s .150*** .144*** .144*** .130*** .125*** .125*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Professional  .124*** .112*** .111*** .076*** .065*** .065*** 
Degree (.016) (.015) (.015) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .155*** .139*** .138*** .1346*** .133*** .132*** 
 (.018) (.016) (.016) (.019) (.018) (.017) 
Metropolitan  .037*** .052*** .052*** .045*** .060*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
K-P F   12.40   12.40 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4.23: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Licensure on Wages of Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .025 .013 .051 .034** 
Licensure (.030) (.016) (.031) (.016) 
ln(Years of .006 .008 .015* .016 
 Licensure) (.009) (.010) (.009) (.010) 
Female -.061*** -.060*** -.181*** -.180*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age .046*** .047*** .084*** .085*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.005) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.023*** -.022*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .032*** .033*** -.0000 .0001 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
White -.014 -.016 -.006 -.009 
 (.011) (.011) (.013) (.014) 
Black .028*** .025** .051*** .047** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.019) 
Asian -.027* -.036** -.050* -.055* 
 (.016) (.015) (.027) (.028) 
Master’s .150*** .144*** .130*** .125*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Professional  .124*** .112*** .076*** .065*** 
Degree (.016) (.015) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .155*** .139*** .147*** .133*** 
 (.018) (.016) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .037*** .051*** .045*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.24: Effect of Years of Any Regulation and Years-Squared on Wages of Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .038 .032** .056** .046** 
Regulation (.024) (.016) (.024) (.018) 
Years of .002 .002 .003 .004 
Any 
Regulation 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) 
Years of  -.0000 -.0000 -.0001 -.0001 
Any 
Regulation –
Squared 
(.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Female -.060*** -.060*** -.181*** -.170*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age .046*** .047*** .084*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.023*** -.022*** 
Children 
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .032*** .033*** -.0001 .0001 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
White -.014 -.015 -.006 -.009 
 (.011) (.011) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .025** .051*** .047** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.019) 
Asian -.028* -.037** -.050* -.054* 
 (.016) (.015) (.027) (.028) 
Master’s .149*** .144*** .129*** .126*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Professional  .124*** .111*** .075*** .065*** 
Degree (.016) (.015) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .155*** .139*** .146*** .133*** 
 (.018) (.016) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .039*** .052*** .047*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset. Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
144 
 
Table 4.25: Effect of Years of Regulation Named Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of 
Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .011 .028* .033 .044*** 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.032) (.015) (.032) (.015) 
Years of  -.0000 .0008 .001 .001 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) 
Years of  .0000 .0000 -.0000 -.0000 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure –
Squared 
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) 
Female -.061*** -.060*** -.181*** -.180*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age .046*** .047*** .084*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.005) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.023*** -.022** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .032*** .033*** -.0001 .0000 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
White -.014 -.016 -.007 -.009 
 (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .025** .051*** .047** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.019) 
Asian -.027* -.037** -.049* -.055* 
 (.016) (.015) (.027) (.028) 
Master’s .150*** .144*** .130*** .125*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Professional  .124*** .111*** .076*** .065*** 
Degree (.016) (.015) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .155*** .139*** .146*** .133*** 
 (.018) (.016) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .037*** .052*** .045*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.26: Effect of Years of Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of Social Workers 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .020 .008 .039 .022 
Licensure (.029) (.015) (.030) (.018) 
Years of  .0006 .001 .002 .002 
Licensure (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) 
Years of  -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 
Licensure –
Squared 
(.0000) (.0001) (.0000) (.0001) 
Female -.061*** -.060*** -.181** -.180*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age .046*** .047*** .084*** .085*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.005) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.023*** -.022*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .032*** .033*** .0000 .0001 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
White -.014 -.016 -.007 -.009 
 (.011) (.011) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .025** .051*** .047** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.019) 
Asian -.027* -.036** -.050* -.055* 
 (.016) (.015) (.027) (.028) 
Master’s .145*** .144*** .129*** .125*** 
Degree (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Professional  .124*** .112*** .076*** .065*** 
Degree (.016) (.015) (.020) (.020) 
Doctorate .155*** .139*** .146*** .133*** 
 (.017) (.016) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .037*** .051*** .045*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
N 46,609 46,609 46,609 46,609 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.27: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Regulation-Strictness on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists 
 (1) (2) 
 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log 
of Hourly Wage 
Dependent Variable = Natural  
Log of Annual Wage 
Regulation-Strictness Variables:   
Licensure .050 .146 
 (.068) (.090) 
Certification .095 .237*** 
 (.072) (.085) 
Fraction of Board  -.050 -.117* 
Comprised of DNs (.051) (.061) 
Continuing Education  .005 .011*** 
Hours per Year (.004) (.004) 
Practice Hours  -.001 -.002* 
for Initial Credentials (.001) (.001) 
Application Fee -.0003 -.0004 
 (.0004) (.0006) 
Yearly Renewal Fee -.0003 -.0005 
 (.0007) (.0008) 
Year 2000 .085* -.033 
 (.045) (.076) 
Female -.002 -.199** 
 (.047) (.075) 
Age .034*** .069*** 
 (.006) (.011) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0007*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of Children  .038*** -.173*** 
Less than 5 Years (.012) (.034) 
Married .077*** -.030 
 (.022) (.030) 
White .229*** .320*** 
 (.070) (.091) 
Black .273** .457*** 
 (.095) (.122) 
Asian .174** .247** 
 (.074) (.105) 
Master’s Degree .075*** .042 
 (.026) (.038) 
Professional Degree .021 .009 
 (.052) (.060) 
Doctorate .217*** .291*** 
 (.077) (.107) 
Metropolitan Area .081*** .145*** 
 (.027) (.044) 
   
Other Control Variables   
Industry Groups Yes Yes 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No 
 
Number of States 40 40 
N 2020 2020 
 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.28: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Regulation-Strictness on Wages of Social Workers 
 (1) (2) 
 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log of 
Hourly Wage 
Dependent Variable = Natural  
Log of Annual Wage 
Regulation-Strictness Variables:   
Licensure -.049*** -.065*** 
 (.016) (.020) 
Fraction of Board  .051 .031 
Comprised of SWs (.061) (.076) 
Continuing Education  .004*** .006*** 
Hours per Year (.001) (.001) 
Experience Hours  .0000*** .0000*** 
for Initial Credentials (.0000) (.0000) 
Application Fee .0002** .0002** 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
Yearly Renewal Fee -.0003 -.0000 
 (.0007) (.0007) 
Bachelor’s Exam .0005 .009 
 (.027) (.041) 
Year 1990 -.183*** -.136*** 
 (.023) (.026) 
Year 2000 -.267*** -.205*** 
 (.045) (.048) 
Female -.051*** -.170*** 
 (.009) (.016) 
Age .042*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0001) 
Number of Children  .030*** -.028** 
Less than 5 Years (.006) (.012) 
Married .046*** .009 
 (.008) (.011) 
White -.002 .034 
 (.018) (.026) 
Black .025 .080** 
 (.021) (.037) 
Asian -.084** -.165* 
 (.040) (.096) 
Master’s Degree .139*** .124*** 
 (.007) (.009) 
Professional Degree .090* .067 
 (.046) (.055) 
Doctorate .131*** .181*** 
 (.033) (.054) 
Metropolitan Area .065*** .064*** 
 (.007) (.011) 
   
Other Control Variables   
Industry Groups Yes Yes 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No 
 
Number of States 33 33 
N 16,094 16,094 
 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 5: Quality of Service under Occupational Licensure  
5.1 Introduction 
From a public policy perspective, important justifications for occupational licensure are that 
licensure improves the quality of service rendered to consumers and licensure protects 
consumers by reducing the availability of un-credentialed substitutes.  By meeting licensure 
requirements, licensees demonstrate some minimum level of competency in the occupation.  
Individuals who cannot meet the licensure requirements are excluded from the occupation via the 
practice restriction component of licensure.  Thus, licensure can be seen as a “signal” of quality 
that demonstrates to other members of the occupation and to consumers that an individual is 
committed to the work of the occupation (Spence 1973).   
To the extent that licensure requirements are correlated with the actual skills needed to 
provide quality service, licensure may increase the average quality of service provided by 
practitioners in the occupation.  However, the requirements for licensure do not always correlate 
well with the occupational skills required to provide the service.  African-style hair braiders in 39 
states, for example, must obtain a cosmetology
117
 license involving up to 2,100 hours of training 
that is unrelated to braiding (Goldstein 2012; Institute for Justice 2015).  Since the licensure 
requirements for cosmetology are unrelated to the skills needed to provide service as a hair 
braider, it is unlikely that licensure increases the quality of hair braiding.  Thus, there is no 
guarantee that licensure will increase the average quality of service provided.   
As noted in Chapter 1, there are very few empirical studies of the quality effects of 
occupational licensure.  These studies yield mixed results, with most failing to find evidence of 
quality improvements.  In the long run, minimum quality standards associated with licensure 
                                                 
117
 In some states, hair braiders are required to obtain a hairdressing license instead of a cosmetology license, but the 
hairdressing license does not include instruction on African-style hair braiding. 
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may actually provide a ceiling on the quality of services delivered to consumers (Ryoo 1996).   
The result may be a lower average quality of service under licensure than was available when the 
occupation was unregulated. 
Economic theory suggests that occupational licensure may decrease the number of 
practitioners in an occupation and increase the price of service.  These effects are likely to reduce 
access to the service for some consumers, because the supply is constrained when providers are 
not available or services are too expensive in the immediate area.  For occupations where the 
quality of service may be improved by licensure, the increase in quality is only available to 
consumers who can afford to pay the higher price for service or who have insurance that covers 
the service (e.g., medical insurance that covers physician’s services).  Failure to obtain service 
can be viewed as a reduction in the quality of service for those who are excluded.   
5.2 Research Design  
Practitioners in health and social services occupations have the potential to impact the physical 
and emotional well-being of consumers, so an argument can be made that licensing those 
occupations to ensure competency of practitioners and improve the quality of service is in the 
public interest.  Few studies have attempted to empirically test the public interest hypothesis to 
assess the impact of occupational licensure on quality.  As noted in Chapter 2, empirical studies 
have found either no quality improvement due to licensure of public school teachers or uncertain 
effects on quality as measured by student achievement test scores.
118
  I am not aware of any 
studies of the impact of licensure of registered nurses (RNs), dietitians and nutritionists (DNs), or 
social workers (SWs) on the quality of services provided by practitioners of those occupations.  
                                                 
118
 These studies include Kleiner and Petree (1988), Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2005), and Kane and Staiger 
(2005). 
150 
 
This chapter analyzes whether licensing DNs and SWs, both health and social services 
occupations, has impacted the quality of the services they provide to consumers. 
Measuring the quality of services provided by DNs and SWs is challenging.  I am not 
aware of any generally available data that associates specific actions by a DN or SW with 
specific outcomes for consumers.  Thus, there is no visibility into individual cause and effect 
scenarios, so it is not possible to directly measure whether or not, on average, a licensed DN or 
SW provides a higher quality of service than an unlicensed DN or SW.  Also, the scope of both 
the DN and SW occupations encompasses a number of specialized practice areas.  This makes it 
difficult to isolate one particular variable to use as a measure of quality.  The field of dietetics, 
for example, includes clinical dietitians, who provide nutritional services to patients in hospitals 
and other health care facilities; community dietitians, who counsel individuals and groups on 
nutritional practices to prevent disease and promote health; management dietitians, who oversee 
large-scale meal planning and preparation in various institutions; and consultant dietitians, who 
perform nutrition screenings  and offer advice on diet-related concerns such as weight loss and 
cholesterol control.  The field of social work, on the other hand, includes direct-service social 
workers, who help people solve and cope with problems in their everyday lives; and clinical 
social workers, who diagnose and treat mental disorders and emotional issues.   
Since both DNs and SWs are health and social services occupations, it is reasonable to 
expect that the services provided by DNs and SWs should improve, or at least not adversely 
affect, the physical and mental health of the consumers of their services.  I measure the quality of 
services provided by DNs and SWs using individual-level health indicators that may improve 
when the consumer purchases those services.  One example of such a health indicator is whether 
or not an individual has high blood pressure.  Dietary improvements suggested by DNs may 
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lower blood pressure.  Similarly, resolution of emotional issues in consultation with SWs may 
also lower blood pressure.  Thus, modeling a health indicator as a function of licensure of DNs 
or SWs provides a way to estimate whether licensure of DNs or SWs improves the quality of 
service provided, where the measure of the quality of service is the improvement in the health 
indicator. 
Typically, empirical models for the quality of service under licensure analyze data for a 
single state or data that is aggregated by state.  I take a different approach and analyze individual 
level survey data that includes observations from different states over several decades and an 
assortment of health indicators that can be used as measures of the quality of service provided.  
With individual level data, I am able to control for individual demographic variables, as well as 
state and year fixed effects and the type of regulation in effect during the observation year.  I 
estimate separate health indicator models for DNs and SWs for the case of any regulation of the 
occupation and for licensure of the occupation. 
5.3 Data 
To analyze whether licensure has had an impact on the quality of service provided by DNs and 
SWs, I use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
119
 that includes 
health survey responses by individuals over the period from 1984 through 2013.  The BRFSS is a 
cross-sectional telephone survey conducted monthly by state health departments with technical 
and methodological assistance provided by the Center for Disease Control (CDC).  BRFSS data 
include year, state, basic individual-level demographic information, and individual responses to a 
number of health-related questions that generate information about health risk behaviors, clinical 
preventive practices, and health care access and use, primarily related to chronic disease and 
                                                 
119
 The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data is available through the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention website (http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/ ). 
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injury.  Some states did not begin conducting surveillance of BRFSS data until after 1984.  Table 
5.1 shows the states conducting surveillance of BRFSS data by year and also the year of first 
regulation of DNs and SWs by state.   
Options for health indicators are limited by data availability, since the health-related 
questions and possible responses sometimes change from year to year.  There are five indicators 
that may be impacted by the work of DNs and three indicators that may be impacted by the work 
of SWs and can be defined from the available data.  For DNs, these include:  BMI (Body Mass 
Index),
120
 Obesity (BMI >= 30),
121
 Exerciser (“Do you participate in any physical activity or 
exercise?”), High Blood Pressure (“Have you been told that you have high blood pressure?”), 
and High Cholesterol (“Have you been told that you have high cholesterol?”).  For SWs, these 
include: High Blood Pressure, Smoker (“Do you smoke?”), and Poor Mental Health Days (“How 
many days in a month would you say your mental health was poor?”).  Table 5.2 shows the years 
of availability of these health indicators in the BRFSS data.  
The exact questions in the BRFSS survey sometimes change from one year to the next, so 
construction of the health indicator variables required finding variable definitions that remain 
constant over the survey years, despite the changes in survey questions.  The relevant survey 
questions and how the response choices are mapped to health indicator variables are included in 
the appendix of this chapter.  The resulting health indicator variables for obesity, exerciser, high 
blood pressure, high cholesterol, and smoker are all binary variables with values 0 (for no) and 1 
(for yes), irrespective of intensity.
122
  BMI is proportional to the ratio of an individual’s weight in 
                                                 
120
 BMI (body mass index) is a measure of body fat based on height and weight that applies to adult men and 
women. 
121
 The Center for Disease Control defines obesity as a BMI >= 30, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/defining.html . 
122
 For obesity, yes means the individual has a BMI that is greater than or equal to 30.  For exerciser, yes means the 
individual currently participates in physical activity or exercise.  For high blood pressure, yes means the individual 
has been told that he or she has high blood pressure.  For high cholesterol, yes means the individual has been told 
that he or she has high cholesterol. For smoker, yes means the individual is currently a smoker. 
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pounds to the square of the individual’s height in inches.123  Therefore, BMI is a normalized, 
continuous variable.  The number of poor mental health days in the last month is a constrained, 
count variable with minimum value 0 and maximum value 30.  Summary statistics are included 
in Table 5.3.  If licensure of DNs or SWs increases the quality of service provided, licensure may 
be associated with improvement in the health indicator variables.  This improvement would 
appear as a reduction in BMI or the number of poor mental health days; as a reduction in the 
probability that an individual is obese, is a smoker, or has high blood pressure or high 
cholesterol; or as an increase in the probability that an individual is an exerciser.   
5.4 Empirical Model 
To estimate the effect of state licensure of DNs and SWs on quality of service, I use a fixed 
effects model of the form: 
                
       
               
 
where the dependent variable H is one of eight health indicators for individual i in year t, R is a 
regulation variable (any regulation or licensure) in state s in year t, D is a vector of 
characteristics for individual i in year t, S is a vector of exogenous state characteristics in state s 
in year t,   includes state fixed effects,   includes year fixed effects, and   is a random 
disturbance term for individual i in year t.  The health indicators derived from the health-related 
questions in the BRFSS data serve as measures of the quality of service provided by DNs or 
SWs.  
For each occupation (DNs and SWs), I estimate separate empirical models for each 
combination of one of several health indicator variables and one of two state regulation variables 
(any regulation and licensure).  Year dummies are for the 30 years from 1984 through 2013, 
except for the high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and poor mental health day variables for 
                                                 
123
 BMI = (weight in pounds * 703)/(height in inches * height in inches). 
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which BRFSS data was not available in some years as noted in Table 5.2.  Individual 
characteristic variables include gender (female, male), age, age-squared, marital status (married, 
not married), race (white, black, Asian, other), education (less than high school, high school, 
some college, a bachelor’s degree or higher), employment status (employed, not employed), 
number of adults in the household, and income level (very low income, low income, medium 
income, high income).
124
  The state characteristic variables are state population
125
 and per capita 
state GDP.
126
 
I estimate fixed effects linear models for BMI and the six binary variables (obese, 
drinker, exerciser, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and smoker).  For the number of poor 
mental health days indicator variable, I estimate a two-part model.  The first part is a fixed 
effects model for the number of poor mental health days using data for all individuals that 
respond to the mental health days question on the BRFSS survey.  The second part is a fixed 
effects model for the natural log of the number of poor mental health days using data just for 
individuals who reported having a non-zero number of poor mental health days during the last 
month.  Using the same IVs used for regulation variables in the wage models in Chapter 4, I also 
estimate 2SLS models for all of the health indicator variables. 
5.5 Empirical Results 
This section discusses the results of the empirical analysis for both DNs and SWs. 
5.5.1 Dietitians and Nutritionists 
The top row of Table 5.4 (labeled FE) reports the FE estimates of the effect of any regulation of 
DNs on five health indicator variables (BMI, obesity, exerciser, high blood pressure, and high 
                                                 
124
 For 1984-1993, very low income = $14,999 or less, low income = $15,000 - $24,999, medium income = $25,000 
- $49,000, and high income = $50,000 or more.  For 1994-2013, very low income = $24,999 or less, low income = 
$25,000 - $49,999, medium income = $50,000 - $74,999, and high income = $75,000 or more.   
125
 The source for state population data is the U.S. Census (http://www.census.gov). 
126
 The source for state per-capita gross domestic product is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov). 
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cholesterol) that may be impacted by services provided by DNs.  FE models control for 
endogeneity caused by within state variations over time.  Each column in the FE row of Table 
5.4 is a separate model.  All FE models control for year and state fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors at the state level.  The coefficient of the any regulation variable is negative for 
every health indicator variable, indicating that regulation of DNs is associated with a reduction in 
BMI, a reduction in the probability that an individual is obese or an exerciser, and a reduction in 
the probability that an individual has high blood pressure or high cholesterol.  Except for the 
exerciser variable, the negative coefficients indicate an improvement in the health indicators due 
to regulation.  Coefficients are statistically significant for BMI, obesity, and exerciser.  On 
average, regulation of DNs is associated with a .103 decrease in BMI, a 0.4 percentage point 
decrease in the probability that an individual is obese, and a 2.9 percentage point decrease in the 
probability that an individual is an exerciser.
127
 
I tested both of the IVs
128
 used for regulation variables in the wage models in Chapter 4 
to determine if (1) they are correlated with the regulation variables, but not with the health 
indicator variables, (2) they have the correct directional sign in the first stage, and (3) they have 
enough power as instruments for any regulation or licensure of DNs to be used in 2SLS models 
to estimate the impact of any regulation or licensure of DNs on the health indicator variables.  
The test statistic when standard errors are clustered is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic.  
Based on the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb, when the F-statistic is 10 or more, the IVs 
have sufficient power for use in the models.  Neither of the two IVs from Chapter 4 has the 
power to be used as an instrument for licensure of DNs.  One IV, percentage of Democrats in the 
                                                 
127
 The BMI scale ranges from 12 to 69, so a change of .103 ranges from an 8.33% to a .15% decrease in BMI due to 
regulation of DNs. 
128
 The IVs used for regulation variables in Chapter 4 were (1) percentage of Democrats in the state legislature 
minus the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature two years before any regulation of DNs in the state, and 
(2) percentage turnover in the State House in the first year of any regulation of DNs in the state. 
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state legislature minus the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature two years before any 
regulation of DNs in the state, does have enough power to be used as an instrument for any 
regulation of DNs, but only in models that do not control for state FEs.   
The second row of Table 5.4 (labeled 2SLS (without FE)) reports the 2SLS estimates of 
the effect of any regulation of DNs on the five health indicator variables that may be impacted by 
services provided by DNs.  The 2SLS models control for possible endogeneity due to uncertain 
causality between the health indicator variables and regulation of DNs.  Again, each column in 
the 2SLS row of Table 5.4 is a separate model.  All 2SLS models control for year fixed effects 
and cluster standard errors at the state level.  The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is shown 
for each model.  Values are greater than 10, but not by much, indicating that the selected IV may 
be weak.  The coefficient of the any regulation variable is positive for BMI, obesity, and high 
blood pressure, and negative for exerciser and high cholesterol.  Except for the high cholesterol 
variable, the coefficients indicate a worsening of the health indicators due to regulation.  
Coefficients are statistically significant for exerciser and high blood pressure.  On average, 
regulation of DNs is associated with an 18.2 percentage point decrease in the probability that an 
individual is an exerciser and a 3.6 percentage point increase in the probability that an individual 
has been told that he or she has high blood pressure.  The latter could be due to increased 
reporting of negative health indicators (such as high blood pressure) when individuals who are 
loss averse seek the services of a DN when regulation is enacted.  
Since the selected IV does not have sufficient power to be used in 2SLS models with FE, 
I cannot control for both within state variations over time and uncertain causality.  Therefore, the 
impact of any regulation of DNs on the five health indicator variables in Table 5.4 is uncertain.  
There appears to be a decrease in the probability that an individual is an exerciser that is 
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statistically significant and a decrease in the probability that an individual has high cholesterol 
that is not significant.  The signs of the coefficients of the BMI, obesity, and high blood pressure 
health indicator variables flip between the FE and 2SLS (without FE) models, so the significant 
negative FE coefficients (for BMI and obesity) and positive 2SLS coefficient (for high blood 
pressure) may not be accurate.  The FE coefficients for BMI and obesity indicate a very small 
positive impact on the health indicators.  At the sample mean BMI of 26.43, a .103 reduction in 
BMI is only a 0.39% reduction; and the coefficient for obesity indicates only a 0.4 percentage 
point decrease in the probability that an individual is obese.  So, any positive impact on health 
indicators due to regulation of DNs is uncertain and very small (less than 0.5%). 
Table 5.5 reports the FE estimates of the effect of licensure of DNs on the five health 
indicator variables that may be impacted by services provided by DNs.  Again, each column is a 
separate model and all FE models control for year and state fixed effects and cluster standard 
errors at the state level.  Table 5.5 does not include a row of coefficients estimated by 2SLS, 
since the selected IV does not have enough power to be used as an instrument for licensure of 
DNs in the quality models.  The FE coefficients of the licensure variable are positive for every 
health indicator variable except high cholesterol, which indicates a worsening of the health 
indicators for BMI, obesity, and high blood pressure.  All of the coefficients are small and only 
the coefficient of the licensure variable for the high blood pressure model is statistically 
significant.  On average, licensure of DNs is associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in 
the probability that an individual has been told that he or she has high blood pressure.  Again, 
this could be due to increased reporting of negative health indicators due to licensure of DNs, 
instead of a reduction in the quality of service provided.  I find no evidence that licensure of DNs 
improves the quality of service provided to consumers. 
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5.5.2 Social Workers 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report the FE estimates of the effect of any regulation and licensure of SWs, 
respectively, on three health indicator variables (high blood pressure, smoker, and poor mental 
health days) plus the natural log of the number of poor mental health days, all of which may be 
impacted by services provided by SWs.  Again, each column is a separate model and all FE 
models control for year and state fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the state level.  
Neither table for SWs includes coefficients estimated by 2SLS, because neither of the IVs used 
for regulation variables in the wage models in Chapter 4 has enough power to be used as an 
instrument for any regulation or licensure of SWs in the quality models. 
The coefficient of the any regulation variable is positive for every health indicator 
variable in Table 5.6, which indicates a worsening of the health indicators due to any regulation.  
Only the coefficient of the any regulation variable for the model for the natural log of the number 
of poor mental health days is statistically significant.  I find that any regulation of SWs is 
associated with a 1.41 percentage increase in the number of poor mental health days for 
individuals reporting a non-zero number of poor mental health days, and I find no evidence that 
any regulation of SWs improves the quality of service provided to consumers. 
In Table 5.7, the coefficient of the licensure variable is negative for high blood pressure 
and poor mental health days, indicating an improvement in those health indicators, and positive 
for smoker and the natural log of poor mental health days, indicating a worsening of those health 
indicators.  Only the coefficients of the licensure variable for smoker and the number of poor 
mental health days are statistically significant.  I find a .7 percentage point increase in the 
probability that an individual is a smoker due to licensure of SWs.  I also find that licensure is 
associated with a decrease of .054 in the number of poor mental health days.  At the sample 
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mean number of poor mental health days of 3.32 days, licensure of SWs cause a 1.6% decrease, 
on average, in the number of poor mental health days.  This is a small, yet statistically significant 
improvement in the quality of service due to licensure of SWs. 
5.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
In this chapter, I use primarily FE analysis, with some 2SLS (without FE) analysis, to determine 
the impact of any regulation or licensure of DNs and SWs on the quality of service provided by 
modeling how regulation impacts a number of health indicator variables selected for each 
occupation.  For DNs, I find very small improvements in two health indicator variables due to 
any regulation.  The improvements are a 0.39% decrease in BMI at the sample mean and a 0.4 
percentage point decrease in the probability of obesity.  However, I find no evidence that 
licensure of DNs improves the quality of service.  For SWs, I find no evidence that any 
regulation of SWs improves the quality of service.  However, I find a very small (.054) decrease 
in the number of poor mental health days due to licensure of SWs.  Thus, I find small 
improvements in quality due to any regulation of DNs (as measured by BMI and the probability 
of obesity) and due to licensure of SWs (as measured by the number of poor mental health days).   
These results for DNs and SWs can be compared with those found in the literature for 
RNs and public school teachers.  In the case of RNs, no studies of the impact of licensure on the 
quality of service are found.  Like DNs and SWs, the broad scope of the RN occupation, which 
encompasses a number of specialized practice areas, makes it difficult to identify individual 
cause and effect scenarios that can be used to study the quality of service provided by RNs.  For 
public school teachers, the availability of achievement test scores provides a measure of quality 
of service by teachers that was used by Kleiner and Petree (1998), but yielded uncertain results 
on the impact of licensure on quality of service.  Other studies found no quality improvement for 
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teachers due to licensure.  I also find no impact on quality for DNs and SWs in some cases 
(licensure of DNs and any regulation of SWs) and uncertain impact in other cases (any 
regulation of DNs).  However, my results differ from those for public school teachers because I 
find small improvements in the quality of service due to any regulation of DNs and licensure of 
SWs in some cases. 
With observations from up to 30 survey years for each health indicator variable, there are 
between one and six million observations for each empirical model.  However, there is no way to 
know from the BRFSS data whether or not an individual who responded to the survey actually 
consumed services provided by DNs or SWs.  Instead, this analysis focuses on the effect of 
licensure of DNs and SWs on the health indicator variables for individuals in the state, 
independent of whether or not an individual survey responder consumed the services of DNs or 
SWs.  
Caution is warranted when interpreting changes in the health indicator variables.  There 
are population groups (such as athletes and the elderly) for whom an increase in BMI may 
indicate health improvement.  Also, the BRFSS survey identifies an individual as having high 
blood pressure (or high cholesterol) if the individual was ever told that he or she had that 
condition.  Thus, the BRFSS data will not capture cases where an individual with high blood 
pressure or high cholesterol is able to successfully manage that condition, perhaps due to the 
services of a DN or a SW.  It is also possible that an individual who is loss averse will seek the 
services of a DN or SW when licensure is enacted and learn that he or she is obese or has high 
blood pressure or high cholesterol as a result of that service.  This may result in increased 
reporting of negative health indicators as a result of licensure, even though they do not result 
from poor quality of service by practitioners.  However, there may also be individuals who are 
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denied access to the services of licensed DNs or SWs due to supply constraints and higher prices.  
For those individuals, there may be a decrease in the reporting of negative health indicators as a 
result of licensure.  Therefore, the net effect of licensure on reporting of negative health 
indicators in the survey population is unclear. 
The effectiveness of this empirical study is subject to a few limitations.  First, the BRFSS 
data is collected via a telephone survey that asks personal questions about height, weight, 
medical history, mental state, and personal habits.  Individuals might lie when answering these 
questions over the phone and this could introduce bias into the data.  Second, the reason for 
using the BRFSS data over other possible options is to take advantage of the individual level 
data; however, there is no way to know which individuals consumed the services of DNs or SWs 
and whether the health indicators derived from the BRFSS data are suitable proxies for quality of 
service.  In the case of DNs, for example, instead of knowing whether an individual was ever 
told that he or she had high blood pressure or high cholesterol, it would be more useful to know 
if an individual who has high blood pressure or high cholesterol is able to manage or reverse 
those conditions via dietary choices.  Similarly, for SWs, in addition to the number of poor 
mental health days per month, it would be useful to know how long it has been since the 
individual experienced a life event (such as divorce, death, job loss, family violence, etc.) that 
might trigger poor mental health days.  Third, in the case of SWs, 13 of the 36 states that regulate 
SWs by 2013 began that regulation before 1984, the first year of the BRFSS survey data.  
Therefore, any immediate improvement in quality of service due to regulation requirements for 
those 13 states that regulated SWs before 1984 will not affect the empirical results.  Finally, 
there is considerable variation in the BRFSS questions and response options from one year to the 
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next.  This reduces the number of health indicators that can be used as quality of service 
measures. 
 Despite these limitations stemming from the use of the BRFSS data, the empirical results 
in this chapter have important policy implications.  Although I find evidence of a positive effect 
on some health indicators due to any regulation or licensure of DNs or SWs, the effects are small 
and, in some cases, uncertain.  As a result, my findings do not strongly support the public interest 
theory that licensure of DNs and/or SWs is justified primarily based on improvements in the 
quality of service provided to the consumer.  This is in contrast to both the Academy of Nutrition 
and Dietetics
129
 and the American Social Work Boards
130
 which promote licensure of DNs and 
SWs, respectively, as a means to signal higher quality of service.   
5.7 Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129
 The website for the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics is http://www.eatright.org . 
130
 The website for the American Social Work Boards is http://www.aswb.org . 
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Table 5.1: States Conducting Surveillance of BRFSS Data, by Year  
 
Table 5.1 – Page 1 of 2 
State Year 
First Year of 
Regulation of DNs 
First Year of 
Regulation of SWs 
Alabama 1986-2013 1984 TP; 1989 L 1978 TP 
Alaska 1991-2013 2000 C 2001 L 
Arizona 1984-2013 - 2004 L 
Arkansas 1991, 1993-2013 1989 L 1981 L 
California 1984-2013 1983 TP - 
Colorado 1990-2013 - - 
Connecticut 1985, 1988-2013 1994 C - 
Delaware 1990-2013 1994 C; 2009 L - 
Florida 1985-2013 1988 L - 
Georgia 1985-2013 1984 C; 1994 L - 
Hawaii 1986-2013 2009 L 1994 L 
Idaho 1984-2013 1995 C 1993 L 
Illinois 1984-2013 1992 L - 
Indiana 1984-2013 1994 C - 
Iowa 1988-2013 1986 L 1985 L 
Kansas 1992-2013 1989 L 1974 L 
Kentucky 1985-2013 1988 C; 1994 L 1974 TP 
Louisiana 1990-2013 1987 C; 1988 L 2000 L 
Maine 1987-2013 1985 C; 1988 L 1977 L 
Maryland 1987-2013 1986 C; 1989 L 1957 L 
Massachusetts 1986-2013 1999 C 1980 L 
Michigan 1988-2013 2007 C 1978 L 
Minnesota 1984-2013 1995 L 2005 L 
Mississippi 1990-2013 1986 C; 1994 L 1972 L 
Missouri 1986-2013 1995 L 1989 L 
L = Licensure; C = Certification; TP = Title Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Table 5.1 – Page 2 of 2 
State Year 
First Year of 
Regulation of DNs 
First Year of 
Regulation of SWs 
Montana 1984-2013 1983 TP; 1987 L - 
Nebraska 1987-2013 1988 L 1993 L 
Nevada 1992-2013 1995 C 1999 L 
New Hampshire 1987-2013 2001 L - 
New Jersey 1991-2013 - 1991 L 
New Mexico 1986-2013 1990 L 1990 L 
New York 1985-2013 1991 C - 
North Carolina 1984-2013 1992 L 1992 L 
North Dakota 1985-2013 1986 L 1987 L 
Ohio 1984-2013 1987 L 1984 L 
Oklahoma 1988-2013 1985 C 1981 L 
Oregon 1989-2013 1990 L 1990 TP 
Pennsylvania 1989-2013 2002 C 1990 TP 
Rhode Island 1984-2013 1991 C; 1992 L - 
South Carolina 1984-2013 2006 L 1976 L 
South Dakota 1987-2013 1996 L 1975 L 
Tennessee 1984-2013 1987 L 1986 L 
Texas 1987-2013 1984 C 1999 L 
Utah 1984-2013 1986 C 1994 L 
Vermont 1990-2013 1995 C - 
Virginia 1989-2013 1995 TP 1979 L 
Washington 1987-2013 1988 C - 
West Virginia 1984-2013 1996 L 1997 TP 
Wisconsin 1984-2013 1994 C 1991 L 
Wyoming 1993-2013 2012 L 2000 L 
L = Licensure; C = Certification; TP = Title Protection 
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Table 5.2: Years of Availability for Health Indicators Derived from BRFSS Data 
 
Health Factor Years of Available BRFSS Data 
BMI 1984-2013 
Obese 1984-2013 
Drinker 1984-2013 
High Blood Pressure 1984 - 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 
High Cholesterol 1987 - 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 
Smoker 1984-2013 
Poor Mental Health Days 1993-2013 
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics for Health Indicators Derived from BRFSS Data 
 
Summary Statistics for Health Indicators 
Quality Measure Mean  
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Observations 
Average 
Age Female Male 
BMI 26.43 5.96 12 69 5734116 45.25 50% 50% 
Obese 0.21 0.41 0 1 5734116 45.25 50% 50% 
Exerciser 0.65 0.48 0 1 5728834 45.25 50% 50% 
High Blood Pressure 0.42 0.49 0 1 3397205 45.00 51% 49% 
High Cholesterol 0.17 0.38 0 1 4199863 45.03 51% 49% 
Smoker 0.22 0.41 0 1 5730501 45.25 50% 50% 
Poor Mental Health Days 3.32 7.38 0 30 5734116 45.25 50% 50% 
 
 
Summary Statistics for BRFSS Data 
Average Age 45  Education  
Average Number of Adults Per  2.2  Less Than High School 21% 
Household   High School 26% 
Sex   Some College 24% 
Female 50%  College – Bachelor’s Degree or  29% 
Male 50%  More  
Marital Status   Employment Status  
Married 59%  Employed 61% 
Not Married 41%  Not Employed 39% 
Race   Income Level  
White 75%  Very Low Income 21% 
Black 10%  Low Income 23% 
Asian 4%  Medium Income 27% 
Other 11%  High Income 29% 
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Table 5.4: Coefficients of Any Regulation Variable for FE and 2SLS (without FE) Models 
Estimating the Impact of Any Regulation on Different Health Indicators for Dietitians and 
Nutritionists  
 
Dependent 
Variables = BMI Obesity Exerciser 
High Blood 
Pressure 
High 
Cholesterol 
Models      
FE -.103** -.004* -.029** -.006 -.010 
 (.042) (.002) (.012) (.005) (.007) 
      
2SLS (without FE) .136 .012 -.182*** .036*** -.006 
 (.290) (.019) (.053) (.013) (.013) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald rk F Statistic 
11.28 11.28 11.27 12.67 11.88 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering by State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5734116 5734116 5728834 3397205 4199863 
 
 
Each column represents a different health indicator and a different empirical model.  In addition 
to the any-regulation dummy, other control variables include the number of adults in the 
household, age, age-squared, gender, race (white, black, Asian, and other), marital status 
(married and not married), education status (less than high school, high school, some college, 
bachelor’s degree or more), employment status (employed, not employed), income level (very 
low income, low income, medium income, and high income), population, and per-capita state 
GDP.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at 
the 5% level; and *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.5: Coefficients of Licensure Variable for FE Models Estimating the Impact of Licensure 
on Different Health Indicators for Dietitians and Nutritionists  
 
Dependent 
Variables = BMI Obesity Exerciser 
High Blood 
Pressure 
High 
Cholesterol 
Model      
FE .031 .004 .008 .014* -.010 
 (.085) (.004) (.015) (.007) (.007) 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering by State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5734116 5734116 5728834 3397205 4199863 
 
 
Each column represents a different health indicator and a different empirical model.  In addition 
to the licensure dummy, other control variables include the number of adults in the household, 
age, age-squared, gender, race (white, black, Asian, and other), marital status (married and not 
married), education status (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor’s degree or 
more), employment status (employed, not employed), income level (very low income, low 
income, medium income, and high income), population, and per-capita state GDP.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; 
and *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.6: Coefficients of Any Regulation Variable for FE Models Estimating the Impact of Any 
Regulation on Different Health Indicators for Social Workers  
 
Dependent 
Variables = 
High Blood 
Pressure Smoker 
Poor Mental 
Health Days 
ln(Poor Mental 
Health Days) 
Model     
FE .031 .004 .008 .014* 
 (.085) (.004) (.015) (.007) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering by State Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3397205 5730501 5734116 1680509 
 
 
Each column represents a different health indicator and a different empirical model.  In addition 
to the any-regulation dummy, other control variables include the number of adults in the 
household, age, age-squared, gender, race (white, black, Asian, and other), marital status 
(married and not married), education status (less than high school, high school, some college, 
bachelor’s degree or more), employment status (employed, not employed), income level (very 
low income, low income, medium income, and high income), population, and per-capita state 
GDP.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at 
the 5% level; and *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.7: Coefficients of Licensure Variable for FE Models Estimating the Impact of Licensure 
on Different Health Indicators for Social Workers  
Dependent 
Variables = 
High Blood 
Pressure Smoker 
Poor Mental 
Health Days 
ln(Poor Mental 
Health Days) 
Model     
FE -.006 .007*** -.054** .011 
 (.007) (.003) (.021) (.012) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering by State Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3397205 5730501 5734116 1680509 
 
 
Each column represents a different health indicator and a different empirical model.  In addition 
to the licensure dummy, other control variables include the number of adults in the household, 
age, age-squared, gender, race (white, black, Asian, and other), marital status (married and not 
married), education status (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor’s degree or 
more), employment status (employed, not employed), income level (very low income, low 
income, medium income, and high income), population, and per-capita state GDP.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; 
and *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
The long history of occupational regulation in the United States has resulted in a large number of 
regulated occupations and a large percentage of the U.S. workforce that is subject to regulation.  
There are four types of occupational regulation: registration, title protection, certification, and 
licensure.  These types of regulation differ by how restrictive they are for the regulated 
individual and by how much information they provide to the consumer.  Licensure is the most 
restrictive form of occupational regulation, since it includes practice restriction, making practice 
in a licensed profession illegal without a license.   
The practice restriction component of licensure leads to economic effects.  When state 
licensure boards manipulate licensure requirements to control the number of practitioners in an 
occupation, the result may be a reduction in the number of practitioners and reduced access to 
services for consumers.  This reduction in supply may increase wages for practitioners and 
increase the price of services paid by consumers.  The expectation is that licensure improves the 
quality of service provided to consumers through minimum competency requirements that 
practitioners must meet to acquire a license.  Literature on the economic effects of occupational 
licensure is mixed, with results depending on the occupation studied.     
There are two contrasting theories about why states license occupations.  The public 
interest theory focuses on the consumer protection aspect of occupational licensure, while the 
rent capture theory focuses on the restricted entry aspect of occupational licensure.  The two 
economic theories look at occupational licensing from different viewpoints, but both 
perspectives are important to an understanding of the topic.  Practitioners must request licensure 
in order for the state legislature to consider it, while the proposed legislation must benefit 
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consumers in order for the state legislature to pass it.  Characteristics of both the occupation and 
the state (including the state legislature) affect whether an occupation is licensed in that state. 
In this dissertation, I extend the existing literature by investigating the economic effects 
of state regulation of two occupations: dietitians and nutritionists (DNs) and social workers 
(SWs).  These occupations have not been extensively studied in the literature and they share 
several characteristics that set them apart from some other regulated occupations that require a 
bachelor’s degree, including high percentages of female, part time, and institutional workers; 
strong occupational associations; and different types of state regulations.  In a number of ways 
that affect the likelihood of occupational regulation, DNs and SWs are similar to registered 
nurses (RNs) and public school teachers, two occupations that have been studied in the literature.  
All four occupations deal with the health and welfare of consumers, require a minimum of a 
bachelor’s degree, and have strong professional associations, high percentages of institutional 
and female employment, and low wages relative to other occupations that require a bachelor’s 
degree.  These similarities suggest that the literature on the economic effects of licensure of RNs 
and public school teachers might provide insight into the economic effects of licensure of DNs 
and SWs.  For RNs and public school teachers, licensure is not found to affect the number of 
practitioners or the quality of service provided by practitioners, and there is also no evidence of a 
lasting wage premium due to licensure.  I compare my empirical results for DNs and SWs to 
those for RNs and public school teachers. 
I use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 5% Census samples to construct datasets of 
professional DNs and SWs for use in deriving the number of practitioners in each Census year 
and for estimating the effect of regulation on wages.  Using data from multiple years allows me 
to capture non-linear effects.  There are few examples in the literature of the use of multi-year 
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datasets and none that I know of model non-linear effects of occupational licensure using 
individual-level data.  I also use individual-level data from the BRFSS to measure the effect of 
regulation on the quality of service provided by defining health indicator variables that act as 
proxies for the quality of service.  I believe this is the first use of individual-level data to measure 
the effect of occupational regulation on quality. 
Empirical analysis of the economic effects of licensure on DNs and SWs is complicated 
by several factors.  First, different states employ different types of regulation for the same 
occupation, and the name of the state regulation does not always match the type of regulation in 
the state statute.  To deal with this, I define three regulation levels and estimate separate models 
for each.  The regulation levels are any regulation, regulation named licensure (with or without 
practice restriction), and licensure (with practice restriction).  Second, the state statutes for 
occupational regulation of DNs and SWs often include exemptions from regulation for certain 
industries and job positions.  To address this, I identify observations for individuals who work in 
an industry or job position that the state exempts from regulation, even if regulation was enacted 
after the year of the observation, and I remove those exempt observations from the dataset before 
estimating wage models.  Third, both DNs and SWs have high percentages of part time 
practitioners, for whom hourly wage is a better measure of wages than annual wage.  To address 
part time employment, I calculate an hourly wage for each observation and estimate both hourly 
wage and annual wage models.  For models of the effect of regulation on wages, I estimate OLS 
models, FE models to control for endogeneity due to unobservable state attributes that are 
constant over time, and, where possible, 2SLS models with IVs for regulation variables to 
control for possible endogeneity due to uncertain causality between regulation variables and 
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wages.   Models for the number of practitioners are FE models, while models for the quality of 
service include both FE and, where possible, 2SLS models.  
In Chapter 3, I investigate the impact of state regulation of DNs and SWs on the number 
of practitioners.  For both occupations, I find no evidence to support the hypothesis that licensure 
reduces the number of practitioners, since the impact of different types of regulation on the 
number of DNs or SWs is small and not significant.  This result for DNs and SWs is consistent 
with the literature for RNs and public school teachers, where licensure is not found to affect the 
number of practitioners for those occupations.  I find that licensure is associated with a 
statistically significant increase in the number of DNs in job positions that are exempt from 
regulation (possibly to avoid having to comply with licensure requirements), together with a 
decrease in the number of DNs in job positions that are not exempt from regulation that is not 
significant.  This shift between exempt and not exempt job positions is not evident for SWs.  
Analysis of movement between job positions within an occupation that are exempt or not exempt 
from regulation is not found in the literature.   
In Chapter 4, I analyze the impact of state regulation on the wages of DNs and SWs using 
three types of wage models.  Regulation-level models control for a single regulation level (any 
regulation, regulation named licensure, or licensure) and look for linear effects of regulation on 
wages.  Years-of-regulation models control for the absence of a single level of occupational 
regulation and some measure of the duration of that level of occupational regulation and are 
designed to capture non-linear effects of regulation on wages.  Regulation-strictness models 
control for regulation type and specific elements of the state statutes and examine whether any 
wage premium due to regulation can be attributed to the strictness of regulation. 
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Using regulation-level models, I find that any regulation (title protection, certification, or 
licensure) of DNs has a small, positive, but not significant, impact on both hourly and annual 
wages, and that regulation named licensure has a small, positive, but not significant, impact on 
hourly wages of SWs.  For the regulation-strictness models, I find some specification issues that 
may invalidate any conclusions.  However, I find that certification (relative to title protection), 
fraction of the board comprised of DNs, number of continuing education hours required per year, 
and number of practice hours required for initial credentials appear to have significant impacts 
on wages for DNs.  Similarly, I find that licensure (relative to title protection), number of 
continuing education hours required per year, and application fee appear to have significant 
impacts on wages for SWs. 
From the years-of-regulation models, I find that the coefficients of the absence of 
regulation level variables are mostly positive because wages of both DNs and SWs tend to be 
higher in states that do not regulate those occupations.  Years-of-regulation models that capture 
non-linear effects in terms of the natural log of years of regulation are a better fit to the data than 
years-of-regulation models in terms of years of regulation and the square of years of regulation 
for both DNs and SWs.  The models for the natural log of wages as a function of the natural log 
of years of regulation suggest that wages increase with years of regulation, but the rate of 
increase of wages slows as the years of regulation increase.  The coefficient of the natural log of 
years of regulation is interpreted as the elasticity of wages with respect to years of regulation.  
For DNs, I find an elasticity of annual wages with respect to years of any regulation of 0.073.  
For SWs, I find an elasticity of annual wages with respect to years of any regulation of 
approximately 0.02, statistically insignificant elasticities of hourly and annual wages with respect 
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to years of regulation named licensure of 0.016, and an elasticity of annual wages with respect to 
licensure of 0.015. 
 Compared to the literature for the effect of licensure on wages of RNs and public school 
teachers where no lasting wage premium due to licensure is found, my empirical results suggest 
a slightly different result for DNs and SWs.  Overall, I find a small, positive impact on wages of 
DNs and SWs due to regulation of those occupations.  The positive elasticities found from the 
models of the natural log of wages as a function of the natural log of years of regulation suggest 
that there is a lasting wage premium due to regulation of DNs and SWs.  
I find little evidence to suggest differences in how regulation level affects wages.  In most 
of the models, empirical results for different regulation levels are similar in magnitude, sign, and 
significance of the estimated coefficients.  I do not find evidence that licensure has a greater 
impact on wages of DNs and SWs than any regulation or regulation named licensure.   This may 
be a result of the strong influence of the occupational associations for DNs and SWs that set 
strict professional standards apart from state regulation, such that earning state credentials adds 
little additional information about a person’s qualifications to practice.  I also do not find 
important differences in how occupational regulation of DNs and SWs affects the hourly and 
annual wage measures.   
In Chapter 5, I analyze the impact of licensure of DNs and SWs on the quality of service 
provided by modeling how regulation impacts a number of health indicator variables selected for 
each occupation.  For DNs, I find very small improvements in two health indicator variables due 
to any regulation.  The improvements are a 0.39% decrease in BMI at the sample mean and a 0.4 
percentage point decrease in the probability of obesity.  For SWs, I find a very small (.054) 
decrease in the number of poor mental health days due to licensure of SWs.  These results for 
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DNs and SWs can be compared with those found for RNs and public school teachers.  No studies 
of the impact of licensure on the quality of service by RNs are found in the literature, possibly 
due to the broad scope of the RN occupation, which makes it difficult to identify individual 
cause and effect scenarios that can be used to study the quality of service.  For public school 
teachers, licensure is found to have uncertain impact on achievement test scores and, otherwise, 
no impact on the quality of service.  My results differ from those for public school teachers 
because I find small improvements in the quality of service (as measured by health indicators) 
due to any regulation of DNs and licensure of SWs. 
  In the context of the overall body of literature on the economic effects of occupational 
licensure, my empirical results for DNs and SWs are not surprising.  In addition to expanding the 
list of occupations that have been studied to include DNs and SWs, my dissertation extends the 
existing literature in several ways.  I manage the problem of regulation types not matching 
regulation names by introducing regulation levels and analyzing whether effects are due to any 
type of regulation, regulation that is named licensure (with or without practice restriction), or 
actual licensure (with practice restriction).  I recognize that the state regulation statutes 
frequently exempt practitioners in certain job positions from regulation and use that information 
to estimate separate models for exempt and not exempt observations to look for evidence of 
movement of practitioners towards exempt job positions when regulation is enacted.  I capture 
non-linear effects of regulation on wages by controlling for the absence of regulation and the 
natural log of years of regulation, which allows me to estimate wage elasticities with respect to 
years of regulation.  I use health indicator variables derived from survey responses as measures 
of the quality of service provided by practitioners and estimate models for the impact of 
regulation on the quality of service using individual-level health survey data.  These new 
178 
 
approaches may prove useful in future empirical investigations of the economic effects of 
licensure for other occupations. 
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Chapter 3 Appendix: Models of the Effect of Years-of-Regulation on 
the Number of Practitioners 
This appendix reports the empirical results for models of the effect of years-of-regulation on the 
number of practitioners.  These models are designed to capture non-linear effects of occupational 
regulation and the lag nature of grandfather effects and to explore whether any effect on the 
numbers of practitioners due to licensure varies over time.
131
  The empirical results are included 
in this appendix, instead of in the body of Chapter 3, because there are no significant coefficients 
to report.  However, there are some patterns revealed in the signs of the coefficients, and those 
patterns are reported here.  
Each of the following tables includes two non-linear models for the four measures of the 
number of DNs or SWs.  First, the number of DNs or SWs is modeled as a function of a dummy 
for no regulation and a variable for years-of-regulation.  Second, the number of DNs or SWs is 
modeled as a function of a dummy for no regulation and variables for years-of-regulation and 
years-of-regulation squared.  There are three tables of empirical results for each occupation. 
Tables 3A.1, 3A.2, and 3A.3 are for DNs.  Table 3A.1 is for the effect of years-of-any 
regulation, Table 3A.2 is for the effect of years-of-regulation named licensure, and Table 3A.3 is 
for the effect of years-of-licensure.  Similarly, Tables 3A.4, 3A.5, and 3A.6 are for SWs.  Table 
3A.4 is for the effect of years-of-any regulation, Table 3A.5 is for the effect of years-of-
regulation named licensure, and Table 3A.6 is for the effect of years-of-licensure. 
 For the models of the number of practitioners as a function of the natural log of years of 
regulation, in all but two cases (one for DNs and one for SWs) the coefficients of the natural log 
of years of regulation variables are negative in the first two columns of the tables.  This suggests 
                                                 
131
 Years-of-regulation models are introduced in Chapter 4 to analyze non-linear effects of licensure on wages of 
practitioners.    
186 
 
that the number of practitioners may decrease with increasing years of regulation.  In every case, 
the coefficients of the natural log of years of regulation variables are positive in column three 
and negative in column four.  This suggests that increasing years of regulation are associated 
with an increase in the number of practitioners who are exempt from regulation and a decrease in 
the number of practitioners who are not exempt from regulation. 
For the models of the number of practitioners as a function of years of regulation and 
years of regulation squared, the coefficient of the years of regulation variable is positive and the 
coefficient of the years of regulation squared variable is negative for DNs in the first two 
columns.  However, for SWs, the coefficient of both the years of regulation and the years of 
regulation squared variables are negative (with one exception) in the first two columns.  It is 
possible that the earlier introduction of state regulation of SWs compared to DNs may result in 
estimated coefficients that show the number of SWs decreasing with years of regulation, while 
the number of DNs appears to be increasing with years of regulation.  The coefficients of the 
years of regulation variables for DNs are positive in column three and are either smaller in 
magnitude or negative in column four.  For SWs, the coefficients of the years of regulation 
variables are positive in column three and negative in column four.  Again, this suggests that 
increasing years of regulation may be associated with an increase in the number of practitioners 
who are exempt from regulation and a decrease in the number of practitioners who are not 
exempt from regulation, particularly for the SW occupation. 
Because none of the estimated coefficients in this appendix are statistically significant, 
the discussion of the patterns revealed in the signs of the coefficients includes observations, but 
not empirical results to be reported.  Instead, these observations may suggest areas for further 
empirical investigation into how years of regulation affect the number of practitioners.   
187 
 
Table 3A.1: Effect of Years-of-Any Regulation on the Number of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
DNs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of DNs 
using data from 41 
States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
DNs using data 
from 41 States that 
Regulate DNs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt DNs using 
data from 41 States 
that Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
No  -108.307 -128.913 64.905 -193.817 
Regulation (99.147) (104.119) (131.600) (158.453) 
ln(Years of  -5.412 53.173 101.837 -48.664 
Any 
Regulation) 
(59.724) (95.013) (98.185) (136.866) 
 
No  143.488 121.204 140.584 -19.380 
Regulation (157.911) (157.436) (158.373) (228.328) 
Years of  80.413 87.357 54.715 32.642 
Any 
Regulation 
(55.314) (60.515) (41.598) (78.815) 
Years of Any -5.200 -5.322 -2.777 -2.545 
Regulation 
Squared 
(3.111) (3.196) (1.945) (3.960) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 41 41 41 
n 150 123 123 123 
 
Exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts from 
regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not exempt 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of 
male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax rate (state and local 
taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, state 
population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the poverty 
level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3A.2: Effect of Years-of-Regulation Named Licensure on the Number of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
DNs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of 
DNs using data 
from 41 States 
that Regulate 
DNs by 2000 
Number of 
Exempt DNs 
using data from 
41 States that 
Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt DNs 
using data from 
41 States that 
Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
No Regulation  -102.115 -108.389 38.112 -146.501 
Named Licensure (103.613) (106.926) (162.519) (172.429) 
ln(Years of Regulation -45.553 -36.541 39.866 -76.407 
Named Licensure)  (59.045) (74.681) (65.754) (85.957) 
 
No Regulation 20.601 21.661 103.737 -82.076 
Named Licensure (134.847) (138.346) (207.335) (238.789) 
Years of Regulation 31.003 36.002 39.931 -3.929 
Named Licensure (43.051) (46.267) (44.286) (62.098) 
Years of Regulation -2.541 -2.754 -2.234 -0.519 
Named Licensure Squared (2.560) (2.639) (2.332) (3.451) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of States 50 41 41 41 
n 150 123 123 123 
 
Exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts from 
regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not exempt 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of 
male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax rate (state and local 
taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, state 
population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the poverty 
level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
Table 3A.3: Effect of Years-of-Licensure on the Number of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
DNs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of 
DNs using data 
from 41 States 
that Regulate 
DNs by 2000 
Number of 
Exempt DNs 
using data from 
41 States that 
Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt DNs 
using data from 
41 States that 
Regulate DNs 
by 2000 
No Licensure  -52.140 -47.883 -86.937 39.054 
 (110.578) (115.460) (60.142) (90.802) 
ln(Years of Licensure) -22.662 -7.944 6.408 -14.352 
 (53.648) (66.004) (35.300) (63.087) 
 
No Licensure 6.947 17.197 -57.977 75.175 
 (150.476) (156.989) (89.125) (123.843) 
Years of Licensure 17.275 23.951 13.670 10.281 
 (40.975) (44.366) (29.278) (40.930) 
Years of Licensure -1.614 -1.900 -0.862 -1.038 
Squared (2.553) (2.675) (1.883) (2.316) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of States 50 41 41 41 
n 150 123 123 123 
 
Exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts from 
regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt DNs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not exempt 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of 
male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax rate (state and local 
taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, state 
population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the poverty 
level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3A.4: Effect of Years-of-Any Regulation on the Number of Social Workers 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
SWs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of SWs 
using data from 33 
States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Exempt 
SWs using data 
from 33 States that 
Regulate SWs by 
2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt SWs using 
data from 33 States 
that Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
No  368.119 40.341 245.280 -204.939 
Regulation (550.101) (437.270) (327.163) (479.439) 
ln(Years of  -129.599 -189.648 164.907 -354.555 
Any 
Regulation) 
(300.274) (366.640) (154.782) (405.374) 
 
No  520.371 369.123 103.679 265.444 
Regulation (599.653) (498.560) (265.443) (595.464) 
Years of  -27.434 -66.710 30.171 -96.881 
Any 
Regulation 
(66.618) (86.447) (37.182) (98.968) 
Years of Any -0.538 -0.027 -0.208 0.181 
Regulation 
Squared 
(1.559) (1.410) (0.952) (1.569) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of 
States 
50 33 33 33 
n 150 99 99 99 
 
Exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts from 
regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not exempt 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of 
male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax rate (state and local 
taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, state 
population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the poverty 
level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3A.5: Effect of Years-of-Regulation Named Licensure on the Number of Social Workers 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
SWs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of 
SWs using data 
from 33 States 
that Regulate 
SWs by 2000 
Number of 
Exempt SWs 
using data from 
33 States that 
Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt SWs 
using data from 
33 States that 
Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
No Regulation  179.076 -25.988 34.613 -60.600 
Named Licensure (607.849) (420.139) (267.504) (481.354) 
ln(Years of Regulation 16.487 -76.868 235.170 -312.038 
Named Licensure)  (272.737) (308.887) (152.393) (344.023) 
 
No Regulation 161.811 -6.075 -111.367 105.292 
Named Licensure (591.590) (403.354) (249.428) (458.440) 
Years of Regulation -9.059 -34.723 49.285 -84.009 
Named Licensure (64.075) (74.616) (35.253) (89.334) 
Years of Regulation -0.405 0.343 -0.466 0.809 
Named Licensure Squared (1.516) (1.423) (0.890) (1.732) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of States 50 33 33 33 
n 150 99 99 99 
 
Exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts from 
regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not exempt 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of 
male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax rate (state and local 
taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, state 
population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the poverty 
level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3A.6: Effect of Years-of-Licensure on the Number of Social Workers 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Model 
Number of 
SWs using 
data from 50 
States 
Number of 
SWs using data 
from 33 States 
that Regulate 
SWs by 2000 
Number of 
Exempt SWs 
using data from 
33 States that 
Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
Number of Not-
Exempt SWs 
using data from 
33 States that 
Regulate SWs 
by 2000 
No Licensure  487.260 147.271 378.013 -230.743 
 (639.398) (527.238) (427.073) (620.471) 
ln(Years of Licensure) -97.823 -160.542 195.513 -356.055 
 (320.589) (388.818) (165.419) (442.415) 
 
No Licensure 618.917 335.157 249.329 85.828 
 (638.074) (534.180) (347.774) (629.248) 
Years of Licensure -11.269 -37.255 29.893 -67.148 
 (68.500) (76.325) (39.236) (89.772) 
Years of Licensure -0.865 -0.194 -0.428 0.234 
Squared (1.677) (1.533) (1.105) (1.767) 
Other Control Variables 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of States 50 33 33 33 
n 150 99 99 99 
 
Exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute exempts from 
regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Not-exempt SWs are those who work in an industry or job position that the state statute does not exempt 
from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after the year of the observation. 
Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for natural log of per capita income, 
unemployment rate, percentage of female population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of 
male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percentage tax rate (state and local 
taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, state 
population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the poverty 
level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 4 Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis for the Impact of 
Regulation on Wages Using Alternate Definition of Exempt 
This appendix includes empirical results for the regulation-level, years-of-regulation, and 
regulation-strictness models for DNs and SWs using an alternate definition of exempt.  In the 
body of Chapter 4, the exempt category is defined as follows: In states that regulate the 
occupation by the year 2000, the exempt category includes individuals who work in an industry 
or job position that the state statute exempts from regulation, even if regulation was enacted after 
the year of the observation.   In states that do not regulate the occupation by the year 2000, there 
are no observations in the exempt category.  However, in this appendix, the alternate definition 
of the exempt category is defined as follows: An observation is exempt only if the state regulates 
the occupation in the observation year and the state statute exempts the individual’s industry or 
job position.  With this definition, no observations in a state are exempt from regulation unless 
regulation is in effect in the state.  This leaves more observations in the dataset for the years prior 
to regulation taking effect.  Summary statistics and empirical results for this alternate definition 
of exempt are included in this appendix.  Each table in the appendix refers to the corresponding 
table in the body of Chapter 4. 
 Comparing the results in this appendix to those in the body of Chapter 4, I find very 
similar empirical results for the two definitions of exempt.  There are some differences worth 
noting.  First, for the alternate definition of exempt used in this appendix, the selected IV for the 
absence of regulation variable has enough power to be used in the model for the effect of the 
natural log of years of regulation named licensure on hourly wages of DNs, and the resulting 
2SLS (with FE) coefficient in Table 4A.14 (.240) is highly significant.  However, the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is only 10.20, just barely above the minimum value of 10, 
which means that the IV is weak and the estimated coefficient may not be correct.  In Table 4.16 
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in the body of Chapter 4, the IV does not have enough power and a 2SLS coefficient is not 
estimated for the effect of the natural log of years of regulation named licensure on hourly wages 
of DNs.  Second, while the magnitude and signs of the estimated coefficients are similar with the 
two definitions of exempt, more estimated coefficients are statistically significant for the 
alternate definition of exempt in this appendix.  This is true for quite a few models.  Since the 
alternate definition of exempt used in this appendix keeps more observations and many of those 
observations are from before regulation takes effect, it is possible that the models with the 
alternate definition of exempt find a more significant change in wages due to regulation.  
However, given that the individuals who are kept in the dataset due to the alternate definition of 
exempt should not be affected by regulation, the additional significance resulting from including 
them in the models tends to obscure the effect of regulation on the wages of individuals who are 
not exempt from regulation.  Therefore, the empirical results in the body of Chapter 4 are 
preferred.  
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Table 4A.1: Summary Statistics for Dietitians and Nutritionists – Work and Wage Variables 
(compare to Table 4.1) 
 
 
Males and Females 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 7.42% 6.64% 6.96% 6.97% 
Females 92.58% 93.36% 93.04% 93.03% 
 
Part Time Workers (35 or fewer hours per week) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 11.46% 12.07% 16.67% 13.55% 
Females 24.05% 29.29% 31.11% 28.53% 
All Observations 25.06% 30.51% 32.19% 29.65% 
 
Institutional Employment (Hospitals or Educational Institutions) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hospitals 61.25% 52.57% 42.14% 51.15% 
Educational Institutions 7.66% 5.84% 3.83% 5.60% 
Totals 68.91% 58.41% 45.97% 56.75% 
 
Average Ratio of DN Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– All Observations In Professional Dataset 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage 0.7942 0.7755 0.7598 0.7749 
Annual Wage 0.7398 0.6971 0.6965 0.7085 
 
Average Ratio of DN Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– Just Observations Subject to Any Regulation 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage - 0.7774 0.7625 0.7678 
Annual Wage - 0.6880 0.7026 0.6974 
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Table 4A.2: Summary Statistics for Social Workers - Work and Wage Variables (compare to 
Table 4.2) 
 
 
Males and Females 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 38.04% 31.80% 21.63% 29.45% 
Females 61.96% 68.20% 78.37% 70.55% 
 
Part Time Workers (35 or fewer hours per week) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Males 13.26% 12.38% 11.44% 12.40% 
Females 19.41% 19.90% 18.13% 19.09% 
All Observations 23.19% 23.41% 19.98% 21.88% 
 
Institutional Employment (Hospitals or Educational Institutions) 
 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hospitals 10.94% 11.56% 13.45% 12.14% 
Educational Institutions 5.68% 5.14% 6.36% 5.76% 
Totals 16.62% 16.70% 19.81% 17.90% 
 
Average Ratio of SW Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– All Observations In Professional Dataset 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage 0.7742 0.7430 0.6818 0.7272 
Annual Wage 0.7676 0.7277 0.6634 0.7130 
 
Average Ratio of SW Wages to Average Wages with a Bachelor’s Degree in the State 
– Just Observations Subject to Any Regulation 
Wage Measure 1980 1990 2000 All Years 
Hourly Wage 0.7708 0.7451 0.6779 0.7094 
Annual Wage 0.7512 0.7233 0.6664 0.6938 
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Table 4A.3: Summary Statistics for Dietitians and Nutritionists – Individual Demographic 
Variables (compare to Table 4.3) 
Census Year Number  
Highest Degree 
Earned Number  
Place of Work 
State Number 
1980 1,293  Bachelors 2,841  Arkansas 14 
1990 1,748  Masters 1,570  California 550 
2000 1,723  Professional 234  Colorado 68 
   Doctorate 119  Connecticut 72 
Sex Number     Delaware 19 
Female 4,432  Place of Work Number  Florida 121 
Male 332  Metropolitan Area 3,158  Georgia 107 
   Non-Metropolitan Area 1,606  Hawaii 28 
Age Range Number     Idaho 23 
19 0  Industry Group Number  Illinois 192 
20 – 24 374  Agriculture 15  Indiana 127 
25 - 29 901  Mining 0  Iowa 69 
30 - 34 830  Construction 2  Kansas 63 
35 - 39 694  Manufacturing 2  Kentucky 67 
40 - 44 609  Wholesale Trade 79  Louisiana 51 
45 - 49 502  Retail Trade 42  Maine 15 
50 - 54 362  Transportation and 
Warehousing 
47 
 Maryland 92 
55 - 59 272   Massachusetts 134 
60 - 64 125  Utilities 2  Michigan 179 
65 - 69 55  Information and 
Communications 
3 
 Minnesota 93 
70 - 74 24   Mississippi 37 
75 - 79 8  Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate, and 
Rental and Leasing 
8 
 Missouri 123 
80 - 84 4   Montana 13 
85 - 89 3   Nebraska 48 
90 - 94 1  Professional, 
Scientific, 
Management, 
Administrative, and 
Waste Management 
73 
 Nevada 27 
Mean Age 38.37   New Hampshire 28 
    New Jersey 187 
Number of 
Children Aged 
Less Than 5 Years Number 
  
New Mexico 28 
 Educational Services 268  New York 497 
 Health Services (not 
Hospitals) 
1,065 
 North Carolina 82 
0 3,965   North Dakota 17 
1 583  Hospitals 2,438  Ohio 242 
2 199  Social Services 189  Oklahoma 55 
3 17  Arts, Entertainment, 
Recreation, 
Accommodations, and 
Food Services 
117 
 Oregon 62 
4 0   Pennsylvania 255 
    Rhode Island 29 
Marital Status Number   South Carolina 48 
Married 3,162  Other Services 
(Except Public 
Administration) 135 
 South Dakota 13 
Not Married 1,602 
  
Tennessee 34 
   Public Administration 279  Texas 305 
Race Number  Armed Forces 0  Utah 43 
White 4,059  Unemployed 0  Vermont 13 
Black 304     Virginia 106 
Asian 334  Place of Work State Number  Washington 88 
Other 67  Alabama 46  West Virginia 32 
   Alaska 11  Wisconsin 141 
Total 4,764  Arizona 61  Wyoming 9 
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Table 4A.4: Summary Statistics for Dietitians and Nutritionists – Regulation Variables (compare 
to Table 4.4) 
 
 
Regulation Type 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 100% 56.01% 21.01% 55.29% 
Title Protection 0% 13.10% 14.97% 10.22% 
Certification 0% 16.48% 30.82% 17.19% 
Licensure  0% 14.42% 33.20% 17.30% 
 
Regulation Level 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 1,293 979 362 2,634 
Any Regulation 0 769 1,361 2,130 
Regulation that is Named Licensure 0 471 739 1,210 
Licensure (with Practice Restriction) 0 252 572 824 
 
Years of Regulation 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
For the 2,130 observations subject to any regulation:     
years of any regulation 8.94 4.78 1 17 
square of years of any regulation 102.70 95.85 1 289 
natural log of years of any regulation 2.02 0.64 0 2.83 
For the 1,210 observations subject to regulation named 
licensure: 
    
years of regulation named licensure 8.34 4.81 1 16 
square of years of regulation named licensure 92.32 88.14 1 256 
natural log of years of regulation named licensure 1.91 0.71 0 2.77 
For the 824 observations subject to licensure:     
years of licensure 7.32 4.27 1 14 
square of years of licensure 71.84 65.15 1 196 
natural log of years of licensure 1.75 0.78 0 2.64 
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Table 4A.5: Summary Statistics for Social Workers – Individual Demographic Variables 
(compare to Table 4.6) 
Census Year Number  
Highest Degree 
Earned Number  
Place of Work 
State Number 
1980 12,613  Bachelors 27,501  Arkansas 210 
1990 17,370  Masters 19,461  California 5,284 
2000 19,077  Professional 1,163  Colorado 710 
   Doctorate 935  Connecticut 992 
Sex Number     Delaware 146 
Female 34,612  Place of Work Number  Florida 2,308 
Male 14,448  Metropolitan Area 31,935  Georgia 1,216 
   Non-Metropolitan Area 17,125  Hawaii 179 
Age Range Number     Idaho 155 
19 3  Industry Group Number  Illinois 2,545 
20 – 24 2,866  Agriculture 9  Indiana 936 
25 - 29 8,579  Mining 1  Iowa 574 
30 - 34 8,443  Construction 14  Kansas 482 
35 - 39 7,327  Manufacturing 24  Kentucky 341 
40 - 44 6,736  Wholesale Trade 47  Louisiana 751 
45 - 49 5,676  Retail Trade 13  Maine 331 
50 - 54 4,472  Transportation and 
Warehousing 
52 
 Maryland 1,048 
55 - 59 2,813   Massachusetts 1,168 
60 - 64 1,443  Utilities 18  Michigan 2,188 
65 - 69 442  Information and 
Communications 
19 
 Minnesota 1,178 
70 - 74 171   Mississippi 290 
75 - 79 66  Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate, and 
Rental and Leasing 
379 
 Missouri 667 
80 - 84 26   Montana 131 
85 - 89 3   Nebraska 251 
90 - 94 1  Professional, 
Scientific, 
Management, 
Administrative, and 
Waste Management 
508 
 Nevada 126 
Mean Age 39.09   New Hampshire 219 
    New Jersey 1,645 
Number of 
Children Aged 
Less Than 5 Years Number 
  
New Mexico 273 
 Educational Services 2,824  New York 6,442 
 Health Services (not 
Hospitals) 
3,884 
 North Carolina 1,402 
0 41,861   North Dakota 97 
1 5,771  Hospitals 5,956  Ohio 2,167 
2 1,335  Social Services 20,813  Oklahoma 286 
3 92  Arts, Entertainment, 
Recreation, 
Accommodations, and 
Food Services 
95 
 Oregon 639 
4 1   Pennsylvania 2,830 
    Rhode Island 299 
Marital Status Number   South Carolina 631 
Married 27,935  Other Services 
(Except Public 
Administration) 1,524 
 South Dakota 145 
Not Married 21,125 
  
Tennessee 823 
   Public Administration 12,880  Texas 2,447 
Race Number  Armed Forces 0  Utah 316 
White 39,372  Unemployed 0  Vermont 158 
Black 7,300     Virginia 174 
Asian 904  Place of Work State Number  Washington 1,035 
Other 1,484  Alabama 681  West Virginia 290 
   Alaska 111  Wisconsin 1,056 
Total 49,060  Arizona 627  Wyoming 60 
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Table 4A.6: Summary Statistics for Social Workers – Regulation Variables (compare to Table 
4.7) 
 
 
Regulation Type 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 85.49% 69.25% 49.67% 65.81% 
Title Protection 1.95% 8.66% 10.17% 7.52% 
Licensure  12.56% 22.10% 40.16% 26.67% 
 
Regulation Level 
 
1980 1990 2000 
All 
Years 
No Regulation 10,783 12,028 9,475 32,286 
Any Regulation 1,830 5,342 9.602 16,774 
Regulation that is Named Licensure 1,784 4.110 6,557 12,451 
Licensure (with Practice Restriction) 1,584 3,838 7,622 13,084 
 
Years of Regulation 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
For the 16,774 observations subject to any regulation:     
years of any regulation 11.62 9.70 0 43 
square of years of any regulation 229.21 349.66 0 1849 
natural log of years of any regulation 1.99 1.13 0 3.76 
For the 12,451 observations subject to regulation named 
licensure: 
    
years of regulation named licensure 13.32 10.39 0 43 
square of years of regulation named licensure 285.47 387.85 0 1849 
natural log of years of regulation named licensure 2.12 1.14 0 3.76 
For the 13,084 observations subject to licensure:     
years of licensure 12.63 9.98 0 43 
square of years of licensure 259.29 379.14 0 1849 
natural log of years of licensure 2.11 1.09 0 3.76 
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Table 4A.7: Effect of Any Regulation on Wages of Dietitians and Nutritionists (compare to 
Table 4.9) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Any  -.015 -.024 .057 -.006 .008 .034 
Regulation (.026) (.023) (.072) (.031) (.041) (.086) 
Year 1990 -.120*** -.102 -.163*** -.131** -.078 -.155** 
 (.030) (.062) (.054) (.051) (.101) (.071) 
Year 2000 -.097* -.106 -.181* -.172* -.107 -.218* 
 (.0520) (.113) (.100) (.088) (.182) (.131) 
Female -.030 -.027 -.033 -.252*** -.247*** -.253*** 
 (.027) (.028) (.027) (.041) (.042) (.040) 
Age .038*** .037*** .037*** .080*** .080*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .041*** .042*** .042*** -.167*** -.168*** -.167*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
Married .037* .037* .036* -.066** -.069** -.066*** 
 (.019) (.020) (.019) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
White .163*** .163*** .164*** .228*** .229*** .229*** 
 (.060) (.059) (.058) (.084) (.084) (.082) 
Black .168*** .163*** .169*** .358*** .352*** .359*** 
 (.060) (.060) (.058) (.090) (.091) (.088) 
Asian .134** .123* .136** .242*** .233*** .243*** 
 (.064) (.062) (.063) (.083) (.082) (.082) 
Master’s .076*** .075*** .077*** .062*** .061*** .063*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.014) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .023 .024 .022 .041 .045 .041 
Degree (.036) (.038) (.036) (.041) (.042) (.040) 
Doctorate .214*** .226*** .214*** .329*** .344*** .330*** 
 (.053) (.053) (.052) (.063) (.063) (.062) 
Metropolitan  .037*** .032** .039*** .076*** .071** .077*** 
Area (.013) (.013) (.012) (.026) (.028) (.026) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 
K-P F   14.18   14.18 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset. Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4A.8: Effect of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of Dietitians and Nutritionists 
(compare to Table 4.10) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Regulation  -.027 -.041 .041 -.031 -.023 .024 
Named 
Licensure 
(.023) (.030) (.052) (.027) (.044) (.061) 
Year 1990 -.116*** -.101* -.149*** -.120** -.061 -.146*** 
 (.028) (.059) (.036) (.048) (.097) (.054) 
Year 2000 -.090* -.010 -.151** -.151* -.070 -.200** 
 (.048) (.110) (.061) (.086) (.176) (.096) 
Female -.030 -.028 -.032 -.251*** -.246*** -.253*** 
 (.027) (.028) (.027) (.040) (.041) (.040) 
Age .038*** .037*** .037*** .080*** .080*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0009*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .041*** .042*** .041*** -.167*** -.168*** -.167*** 
Children 
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.010) (.011) (.026) (.025) (.025) 
Married .037* .037* .037* -.066** -.069** -.066*** 
 (.019) (.020) (.019) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
White .164*** .164*** .162*** .229*** .230*** .228*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.060) (.084) (.083) (.083) 
Black .170*** .164*** .165*** .361*** .353*** .356*** 
 (.060) (.060) (.060) (.090) (.090) (.090) 
Asian .135** .124** .134** .243*** .234*** .242*** 
 (.064) (.062) (.064) (.083) (.082) (.083) 
Master’s .076*** .074*** .077*** .062*** .060*** .063*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.014) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .023 .023 .023 .041 .046 .041 
Degree (.036) (.038) (.036) (.041) (.042) (.040) 
Doctorate .215*** .227*** .211*** .331*** .343*** .328*** 
 (.052) (.053) (.052) (.063) (.063) (.063) 
Metropolitan  .037*** .032** .039*** .075*** .071** .077*** 
Area (.013) (.013) (.012) (.026) (.028) (.026) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 
K-P F   38.56   38.56 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4A.9: Effect of Licensure on Wages of Dietitians and Nutritionists (compare to Table 
4.11) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Licensure -.008 -.043 .056 -.009 -.016 .033 
 (.027) (.036) (.072) (.032) (.052) (.083) 
Year 1990 -.127*** -.101* -.143*** -.132*** -.065 -.143*** 
 (.026) (.060) (.032) (.047) (.096) (.051) 
Year 2000 -.110** -.104 -.141** -.175** -.081 -.195** 
 (.044) (.109) (.057) (.084) (.174) (.091) 
Female -.030 -.028 -.033 -.252*** -.246*** -.253*** 
 (.027) (.028) (.027) (.040) (.041) (.039) 
Age .038*** .037*** .037*** .080*** .080*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .041*** .042*** .042*** -.167*** -.168*** -.167*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
Married .037* .037* .037* -.066** -.069** -0.66*** 
 (.019) (.020) (.019) (.026) (.026) (.025) 
White .163*** .164*** .159*** .229*** .230*** .226*** 
 (.060) (.059) (.061) (.083) (.084) (.084) 
Black .169*** .163*** .164*** .359*** .352*** .356*** 
 (.060) (.060) (.061) (.090) (.090) (.090) 
Asian .135* .124* .132** .243*** .233*** .241*** 
 (.064) (.062) (.065) (.083) (.082) (.083) 
Master’s .076*** .074*** .077*** .062*** .061*** .063*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.014) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .023 .024 .021 .042 .046 .040 
Degree (.036) (.038) (.035) (.041) (.042) (.041) 
Doctorate .214*** .226*** .212*** .330*** .343*** .328*** 
 (.053) (.053) (.052) (.063) (.063) (.063) 
Metropolitan  .037*** .032** .039*** .076*** .071** .077*** 
Area (.013) (.013) (.012) (.026) (.028) (.026) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 
K-P F   15.85   15.85 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4A.10: Effect of Any Regulation on Wages of Social Workers (compare to Table 4.12) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Any  -.006 -.025 -.017 -.042** 
Regulation (.019) (.017) (.020) (.018) 
Year 1990 -.161*** -.214*** -.124*** -.202*** 
 (.020) (.029) (.023) (.032) 
Year 2000 -.226*** -.336*** -.162*** -.350*** 
 (.042) (.063) (.044) (.075) 
Female -.058*** -.058*** -.176*** -.176*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Age .049*** .049*** .087*** .087*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .035*** .035*** -.020*** -.020*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .034*** .034*** .004 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
White -.019* -.015 -.008 -.006 
 (.011) (.012) (.014) (.014) 
Black .019** .024** .047*** .048** 
 (.009) (.011) (.018) (.018) 
Asian -.042** -.036** -.055** -.045 
 (.017) (.015) (.025) (.027) 
Master’s .138*** .137*** .117*** .117*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .104*** .103*** .060*** .060*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .122*** .1251*** .112*** .115*** 
 (.015) (.014) (.018) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .058*** .057*** .063*** .064*** 
Area (.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) 
 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.11: Effect of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of Social Workers (compare to 
Table 4.13) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
Regulation  .006 -.007 .026 -.005 -.024* .008 
Named  
Licensure 
(.021) (.016) (.037) (.022) (.014) (.041) 
Year 1990 -.166*** -.223*** -.175*** -.131*** -.212*** -.137*** 
 (.020) (.028) (.026) (.024) (.033) (.032) 
Year 2000 -.238*** -.358*** -.258*** -.178*** -.374*** -.191*** 
 (.042) (.061) (.059) (.044) (.075) (.068) 
Female -.058*** -.058*** -.059*** -.176*** -.177*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Age .049*** .049*** .049*** .087*** .087*** .087*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .035*** .035*** .035*** -.020*** -.020** -.020*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.007) 
Married .034*** .034*** .034*** .004 .003 .004 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
White -.020* -.016 -.021* -.008 -.007 -.009 
 (.010) (.012) (.011) (.013) (.014) (.014) 
Black .018* .023** .016 .047** .047** .045** 
 (.009) (.011) (.010) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Asian -.042** -.036** -.042** -.055** -.044 -.056** 
 (.017) (.015) (.017) (.025) (.028) (.025) 
Master’s .138*** .137*** .137*** .117*** .117*** .117*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.005) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .103*** .103*** .103*** .060*** .059*** .060*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.014) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .122*** .125*** .121*** .111*** .115*** .111*** 
 (.015) (.014) (.015) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .058*** .057*** .057*** .062*** .063*** .062*** 
Area (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.009) 
 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No Yes No 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
K-P F   10.81   10.81 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4A.12: Effect of Licensure on Wages of Social Workers (compare to Table 4.14) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Licensure -.004 -.015 -.012 -.031* 
 (.020) (.017) (.021) (.018) 
Year 1990 -.162*** -.223*** -.129*** -.216*** 
 (.020) (.027) (.023) (.031) 
Year 2000 -.229*** -.353*** -.173*** -.374*** 
 (.040) (.060) (.042) (.072) 
Female -.058*** -.058*** -.176*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Age .049*** .049*** .087*** .087*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .035*** .035*** -.020*** -.020*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .034*** .034*** .004 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
White -.019* -.016 -.008 -.007 
 (.011) (.012) (.014) (.014) 
Black .019** .023** .047*** .048** 
 (.009) (.011) (.018) (.018) 
Asian -.042** -.036** -.056** -.044 
 (.017) (.015) (.025) (.028) 
Master’s .138*** .137*** .117*** .117*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .104*** .109*** .060*** .060*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .122*** .125*** .112*** .115*** 
 (.015) (.014) (.018) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .058*** .057*** .063*** .064*** 
Area (.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) 
 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.13: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Any Regulation on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists (compare to Table 4.15) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .138*** .081* .104* .084 
Regulation (.044) (.041) (.057) (.067) 
ln(Years of .061*** .037* .043 .063* 
Any 
Regulation) 
(.020) (.020) (.028) (.035) 
Female -.027 -.027 -.248*** -.247*** 
 (.027) (.028) (.039) (.041) 
Age .036*** .037*** .079*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .037*** .041*** -.171*** -.169*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.010) (.010) (.025) (.025) 
Married .036* .038* -.066** -.067** 
 (.019) (.019) (.026) (.026) 
White .159*** .161*** .225*** .228*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.083) (.084) 
Black .173*** .163*** .363*** .352*** 
 (.058) (.060) (.089) (.091) 
Asian .131** .122* .242*** .232*** 
 (.064) (.062) (.082) (.082) 
Master’s .079*** .075*** .065*** .061*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .027 .025 .046 .045 
Degree (.037) (.038) (.041) (.042) 
Doctorate .218*** .228*** .333*** .344*** 
 (.053) (.054) (.064) (.064) 
Metropolitan  .018 .029** .059** .069** 
Area (.011) (.012) (.024) (.027) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.14: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of 
Dietitians and Nutritionists (compare to Table 4.16) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
No  .152*** .091* .637*** .134** .091 -.016 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.050) (.048) (.198) (.063) (.079) (.281) 
ln(Years of .059*** .032 .240*** .045 .042 .001 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure) 
(.022) (.022) (.084) (.030) (.039) (.110) 
Female -.027 -.027 -.022 -.248*** -.246*** -.247*** 
 (.028) (.028) (.028) (.039) (.041) (.040) 
Age .036*** .037*** .036*** .079*** .080*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .036*** .040*** .036*** -.171*** -.170*** -.169*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.025) (.025) (.024) 
Married .035* .037* .040** -.067** -.068** -.069*** 
 (.019) (.019) (.019) (.026) (.026) (.025) 
White .158** .162*** .164*** .225*** .229*** .228*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.059) (.082) (.083) (.082) 
Black .171*** .163*** .163*** .364*** .352*** .352*** 
 (.059) (.060) (.059) (.089) (.090) (.088) 
Asian .131** .123* .130** .242*** .233*** .231*** 
 (.064) (.062) (.063) (.081) (.081) (.080) 
Master’s .078*** .075*** .069*** .064*** .061*** .062*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.014) ( .021) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .027 .025 .020 .046 .046 .046 
Degree (.037) (.038) (.039) (.041) (.042) (.041) 
Doctorate .220*** .228*** .222*** .335*** .343*** .335*** 
 (.053) (.054) (.054) (.064) (.063) (.061) 
Metropolitan  .017 .028** .025* .058** .069** .069*** 
Area (.012) (.012) (.013) (.024) (.027) (.026) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 4764 
K-P F   10.20   10.20 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4A.15: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Licensure on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists (compare to Table 4.17) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .129** .094* .114* .093 
Licensure (.054) (.054) (.065) (.085) 
ln(Years of .066** .030 .055 .049 
 Licensure) (.027) (.023) (.033) (.039) 
Female -.029 -.028 -.250*** -.247*** 
 (.027) (.028) (.039) (.041) 
Age .036*** .037*** .078*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .036*** .040*** -.172*** -.068*** 
Children 
< 5 Yrs 
(.010) (.010) (.025) (.026) 
Married .036* .037* -.066** -.068** 
 (.019) (.019) (.026) (.026) 
White .154** .162*** .222*** .228*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.082) (.083) 
Black .169*** .162*** .361*** .351*** 
 (.058) (.060) (.088) (.090) 
Asian .128* .121* .240*** .231*** 
 (.063) (.062) (.081) (.081) 
Master’s .080*** .075*** .065*** .061*** 
Degree (.013) (.014) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .028 .025 .047 .046 
Degree (.037) (.038) (.041) (.043) 
Doctorate .221*** .228*** .336*** .344*** 
 (.054) (.054) (.064) (.063) 
Metropolitan  .017 .028** .058** .070** 
Area (.012) (.012) (.024) (.027) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.16: Effect of Years of Any Regulation and Years-Squared on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists (compare to Table 4.18) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .119** .069 .122 .048 
Regulation (.059) (.055) (.075) (.095) 
Years of .017 .010 .021 .014 
Any 
Regulation 
(.012) (.011) (.017) (.019) 
Years of  -.0004 -.0003 -.0008 -.0003 
Any 
Regulation -
Squared 
(.0006) (.0005) (.0008) (.0010) 
Female -.027 -.027 -.249*** -.247*** 
 (.027) (.028) (.040) (.042) 
Age .036*** .037*** .079*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .037*** .041*** -.171*** -.169*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.010) (.010) (.025) (.025) 
Married .036* .038* -.066** -.068** 
 (.019) (.019) (.026) (.026) 
White .160** .162*** .222** .229*** 
 (.019) (.059) (.084) (.084) 
Black .174*** .163*** .360*** .353*** 
 (.060) (.060) (.090) (.091) 
Asian .132** .122* .240*** .233*** 
 (.064) (.062) (.082) (.082) 
Master’s .079*** .075*** .065*** .061*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .027 .025 .046 .045 
Degree (.037) (.038) (.041) (.042) 
Doctorate .217*** .228*** .333*** .343*** 
 (.053) (.054) (.064) (.064) 
Metropolitan  .019* .029** .059** .070** 
Area (.011) (.012) (.024) (.027) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.17: Effect of Years of Regulation Named Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of 
Dietitians and Nutritionists (compare to Table 4.19) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No Regulation .150** .079 .180** .118 
Named 
Licensure 
(.072) (.071) (.087) (.113) 
Years of .021 .008 .033 .026 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.017) (.018) (.022) (.030) 
Years of  -.0007 -.0002 -.0015 -.0012 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure -
Squared 
(.0008) (.0009) (.0011) (.0015) 
Female -.027 -.027 -.249*** -.247*** 
 (.028) (.028) (.039) (.041) 
Age .036*** .037*** .079*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .036*** .040*** -.172*** -.170*** 
Children < 5 
Yrs 
(.010) (.010) (.024) (.025) 
Married .035* .037* -.066** -.068** 
 (.019) (.019) (.026) (.026) 
White .158** .163*** .222*** .228*** 
 (.060) (.059) (.082) (.083) 
Black .172*** .163*** .361*** .351*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.089) (.090) 
Asian .131** .123* .239*** .232*** 
 (.064) (.062) (.080) (.081) 
Master’s .078*** .075*** .064*** .061*** 
Degree (.014) (.014) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .027 .025 .045 .045 
Degree (.037) (.038) (.041) (.042) 
Doctorate .220*** .228*** .337*** .344*** 
 (.053) (.054) (.064) (.064) 
Metropolitan  .018 .028** .058** .069** 
Area (.012) (.012) (.025) (.027) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry Groups Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.18: Effect of Years of Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists (compare to Table 4.20) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .177** .128 .199* .147 
Licensure (.077) (.092) (.104) (.142) 
Years of .045* .025 .057* .040 
Licensure (.023) (.029) (.033) (.046) 
Years of  -.002 -.001 -.003 -.002 
Licensure -
Squared 
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.003) 
Female -.030 -.028 -.251*** -.247*** 
 (.027) (.028) (.040) (.041) 
Age .036*** .037*** .079*** .080*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0008*** -.0008*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of  .035*** .040*** -.172*** -.170*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.010) (.010) (.024) (.025) 
Married .036* .037* -.066** -.068** 
 (.019) (.019) (.026) (.026) 
White .154** .161*** .221*** .227*** 
 (.059) (.059) (.082) (.083) 
Black .168*** .162*** .359*** .351*** 
 (.058) (.060) (.088) (.090) 
Asian .127** .121* .239*** .231*** 
 (.063) (.062) (.081) (.081) 
Master’s .080*** .075*** .066*** .061*** 
Degree (.013) (.014) (.021) (.021) 
Professional  .028 .025 .047 .046 
Degree (.037) (.038) (.041) (.043) 
Doctorate .221*** .229*** .336*** .345*** 
 (.054) (.054) (.064) (.063) 
Metropolitan  .017 .028** .058** .070** 
Area (.012) (.012) (.024) (.027) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 4764 4764 4764 4764 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the DNs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.19: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Any Regulation on Wages of Social Workers 
(compare to Table 4.21) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .047* .047*** .071*** .070*** 
Regulation (.024) (.017) (.024) (.017) 
ln(Years of .011 .009 .020*** .014 
Any 
Regulation) 
(.007) (.010) (.007) (.011) 
Female -.059*** -.059*** -.177*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Age .047*** .048*** .085*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.022*** -.020*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.007) (.008) 
Married .033*** .034*** .033 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
White -.014 -.015 -.005 -.0060 
 (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) 
Black .026*** .025** .051*** .049** 
 (.009) (.011) (.016) (.018) 
Asian -.035** -.036** -.051** -.045 
 (.015) (.015) (.025) (.027) 
Master’s .1448*** .140*** .123*** .119*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .122*** .108*** .074*** .064*** 
Degree (.016) (.014) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .146*** .131*** .131*** .120*** 
 (.016) (.015) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .040*** .053*** .049*** .060*** 
Area (.009) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.20: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Regulation Named Licensure on Wages of Social 
Workers (compare to Table 4.22) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS 
No  .022 .036** .133** .047 .060*** .105 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.032) (.015) (.064) (.033) (.016) (.069) 
ln(Years of .004 .005 .021 .013 .011 .018 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure) 
(.009) (.013) (.018) (.009) (.013) (.018) 
Female -.059*** -.059*** -.058*** -.177*** -.177*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Age .047*** .048*** .048*** .085*** .086*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0004*** -.0009*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** .035*** -.022*** -.020** -.020*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.007) 
Married .033*** .034*** .034*** .003 .003 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
White -.014 -.015 -.014 -.005 -.006 -.006 
 (.011) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.014) (.014) 
Black .027*** .025** .025** .053*** .048** .049*** 
 (.009) (.011) (.010) (.017) (.018) (.018) 
Asian -.034** -.036** -.036** -.050** -.045 -.045* 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.025) (.028) (.027) 
Master’s .145*** .140*** .139*** .123*** .119*** .119*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .122*** .108*** .109*** .075*** .064*** .064*** 
Degree (.015) (.014) (.014) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .147*** .131*** .130*** .132*** .119*** .119*** 
 (.016) (.015) (.015) (.019) (.018) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .039*** .052*** .053*** .047*** .060*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
K-P F   12.16   12.16 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.  K-P F = Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
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Table 4A.21: Effect of Natural Log of Years of Licensure on Wages of Social Workers (compare 
to Table 4.23) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .029 .024 .054* .051*** 
Licensure (.0301) (.016) (.031) (.017) 
ln(Years of .006 .004 .016* .010 
 Licensure) (.008) (.011) (.009) (.011) 
Female -.059*** -.059*** -.177*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Age .047*** .048*** .085*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.022*** -.020*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .033*** .034*** .003 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
White -.014 -.015 -.005 -.006 
 (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .025** .053*** .049** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.018) 
Asian -.035** -.036** -.051** -.045 
 (.016) (.015) (.025) (.028) 
Master’s .145*** .140*** .123*** .119*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .122*** .108*** .075*** .064*** 
Degree (.015) (.014) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .147*** .131*** .1320*** .120*** 
 (.016) (.015) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .039*** .052*** .047*** .060*** 
Area (.009) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.22: Effect of Years of Any Regulation and Years-Squared on Wages of Social Workers 
(compare to Table 4.24) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .042* .044** .060** .063*** 
Regulation (.024) (.017) (.024) (.019) 
Years of .002 .002 .004 .002 
Any 
Regulation 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) 
Years of  -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 
Any 
Regulation -
Squared 
(.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) 
Female -.059*** -.059*** -.177*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Age .047*** .048*** .085*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.022*** -.020*** 
Children 
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.007) (.008) 
Married .033*** .034*** .003 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
White -.014 -.015 -.005 -.006 
 (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .025** .052*** .049** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.018) 
Asian -.034** -.036** -.050** -.045 
 (.015) (.015) (.025) (.027) 
Master’s .145*** .140*** .123*** .119*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .122*** .108*** .074*** .064*** 
Degree (.016) (.014) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .146*** .132*** .131*** .120*** 
 (.016) (.015) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .040*** .053*** .049*** .060*** 
Area (.009) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset. Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.23: Effect of Years of Regulation Named Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of 
Social Workers (compare to Table 4.25) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .017 .032** .036 .051*** 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.032) (.015) (.032) (.016) 
Years of  -.0001 .0005 .0011 .0006 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure 
(.0020) (.0029) (.0021) (.0030) 
Years of  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Regulation 
Named 
Licensure -
Squared 
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) 
Female -.059*** -.059*** -.177*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Age .047*** .048*** .085*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.022*** -.020** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Married .033*** .034*** .003 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
White -.014 -.016 -.005 -.007 
 (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .024** .052*** .048** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.018) 
Asian -.034** -.036** -.050** -.045 
 (.015) (.015) (.025) (.027) 
Master’s .145*** .140*** .123*** .119*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .122*** .108*** .075*** .064*** 
Degree (.015) (.014) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .146*** .131*** .131*** .119*** 
 (.016) (.015) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .039*** .052*** .047*** .060*** 
Area (.010) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percenage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.24: Effect of Years of Licensure and Years-Squared on Wages of Social Workers 
(compare to Table 4.26) 
 Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Wage Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Annual Wage 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
No  .024 .020 .042 .040** 
Licensure (.029) (.016) (.029) (.018) 
Years of  .0005 .0003 .0017 .0003 
Licensure (.0020) (.0027) (.0022) (.0028) 
Years of  .0000 .0000 -.0000 .0000 
Licensure -
Squared 
(.0000) (.0001) (.0000) (.0001) 
Female -.059*** -.059*** -.177*** -.177*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Age .047*** .048*** .085*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0009*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Number of  .033*** .035*** -.022*** -.020*** 
Children  
< 5 Yrs 
(.004) (.004) (.007) (.008) 
Married .033*** .034*** .003 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
White -.014 -.016 -.005 -.007 
 (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) 
Black .027*** .024** .052*** .048** 
 (.009) (.011) (.017) (.018) 
Asian -.034** -.036** -.051** -.045 
 (.016) (.015) (.025) (.027) 
Master’s .145*** .140*** .123*** .119*** 
Degree (.005) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Professional  .122*** .108*** .075*** .064*** 
Degree (.015) (.014) (.019) (.019) 
Doctorate .146*** .131*** .132*** .120*** 
 (.016) (.015) (.019) (.018) 
Metropolitan  .039*** .052*** .047*** .060*** 
Area (.009) (.008) (.010) (.009) 
Other Control Variables 
Industry 
Groups 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous 
State 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
n 49,060 49,060 49,060 49,060 
 
Control for Industry Groups: Includes control for any industry group that includes more than 1% of the SWs in the 
dataset.  Control for Exogenous State Variables: Includes control for percentage of female population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of male population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, state average percent 
tax rate (state and local taxes), ratio of per capita state debt to per capita income, natural log of per capita state GDP, 
natural log of state population, percentage of state population on Medicare, percentage of state population below the 
poverty level, and percentage of state population living in urban areas. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4A.25: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Regulation-Strictness on Wages of Dietitians and 
Nutritionists (compare to Table 4.27) 
 (1) (2) 
 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log 
of Hourly Wage 
Dependent Variable = Natural  
Log of Annual Wage 
Regulation-Strictness Variables:   
Licensure .055 .135 
 (.065) (.086) 
Certification .065 .212** 
 (.069) (.085) 
Fraction of Board Comprised of DNs -.090 -.150** 
 (.059) (.057) 
Continuing Education Hours per Year .003 .009** 
 (.004) (.004) 
Practice Hours for Initial Credentials -.0014 .0001 
 (.0011) (.0014) 
Application Fee -.0002 .0003 
 (.0003) (.0004) 
Yearly Renewal Fee -.0002 -.0013 
 (.0006) (.0008) 
Year 2000 .137*** .004 
 (.043) (.061) 
Female -.002 -.201*** 
 (.045) (.070) 
Age .036*** .068*** 
 (.005) (.010) 
Age Squared -.0003*** -.0007*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
Number of Children Less than 5 Years .040*** -.160*** 
 (.011) (.031) 
Married .080*** -.032 
 (.023) (.032) 
White .1793** .266** 
 (.070) (.100) 
Black .200** .394*** 
 (.094) (.126) 
Asian .144* .226** 
 (.075) (.106) 
Master’s Degree .083*** .060 
 (.027) (.038) 
Professional Degree .008 -.011 
 (.052) (.062) 
Doctorate .217*** .291*** 
 (.078) (.106) 
Metropolitan Area .096*** .170*** 
 (.025) (.047) 
   
Other Control Variables   
Industry Groups Yes Yes 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No 
 
Number of States 40 40 
n 2130 2130 
 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 4A.26: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Regulation-Strictness on Wages of Social Workers 
(compare to Table 4.28) 
 (1) (2) 
 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log of 
Hourly Wage 
Dependent Variable = Natural  
Log of Annual Wage 
Regulation-Strictness Variables:   
Licensure -.041*** -.045** 
 (.015) (.021) 
Fraction of Board Comprised of SWs .063 .059 
 (.062) (.082) 
Continuing Education Hours per Year .004*** .006*** 
 (.001) (.001) 
Experience Hours for Initial Credentials .0000*** .0000*** 
 (.0000) (.0000) 
Application Fee .0002** .0001 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
Yearly Renewal Fee -.0003 -.0001 
 (.0007) (.0007) 
Bachelor’s Exam .010 .029 
 (.027) (.041) 
Year 1990 -.180*** -.125*** 
 (.022) (.026) 
Year 2000 -.258*** -.190*** 
 (.044) (.048) 
Female -.049*** -.164*** 
 (.004) (.016) 
Age .043*** .081*** 
 (.004) (.004) 
Age Squared -.0004*** -.0009*** 
 (.0000) (.0001) 
Number of Children Less than 5 Years .030*** -.024* 
 (.006) (.012) 
Married .047*** .012 
 (.007) (.011) 
White -.003 .031 
 (.018) (.025) 
Black .023 .077** 
 (.021) (.036) 
Asian -.083** -.154 
 (.039) (.093) 
Master’s Degree .138*** .124*** 
 (.007) (.009) 
Professional Degree .089* .068 
 (.046) (.055) 
Doctorate .130*** .178*** 
 (.033) (.054) 
Metropolitan Area .068*** .065*** 
 (.007) (.011) 
   
Other Control Variables   
Industry Groups Yes Yes 
Exogenous State Variables Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No 
 
Number of States 33 33 
n 16,774 16,774 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 5 Appendix: BRFSS Survey Questions for Health 
Indicators 
Because the exact questions in the BRFSS data change over time, data cleaning is necessary to 
include as many years for each health indicator as possible in the analysis.  For example, the 
health questions regarding an individual’s smoking habits have different possible responses in 
different survey years.  In the years 1984-1993, the question “Are you a smoker?” has five 
response choices: (1) current smoker, (2) former smoker, (3) never smoked, (4) irregular smoker, 
or (5) refuse to answer.  In the years 1994-1995, the same question has seven response choices:  
(1) current smoker – smoked all of the past 30 days, (2) current smoker – smoked 1-29 days in 
the past 30 days, (3) current smoker – smoked 0 days in past 30 days, (4) current smoker – in 
past 30 days unknown number of days smoked, (5) former smoker, (6) never smoked, or (7) 
refused to answer.  Finally, in the years 1996-2013, the same question has five response choices: 
(1) current smoker – smoke every day, (2) current – now smoke some days, (3) former smoker, 
(4) never smoked, or (5) don’t know or refused to answer. To make data from different years 
compatible, I create a dummy variable for smoker, where the value 1 means yes, the individual is 
currently a smoker; and the value 0 means no, the individual currently does not smoke.   
All of the other health indicators derived from the BRFSS dataset have similar definition 
issues and require the same type of data cleaning.  The BRFSS questions for each health 
indicator and the mapping of possible responses from different survey years to the values of the 
health indicator variable are included in this appendix.  
1. Body Mass Index (BMI) = an integer value between 12 and 69. 
 
2. Obese = a dummy equal to 1 when BMI is greater than or equal to 30 and equal to 0 
when BMI is less than 30. 
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3. Exerciser 
 
Table 5A.1: Mapping of BRFSS Survey Responses for Exercise to Exerciser Health Indicator 
Variable 
 
Survey Question = “Do you participate in any physical activity or 
exercise?” 
Exerciser Health 
Indicator Variable 
Values 
Years Possible Responses Yes No Drop 
1984-2013 yes x   
no  x  
don’t know/not sure   x 
refused   x 
 
 
4. High Blood Pressure 
 
Table 5A.2: Mapping of BRFSS Survey Responses for High Blood Pressure to High Blood 
Pressure Health Indicator Variable 
 
Survey Question = “Have you been told that you have high blood pressure?” High Blood 
Pressure Health 
Indicator Variable 
Values 
Years Possible Responses Yes No Drop 
1984-1992 no  x  
yes, by doctor x    
yes, by nurse x   
yes, by health professional x   
don’t know/not sure   x 
refused   x 
1993 - 2005, 
2007, 2009, 
2011, 2013 
yes x   
no  x  
don’t know/not sure   x 
refused   x 
Survey question for high blood pressure is not included in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. 
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5. High Cholesterol 
 
Table 5A.3: Mapping of BRFSS Survey Responses for High Cholesterol to High Cholesterol 
Health Indicator Variable 
 
Survey Question = “Have you been told that you have high cholesterol?” High Cholesterol 
Health Indicator 
Variable Values 
Years Possible Responses Yes No Drop 
1987,         1989 
- 2005, 2007, 
2009, 2011, 
2013 
yes x   
no  x  
don’t know   x 
refused   x 
1988 yes, by a doctor x   
yes, by a health professional x   
no  x  
don’t know/not sure   x 
Refused   x 
Survey question for high cholesterol is not included in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. 
 
6. Smoker 
 
Table 5A.4: Mapping of BRFSS Survey Responses for Smoking to Smoker Health Indicator 
Variable 
 
Survey Question = “Are you a smoker?” Smoker Health Indicator Variable Values 
Years Possible Responses Yes No Drop 
1984-1993 current smoker x   
former smoker  x  
never smoked  x  
irregular smoker x   
refuse to answer   x 
1994-1995 current smoker – smoked all of the past 30 
days 
x   
current smoker – smoked 1-29 days in the 
past 30 days 
x   
current smoker – smoked 0 days in the past 
30 days 
x   
current smoker – in the past 30 days 
unknown number of days smoked 
x   
former smoker  x  
never smoked  x  
refused to answer   x 
1996-2013 current smoker – smoke every day x   
current smoker – now smoke some days x   
former smoker  x  
never smoked  x  
don’t know or refused to answer   x 
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7. Number of Poor Mental Health Days = an integer value between 0 and 30. 
 
8. Natural Log of the Number of Poor Mental Health Days = a value calculated by 
ln(number of poor mental health days) for a dataset that includes only individuals who 
report having a positive number of poor mental health days. 
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